Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Neil Maune and Marcus Raichle formed a general partnership known as the Maune Raichle Law Firm, which later took out life insurance policies for each partner, naming the partnership as beneficiary. In 2011, Maune, Raichle, and three others established a new law firm, MRHFM, governed by an operating agreement containing an arbitration clause and a delegation provision referencing the American Arbitration Association rules. MRHFM took over premium payments for the life insurance policies, but only Raichle’s policy was amended to name MRHFM as beneficiary. After Maune’s death, the death benefit from his policy was paid to the original partnership, not MRHFM. The Estate of Neil Maune sued Raichle and the partnership, alleging wrongful retention of the insurance proceeds, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the partnership was not a party to the operating agreement and thus could not enforce its arbitration provision. The Estate argued that Maune and Raichle signed the agreement only as members and managers of MRHFM, not as partners of the original partnership, and that the claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and held that, under Missouri’s aggregate theory of partnerships, the partnership has no legal existence separate from its partners. Because Maune and Raichle were the only partners and signed the operating agreement in their individual capacities, they bound themselves and the partnership to the arbitration agreement. The Court further held that, due to the delegation provision, questions about the scope of the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Maune vs. Raichle" on Justia Law

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Amanda Mire was charged with driving while intoxicated. She filed two motions in the Circuit Court of Greene County: one to suppress statements she made after emergency medical personnel involuntarily administered a tranquilizing drug, and another to suppress the results of a blood test taken when she was unable to knowingly consent. After a hearing, the circuit court orally ruled in favor of Mire on both motions, finding that her statements and the blood test results should be suppressed due to her inability to knowingly and voluntarily consent while under the influence of the drug.On February 26, 2024, the circuit court entered a docket entry reflecting its ruling, which unequivocally stated that the statements made after administration of the drug and the consent to the blood draw were suppressed. The court scheduled the next setting for the case and invited Mire’s counsel to provide a written order consistent with the oral pronouncement. On March 11, the court entered a formal “judgment and order” that repeated the substance of the February 26 docket entry. The state filed its notice of appeal on March 11, identifying the March 11 order as the one being appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that, under section 547.200.4, the state was required to file its notice of appeal within five days of the entry of the order suppressing evidence. The Court held that the February 26 docket entry constituted the operative order with the substantive effect of suppressing the evidence. Because the state’s notice of appeal was filed more than five days after the February 26 order, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal as untimely. View "State of Missouri vs. Mire" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Phillip Weeks submitted a request under Missouri’s Sunshine Law to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, seeking files containing traffic stop data from 2014 through 2018, specifically in spreadsheet (Excel) format and including officer identification numbers. The Department initially offered to provide traffic analysis reports with redacted officer numbers for a fee, which Weeks declined. During discovery in the resulting lawsuit, the City produced .CSV files containing the requested data. Weeks acknowledged these files matched his request in content but maintained he wanted the data in Excel spreadsheet format. Testimony at trial established that the Department did not maintain the data in Excel format, and there was conflicting evidence about whether the .CSV files could be accurately converted to Excel.The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis found in favor of the City, concluding that the City did not possess an existing record in the specific format Weeks requested. The court determined that the City had not violated the Sunshine Law because it did not withhold any records it actually maintained in the requested format. Weeks appealed, arguing that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, and also contended that the City’s admissions during litigation established it had responsive files at the time of his request.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that Weeks failed to follow the required analytical framework for challenging a judgment as against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, he did not identify all favorable evidence supporting the judgment or address conflicting evidence in accordance with the trial court’s credibility determinations. The Court also found that the City’s admissions did not establish it possessed records in the requested format. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Weeks vs. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

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The case concerns a defendant who, in July 2019, orchestrated a plan to lure a man he believed had wronged him to a house in Springfield, Missouri. The defendant rented a U-Haul van, enlisted two friends, and communicated his intent to harm the victim through text messages and conversations. On the night in question, he picked up the victim, brought him to the designated house, and later drove away with the victim, who was bound and injured. The defendant’s subsequent actions included searching online for ways to dispose of a body, coercing others to help clean the van, and attempting to destroy evidence. The victim was never seen again, and his body was not found, but his blood and personal items were recovered from the van and from a bag the defendant tried to have disposed of.After these events, the Circuit Court of Greene County tried the defendant on charges of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping. The jury found him guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the court orally pronounced consecutive life sentences: life without parole for murder and life with the possibility of parole for kidnapping. However, the written judgment mistakenly recorded the sentences as 999 days for each count. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for conviction and a material discrepancy between the oral and written sentences.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of both first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping, rejecting the defendant’s arguments regarding the corpus delicti doctrine and the statutory requirements for kidnapping. The court also clarified the correct legal standard for “substantial period” in kidnapping cases. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case solely to correct the written judgment to match the oral pronouncement of sentences. View "State v. Winter" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Kevin Rhodes, a former employee of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission, was terminated in December 2019 following an investigation into allegations of workplace misconduct, including the use of a racial slur. Rhodes filed grievances about his treatment during the investigation and, after his termination, brought charges of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. He subsequently received notices of right to sue and filed a lawsuit in circuit court alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Missouri Human Rights Act.A jury in the Circuit Court of Jackson County found in favor of the commission on the sex discrimination claim but ruled for Rhodes on his retaliation and hostile work environment claims, awarding him various damages. The circuit court applied a statutory damages cap and entered judgment accordingly. The commission moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court denied. Both parties appealed: Rhodes challenged the constitutionality of the damages cap, while the commission argued that Rhodes had not made a submissible case. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri due to the constitutional issues raised.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the circuit court’s judgment was not final because it failed to address Rhodes’s requests for equitable relief and prejudgment interest. The court explained that a final judgment must dispose of all claims and forms of relief sought. Because the judgment did not resolve all aspects of Rhodes’s claims, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, declining to address the merits of the parties’ arguments. View "Rhodes v. Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission" on Justia Law

