Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was sixty-one years old when his employment with the Kansas City Chiefs was terminated. Plaintiff was replaced by a younger worker. Plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court alleging a single act of age discrimination on the day of his termination. In pretrial proceedings, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s request to have testimony presented to the jury from numerous nonparty former employees over age forty who were either fired or pressured to resign and their job duties were assumed by younger replacements. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the Chiefs. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court (1) misapplied the legal standard for admission of evidence by so-called “me too” witnesses and abused its discretion in excluding “me too” evidence offered by the former employees; and (2) erred in excluding evidence concerning a discriminatory age-related statement allegedly made by a Chiefs executive and in quashing a deposition order issued to the Chiefs’ chairman and chief executive officer. Remanded. View "Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles and Deborah Bate were both seriously injured in a head-on vehicle collision. After obtaining a judgment against the driver of the opposing vehicle the Bates sued Greenwich Insurance Company seeking underinsured motorist coverage under a policy allegedly issued to Charles Bate’s employer by Greenwich. Greenwich did not answer the petition, and the Bates obtained a default judgment in the amount of $3 million. More than two years later, Greenwich filed an amended motion to set aside the default judgment as void, arguing that service of process was invalid. The trial court set aside the default judgment as void, stating that there was no valid service of process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bates properly effected service of process under Mo. Rev. Stat. 375.906 and complied with all service requirements of that statute. View "Bate v. Greenwich Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Issiah Andra, a Missouri resident, filed a petition against Texas-based Left Gate Property Holding, Inc. after Andra purchased on eBay a vehicle from Left Gate that did not meet Andra’s expectations. The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction over Left Gate. Andra appealed, arguing that Left Gate had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri in accordance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Left Gate’s conduct in Missouri fell within Missouri’s long-arm statute, and Left Gate had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy the due process clause. View "Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc." on Justia Law

Patrick O’Basuyi filed suit against several defendants (collectively, “TriStar”) for breach of contract, quantum meruit and fraudulent conveyance. TriStar responded by filing a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. O’Basuyi filed a motion for separate trial of TriStar’s counterclaims. The trial court overruled the motion for separate trial, determining that Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.06, which governs joinder of claims, authorized its denial of O’Basuyi’s motion for separate trial of the malicious prosecution claim. O’Basuyi subsequently sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the request writ, holding (1) Rule 55.06 does not permit either joinder or trial of a malicious prosecution counterclaim with the underlying claim; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the joint trial of the defendants’ counterclaim and O’Basuyi’s claims. View "State ex rel. O'Basuyi v. Hon. David Lee Vincent III" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Ralston Purina Company shareholder when Ralston and Nestle Holdings, Inc. entered into a merger agreement providing that, at the time of the merger, Ralston stock would be converted and Ralson shareholders would receive payments. Plaintiff was not paid until four days after the stock was converted. Ten years later, Plaintiff filed a class action petition alleging that Nestle breached the agreement by failing to timely pay shareholders. The trial court dismissed the petition as barred by the five-year statute of limitations in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120(1), which applies to all actions upon contracts except those mentioned in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.110. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not applying the ten-year statute of limitations in section 516.110, which applies to all actions “upon any writing…for the payment of money.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the five-year statute applied in this case; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that his petition was timely because the five-year limitations period was tolled by a pending class action against Nestle in another state was without merit. View "Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Schwarz Pharma Inc. was sued in seven individual actions by Plaintiffs, who filed suit in the St. Louis city court. Schwarz filed a motion to transfer venue in these seven individual actions under Mo. R. Civ. P. 51.045. The trial court ruled that the motions were untimely because they were not filed within the sixty-day period after Schwarz was served. Schwarz wrought writs of prohibition in the court of appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Schwarz’s motions to transfer venue were untimely; (2) Schwarz’s timely filed motions demonstrated that venue was improper in St. Louis city; and (3) therefore, the trial court was required to sustain the timely filed motions to transfer venue. View "State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Judge Dowd" on Justia Law