Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund sued, alleging that Phillips improperly obtained reimbursement from the Fund. Wagoner, a participant in and potential claimant against the Fund (RSMo 319.138) moved to intervene and tendered a motion to dismiss. The court entered an interlocutory order overruling Wagoner’s motion to intervene. Wagoner did not seek an immediate appeal. The trial court entered a final judgment approving a settlement between the Fund and Phillips and dismissing the case with prejudice. Wagoner timely appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that Wagoner complied with Rule 81.08(a) because he specified the only judgment from which he had a right to appeal, the final judgment. The court properly denied intervention. Wagoner’s motion did not articulate a specific, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit. Even if Wagoner had demonstrated that he had a legally protectable interest in the suit and that his ability to protect that interest without intervening is impaired or impeded, Wagoner failed to show that the Fund’s Board of Directors would not adequately protect his interest without intervention. Wagoner does not allege that the Board’s pursuit of its claim was fraudulent, collusive, or a breach of its fiduciary duties. View "Mo. Petroleum Storage Tank Ins. Fund Bd. of Directors v. ConocoPhillips Co." on Justia Law

Sanford purchased CenturyLink's internet and phone services. CenturyLink’s “Internet Services Agreement” contains a mandatory arbitration clause for “any and all claims, controversies or disputes of any kind.” Months later, Sanford filed a class action, alleging that CenturyLink violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, RSMo 407.020, by charging a “Universal Service Fund Surcharge” on high-speed internet services. The court ordered the parties to conduct discovery solely on the issue of arbitrability and subsequently denied arbitration, citing the issue of consideration On August 18, 2014, 39 days after entry of the order, CenturyLink filed a notice of appeal under RSMo 435.440. The Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed. Section 435.4401 makes orders denying arbitration immediately appealable. Under Rule 81.04(a), any such appeal must be filed “not later than 10 days after the judgment or order appealed from becomes final.” CenturyLink was incorrect in believing that, under Rule 81.05(a)(1), the 10-day period did not begin to run until 30 days after the court entered its order. Rule 81.05(a)(1) delays the effective date of a judgment for 30 days so that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or amend its ruling before it becomes final and appealable. An interlocutory order, however, remains interlocutory throughout the case (Rule 74.01(b)). The fact that a statute makes an interlocutory order appealable does not make Rule 81.05(a)(1) applicable; it is not a judgment or dispositive order. View "Sanford v. CenturyTel of Mo., LLC" on Justia Law

Curt and Cheri Peters filed a personal injury action against Patrick Terrio, alleging that Mr. Peters was injured at work because Terrio, a supervisory co-employee, was negligent. Peters and Terrio were employed by Tramar Contracting, Inc., a company that specialized in providing services and products to general contractors in the construction industry. Among its services, Tramar delivered dowel baskets, which are 200-pound rebar paver baskets used in concrete construction, manufactured by Wady Industries. Wady Industries shipped the dowel baskets to Tramar stacked, one on top of the other, without warning, bracing, or other precautionary measures. Upon arriving at Tramar, the dowel baskets were kept in this stacked manner in a staging area until they were needed. A row of baskets fell from a flatbed truck onto Peters, causing permanent and catastrophic injuries. The trial court dismissed the Peterses’ claims against Terrio, finding they failed to allege Terrio owed Peters a duty outside of their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. The Peterses appealed, asserting that their petition alleged sufficient facts to support a common law negligence action against Terrio. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Peterses pleaded facts establishing only duties that were a part of the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace; their petition failed to state a negligence cause of action against Terrio. View "Peters v. Wady Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

