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The Supreme Court quashed preliminary writs issued preventing the circuit court from enforcing its orders sustaining motions to compel arbitration and stay proceedings filed by Dollar General, holding that the circuit court properly sustained Dollar General's motions to compel arbitration, stayed the cases, and ordered the parties to arbitrate the question of whether consideration existed. After Jesse Newberry and Becky Lowrance were discharged from Dollar General, they filed charges of discrimination. Dollar General filed motions to compel Newberry and Lowrance to submit their claims to arbitration and stay further proceedings on the grounds that the employees signed agreements to arbitrate. The circuit court sustained Dollar General's motions to compel. Newberry and Lowrance each sought a permanent writ of prohibition preventing the circuit court from enforcing its orders, arguing that Dollar General failed to meet its burden to show consideration supported either the employee arbitration agreements or the provisions delegating threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly sustained Dollar General's motions to compel arbitration and stay the cases. View "State ex rel. Newberry v. Honorable Steve Jackson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court issued a permanent writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to reinstate Gary Sampson's previous probationary term, holding that the circuit court erred in placing Sampson on a third term of probation. In his writ of mandamus seeking his immediate discharge from probation Sampson argued that the circuit court lost authority by placing him on a third term of probation and therefore erred by overruling his motion to be discharged from probation and setting the matter for a probation violation hearing. The Supreme Court agreed that the circuit court erred by placing Sampson on a third term of probation but, because it was unclear whether the circuit court had authority to conduct a probation violation hearing or whether Sampson's probation expired statutorily, the circuit court was required to enter an order continuing Sampson's valid second term of probation. View "State ex rel. Sampson v. Honorable William E. Hickle" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court exercised its discretion not to dismiss this appeal as moot and held that the circuit court erred in placing Trevor Griffith, who had already been discharged from parole, on a third term of probation. Griffith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking an immediate release from custody and to be discharged from probation. Specifically, Griffith argued that the circuit court exceeded its authority after revoking and terminating his second term of probation and executing his sentence. After this case was submitted, Griffith was released from his incarceration and discharged from parole. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court erred in placing Griffith on a third term of probation; (2) when a circuit court places a defendant on an erroneous third term of probation, the case should be remanded to determine the proper course of the defendant's sentence; and (3) because Griffith had been released and discharged, he should not be returned to custody to make this determination. View "State ex rel. Griffith v. Precythe" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the revocation of Appellant's driving privileges for refusing to submit to a chemical test, holding that Appellant's refusal to consent to the chemical test was not voluntary and unequivocal under Mo. Rev. Stat. 577.041. The circuit court sustained the decision of the director of revenue revoking Appellant's driving privileges for one year. On appeal, Appellant argued that his refusal to consent to the chemical test was not voluntary and unequivocal because law enforcement deprived him of his statutory right to counsel by listening to and making recordings of his part of the conversation with his attorney. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining the revocation of Appellant's driving privileges because law enforcement deprived Appellant of his right to confer privately with his attorney, and the director failed to show that Appellant was not prejudiced. View "Roesing v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order directing Mathew and Andrea Elder to remove their dock they built on a lake that abutted their home but that was owned by a neighboring subdivision but reversed the portion of the circuit court's order awarding attorney's fees, holding that the Elders did not acquire riparian rights in the lake and that the circuit court erred in finding "special circumstances" supporting the award of attorney's fees. Missouri law recognizes riparian rights for properties abutting natural bodies of water. The lake in this case was artificial. The Elders never had the right to use the lake based on their ownership of the abutting land and did not otherwise establish an easement for use of the lake. The circuit court entered a judgment directing the Elders to remove the dock and awarded attorney's fees for the board of trustees established by the founder of the subdivision tasked with maintaining the lake. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Elders did not have riparian rights to use the lake because it wa artificial and the Elders had no ownership or easement rights to its use; and (2) the circuit court erred in awarding the trustees attorney's fees because there were no special circumstances. View "Incline Village Board of Trustees v. Edler" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from holding a probation revocation hearing and ordered the circuit court to discharge Travis Jones from probation, holding that Jones's term of probation had expired, and therefore, the circuit court lost the power to revoke his probation. As grounds for the writ, Jones argued that the circuit court failed to make every reasonable effort to hold his probation revocation hearing prior to the expiration of his term of probation and lost authority to do anything other than order his discharge from probation. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Court lost the power to revoke Jones's probation because it failed to make every reasonable effort to bring Jones before the court before the term of probation expired. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of mandamus requiring Respondent to transfer the underlying declaratory judgment action from Greene County to Pulaski County, holding that Greene County was an improper venue because none of the defendants in the underlying action resided in Greene County. An automobile accident that killed Juanita Prater occurred in Pulaski County. Relators filed a wrongful death action against the driver of the other car, Dakota Ball, in Pulaski County. Ronald Prater filed a personal injury action against Ball in Pulaski County. The parties later agreed to transfer the wrongful death and personal injury action to Greene County. USAA General Indemnity Company filed a declaratory judgment action in Greene County seeking a declaration that the auto policy it issued to Ball's stepmother did not cover Ball. None of the defendants resided in Greene County. After unsuccessfully filing a motion to transfer venue, Relators filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the circuit court failed to execute its ministerial duty to transfer the declaratory judgment action from Greene County to a proper venue. View "State ex rel. Prater v. Honorable Jason R. Brown" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court made permanent a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from ordering Relator to submit to a mental evaluation pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 552, holding that chapter 552 did not authorize the circuit court to order the department of mental health to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of Relator. Relator was charged with first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and other offenses. Relator asserted that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The State sought an order for a mental evaluation pursuant to chapter 552. The circuit court granted the motion. Relator then petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition, and the court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court granted transfer and made permanent a writ of probation, holding that the circuit court exceeded its authority by ordering Relator to undergo a mental evaluation pursuant to chapter 552 when Relator intended to rely only on the diminished capacity defense because the circuit court lacked reasonable cause to question his competence to stand trial. View "Caruthers v. Honorable Wendy Wexler-Horn" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling Appellant's Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, holding that Appellant's claims of error were unavailing. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder for the death of a Missouri highway patrolman. The jury was unable to agree whether to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The circuit court subsequently conducted an independent review of the facts and imposed a death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed his Rule 29.15 motion. The motion court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, among other things, that counsel were not ineffective in failing to question Juror 58 during voir dire about the provocative and violent novel he admitted writing and in failing to call other jurors in support of Appellant's motion for new trial. View "Shockley v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that Governor Michael Parson's appointment of Mike Kehoe to the office of Lieutenant Governor was unauthorized under Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.030, holding that Darrell Cope had standing and that the Governor has the authority to appoint a Lieutenant Governor in the event of a vacancy. The Governor Eric Greitens resigned and Governor Parson succeeded Greitens to the office of Governor, the office of Lieutenant Governor was left vacant. Governor Parson appointed Kehoe to be the Lieutenant Governor. Darrell Cope and the Missouri Democratic Party (MDP) filed a petition seeking injunctive and declaratory relief alleging that Governor Parson lacked legal authority to appoint a Lieutenant Governor. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that Cope and the MDO did not have standing to challenging Governor Parson's appointment of Kehoe. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Cope had taxpayer standing to seek a declaratory judgment in this case; and (2) Mo. Const. Art. IV, 4 controls the authority of the Governor to appoint a Lieutenant Governor, and Governor Parson was within his constitutional authority when he appointed Kehoe to the office of Lieutenant Governor. View "Cope v. Parson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Constitutional Law