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David Carter, who was 61 years old when he began working for the Missouri Department of Corrections, experienced repeated harassment from his supervisor, including disparaging remarks about his age and his medical condition, shingles. The supervisor’s conduct included denying Carter access to necessary tools and training, which worsened Carter’s health issues and ultimately led to his resignation. Carter subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act, claiming constructive discharge due to age and disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. In his petition, Carter sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, costs, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and equitable relief.A jury in the Circuit Court of Jackson County found in Carter’s favor, awarding him substantial damages for non-economic harm, back pay, future economic losses, and punitive damages. The circuit court initially entered judgment for the full amount of the jury’s award, then later amended the judgment to reduce the damages in accordance with the statutory cap under section 213.111.4. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs but did not address Carter’s requests for prejudgment interest or equitable relief in its final judgment.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case on appeal. The court determined that the circuit court’s judgment was not final because it failed to resolve Carter’s requests for prejudgment interest and equitable relief, and did not include a statement denying all other requested relief. As a result, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, without reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments regarding the damages cap, attorney fees, or the sufficiency of the evidence. View "Carter v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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After Missouri voters approved a constitutional amendment in November 2024 protecting the right to make decisions about reproductive healthcare, Planned Parenthood filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The organization sought a declaration that various state abortion laws and regulations were unconstitutional under the new amendment and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent their enforcement while the case was pending. The circuit court initially granted a preliminary injunction enjoining several abortion-related statutes and regulations, and later expanded the injunction to include additional licensing requirements after a motion for reconsideration.The State of Missouri challenged the preliminary injunction, arguing that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a peremptory writ directing the circuit court to vacate its orders and reconsider the injunction under a more rigorous standard, requiring a threshold finding that the party seeking the injunction is likely to prevail on the merits. The circuit court complied, reevaluated the request, and again issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the same statutes and regulations. The State then appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri, raising multiple points of error and seeking a stay and expedited review.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that it lacked exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the appeal because the circuit court had not yet ruled on the constitutional validity of the challenged statutes. The Court explained that its exclusive jurisdiction is only invoked when a claim that a statute is unconstitutional has been properly raised, preserved, and ruled upon in the lower court. Since the appeal concerned only the issuance of a preliminary injunction and not a final determination on the statutes’ validity, the Supreme Court of Missouri transferred the case to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, for further proceedings. View "Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. State" on Justia Law

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Robust Missouri Dispensary 3, LLC, operates a dispensary in Florissant, an incorporated city in St. Louis County. After Missouri voters approved a constitutional amendment legalizing non-medical marijuana and allowing local governments to impose a 3 percent sales tax, both Florissant and St. Louis County enacted such a tax. Robust collected and remitted the tax to Florissant but not to St. Louis County. The Missouri Department of Revenue notified Robust that it must also remit the tax to St. Louis County. Robust sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the constitutional amendment only allows a village, town, or city in an incorporated area to impose the tax, not a county.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted summary judgment in favor of St. Louis and St. Charles Counties, finding that the definition of "local government" includes a county in an incorporated area. The court reasoned that excluding counties from the definition would frustrate the amendment's purpose of protecting public health. Robust appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and found that the plain language of the constitutional amendment distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated areas. The court held that in an incorporated area, only a village, town, or city can impose the 3 percent sales tax, while in an unincorporated area, only a county can impose the tax. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to enter judgment in favor of Robust, ruling that St. Louis County cannot impose the tax on sales within Florissant. View "Robust Missouri Dispensary 3, LLC v. St. Louis County" on Justia Law

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Christopher Scott was charged with first-degree robbery, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced in November 2020. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the mandate was issued on January 19, 2022. Scott then filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief on April 11, 2022, raising three claims. A public defender entered an appearance on his behalf but did not request an extension to file an amended motion. The public defender filed an amended motion on August 4, 2022, raising six claims, including the original three. The motion court denied relief on all claims after an evidentiary hearing.The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed the case and transferred it to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri noted that the amended motion was filed late and without an extension request. The court emphasized that the deadlines in Rule 29.15 are mandatory and that the abandonment doctrine, which can excuse untimely filings, applies only to appointed counsel, not to unappointed counsel. Since the public defender was not officially appointed, the abandonment doctrine did not apply.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the motion court should not have considered the untimely claims in the amended motion. As Scott did not challenge the denial of his original pro se claims, the court affirmed the motion court's judgment denying postconviction relief on those claims. The court concluded that the amended motion's additional claims were not properly before the motion court due to the untimely filing. Therefore, the judgment of the motion court was affirmed. View "Scott v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Cedric Mack was charged with driving while intoxicated as a persistent offender. After a jury trial, he was found guilty and sentenced by the circuit court. Mack appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. Subsequently, Mack filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, which included a request for a public defender. A public defender later entered an appearance and filed an amended motion. The motion court overruled the amended motion after an evidentiary hearing. Mack appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the case for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an abandonment inquiry. On remand, the motion court found the public defender had abandoned Mack, considered the amended motion on the merits, and denied relief again. Mack appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. The court noted that Mack's amended motion was not timely filed under the applicable version of Rule 29.15(g). The court also found that the public defender's entry of appearance without being appointed meant the abandonment doctrine did not apply. Consequently, the only issue was whether Mack's single pro se claim needed to be resolved again. The court determined it did not, as the claim had already been raised and decided in Mack's direct appeal.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Mack's pro se Rule 29.15 motion was the only timely filed motion and contained a single claim identical to one previously rejected on direct appeal. Therefore, the judgment of the motion court denying postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Mack v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law