While driving a commercial motor vehicle for his employer, Kevin Parr was killed when his truck was involved in a single-vehicle accident. Plaintiffs, Parr’s two children and father brought a wrongful death action against three of Parr’s supervisory co-employees, Charles Breeden, Wendy Cogdill, and Melany Buttry. The circuit court entered judgment on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the circuit court erred in granting judgment in favor of the defendants because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to the defendants’ negligence as well as to whether the defendants breached duties that arose from federal regulations that are separate and distinct from the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace for all employees. After review, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the duties plaintiffs alleged defendants owed to Parr were part of their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. Further, federal regulations did not prove the existence of a personal duty separate and distinct from the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. Because plaintiffs failed to establish that defendants owed Parr a duty separate and distinct from the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Parr v. Breeden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the Missouri Municipal League, the City of Springfield, and Richard Sheets appealed a circuit court's judgment for the State on plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutional validity of two bills passed by the General Assembly. In 2013, the General Assembly passed House Bill 331 and House Bill 345, which repealed and enacted in lieu thereof numerous sections dealing with local government control over telecommunications infrastructure permitting and public right-of-way. Later that year, a circuit court ruled H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 were enacted in violation of procedural requirements of the Missouri Constitution. The State appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Missouri Supreme Court. With the State's appeal still pending, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 649 and Senate Bill 650 in early 2014. S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 repealed and enacted in lieu thereof some of the same sections as had H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 and, in doing so, set forth the text of H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 as the then-existing law for the relevant sections with proposed changes noted. Two days before S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 became effective (and two days before the Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal in the H.B. 331 and H.B. 345 case), plaintiffs brought suit challenging S.B. 649 and S.B. 650 under the Missouri Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming: (1) the contents of the bills violated article I, section 13's prohibition against retrospective laws; article III, section 40(28)'s prohibition on special laws, and article X, section 21's prohibition on unfunded mandates; and (2) the bills were enacted in violation of article III, section 28. The State moved to dismiss the substantive claims, and both sides moved for a judgment on the pleadings for the enactment claims. The circuit court sustained the State's motions, and plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State was entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this claim. View "Missouri Municipal League v. Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was sixty-one years old when his employment with the Kansas City Chiefs was terminated. Plaintiff was replaced by a younger worker. Plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court alleging a single act of age discrimination on the day of his termination. In pretrial proceedings, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s request to have testimony presented to the jury from numerous nonparty former employees over age forty who were either fired or pressured to resign and their job duties were assumed by younger replacements. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the Chiefs. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court (1) misapplied the legal standard for admission of evidence by so-called “me too” witnesses and abused its discretion in excluding “me too” evidence offered by the former employees; and (2) erred in excluding evidence concerning a discriminatory age-related statement allegedly made by a Chiefs executive and in quashing a deposition order issued to the Chiefs’ chairman and chief executive officer. Remanded. View "Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles and Deborah Bate were both seriously injured in a head-on vehicle collision. After obtaining a judgment against the driver of the opposing vehicle the Bates sued Greenwich Insurance Company seeking underinsured motorist coverage under a policy allegedly issued to Charles Bate’s employer by Greenwich. Greenwich did not answer the petition, and the Bates obtained a default judgment in the amount of $3 million. More than two years later, Greenwich filed an amended motion to set aside the default judgment as void, arguing that service of process was invalid. The trial court set aside the default judgment as void, stating that there was no valid service of process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bates properly effected service of process under Mo. Rev. Stat. 375.906 and complied with all service requirements of that statute. View "Bate v. Greenwich Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Issiah Andra, a Missouri resident, filed a petition against Texas-based Left Gate Property Holding, Inc. after Andra purchased on eBay a vehicle from Left Gate that did not meet Andra’s expectations. The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction over Left Gate. Andra appealed, arguing that Left Gate had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri in accordance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Left Gate’s conduct in Missouri fell within Missouri’s long-arm statute, and Left Gate had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy the due process clause. View "Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc." on Justia Law

Patrick O’Basuyi filed suit against several defendants (collectively, “TriStar”) for breach of contract, quantum meruit and fraudulent conveyance. TriStar responded by filing a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. O’Basuyi filed a motion for separate trial of TriStar’s counterclaims. The trial court overruled the motion for separate trial, determining that Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.06, which governs joinder of claims, authorized its denial of O’Basuyi’s motion for separate trial of the malicious prosecution claim. O’Basuyi subsequently sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the request writ, holding (1) Rule 55.06 does not permit either joinder or trial of a malicious prosecution counterclaim with the underlying claim; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the joint trial of the defendants’ counterclaim and O’Basuyi’s claims. View "State ex rel. O'Basuyi v. Hon. David Lee Vincent III" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Ralston Purina Company shareholder when Ralston and Nestle Holdings, Inc. entered into a merger agreement providing that, at the time of the merger, Ralston stock would be converted and Ralson shareholders would receive payments. Plaintiff was not paid until four days after the stock was converted. Ten years later, Plaintiff filed a class action petition alleging that Nestle breached the agreement by failing to timely pay shareholders. The trial court dismissed the petition as barred by the five-year statute of limitations in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120(1), which applies to all actions upon contracts except those mentioned in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.110. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not applying the ten-year statute of limitations in section 516.110, which applies to all actions “upon any writing…for the payment of money.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the five-year statute applied in this case; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that his petition was timely because the five-year limitations period was tolled by a pending class action against Nestle in another state was without merit. View "Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law