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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Defendant’s motions to suppress evidence and sentencing Defendant to eight years’ imprisonment in connection with his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motions to suppress methamphetamine because Defendant was not unlawfully seized when an officer requested that Defendant produce his driver’s license to verify whether he was driving on a suspended license and Defendant complied with that request; and (2) even though the range of punishment was misstated at the sentencing hearing, Defendant failed to establish that the circuit court imposed sentence based on a mistaken belief. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Defendant’s motions to suppress evidence and sentencing Defendant to eight years’ imprisonment in connection with his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motions to suppress methamphetamine because Defendant was not unlawfully seized when an officer requested that Defendant produce his driver’s license to verify whether he was driving on a suspended license and Defendant complied with that request; and (2) even though the range of punishment was misstated at the sentencing hearing, Defendant failed to establish that the circuit court imposed sentence based on a mistaken belief. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count of possession of child pornography and sentencing him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his consent to the search of his home was voluntary or that exigent circumstances existed warranting officers’ warrantless entry into his home; and (2) he was sentenced based on the circuit court’s “materially false understanding of the possible range of punishment.” The Supreme Court held (1) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s consent to the search was not freely and voluntarily given, application of the exclusionary rule was not appropriate because the officers had no knowledge that the search was unconstitutional; and (2) the record did not support a conclusion that the circuit court imposed sentence based on a mistaken belief. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count of possession of child pornography and sentencing him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his consent to the search of his home was voluntary or that exigent circumstances existed warranting officers’ warrantless entry into his home; and (2) he was sentenced based on the circuit court’s “materially false understanding of the possible range of punishment.” The Supreme Court held (1) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s consent to the search was not freely and voluntarily given, application of the exclusionary rule was not appropriate because the officers had no knowledge that the search was unconstitutional; and (2) the record did not support a conclusion that the circuit court imposed sentence based on a mistaken belief. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling, without a hearing, Defendant’s Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 motion for postconviction relief from his conviction for assault in the first degree and thirteen-year sentence. In denying Defendant’s motion, the motion court found (1) the record conclusively refuted Defendant’s claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, and (2) the record refuted Defendant’s claim that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Defendant of the defense of acting under sudden passion arising out of adequate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record conclusively refused Defendant’s claims that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that his plea counsel was ineffective. View "Booker v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling, without a hearing, Defendant’s Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 motion for postconviction relief from his conviction for assault in the first degree and thirteen-year sentence. In denying Defendant’s motion, the motion court found (1) the record conclusively refuted Defendant’s claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, and (2) the record refuted Defendant’s claim that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Defendant of the defense of acting under sudden passion arising out of adequate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record conclusively refused Defendant’s claims that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that his plea counsel was ineffective. View "Booker v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Department of Public Safety’s Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control and dismissing Appellant’s first amended petition for review under Mo. Rev. Stat. 536 on the grounds that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Appellant’s employment with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was terminated following a disciplinary action. Appellant filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission. The Commission dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was not a merit employee entitled to a hearing before the Commission and that the Division had internal appeal procedures for its employees. Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended petition for review. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice because Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Appellant’s action because it lacked authority to review the Division’s administrative decision as a “contested case” pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.100, as alleged in the first amended petition. View "Nowden v. Division of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, Missouri Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Department of Public Safety’s Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control and dismissing Appellant’s first amended petition for review under Mo. Rev. Stat. 536 on the grounds that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Appellant’s employment with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was terminated following a disciplinary action. Appellant filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission. The Commission dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was not a merit employee entitled to a hearing before the Commission and that the Division had internal appeal procedures for its employees. Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended petition for review. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice because Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Appellant’s action because it lacked authority to review the Division’s administrative decision as a “contested case” pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.100, as alleged in the first amended petition. View "Nowden v. Division of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, Missouri Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court quashing its preliminary writ in mandamus and denying Bryan Robison’s request for a permanent writ against the director of the Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions, and Professional Registration (Department), holding that Robison failed to demonstrate he was entitled to mandamus relief. One month before Robison’s license as a general bail bond agent was set to expire, he applied to renew his license with the director of the Department. As a result of Robison’s outstanding forfeitures and judgments, the director denied Robison’s application for renewal. Rather than exercising his right to file a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission, Robison filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the director denied his renewal application without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. The circuit court quashed its preliminary writ and denied Robison’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the director properly exercised her discretion by refusing the renewal request pursuant to her statutory authority and this Court’s rules. View "State ex rel. Robison v. Lindley-Myers" on Justia Law

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In this declaratory judgment action brought against Judge Russell E. Steele and Judge Kristie Swaim challenging two amendments to a consolidation agreement the parties entered into in 2008, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment that these two amendments were invalid and entered judgment for Judge Steele. The consolidation agreement designated Decker as the sole appointing authority for all deputy circuit clerks and division clerks. In 2013, Judge Steele signed an administrative order amending the consolidation agreement and designating the presiding judge of the Second Judicial Circuit as the appointing authority for all deputy and division clerks. In 2014, the Second Judicial Circuit approved an administrative order amending the consolidation agreement to designate Judge Swaim as the sole appointing authority. Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the amendments. The circuit court entered judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2013 and 2014 amendments were made in compliance with the procedures to which Decker consented in voluntarily joining the consolidation agreement; and (2) therefore, Judge Steele held appointing authority over deputy and division clerks from the date of the order adopting the 2013 amendment until the date of the order adopting the 2014 amendment and transferring that authority to Judge Swaim. View "Gall v. Steele" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts