Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two police officers were patrolling a high-crime area when they passed Defendant, who was riding a bicycle, and observed what appeared to be a handgun protruding from Defendant’s waistband. The officers handcuffed Defendant and then discovered that what appeared to be a gun was an Airsoft toy gun. At that point, the officers called in a warrant check and learned there was a pickup order for Defendant. A subsequent search revealed Defendant was carrying cocaine base. Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court overruled. Defendant appealed, arguing that, although the police had reasonable suspicion to initially stop him when they saw him carrying what appeared to be a gun, they lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him further while they performed a warrant check after they discovered the gun was a toy gun. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress because even after the officers learned the gun was not real, the additional circumstances surrounding the encounter gave them reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Defendant. View "State v. Lovelady" on Justia Law

After five jury trials, Appellant was eventually convicted of the 1991 murder of Gladys Kuehler and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Appellant timely filed a motion for post-conviction relief, raising thirteen points on appeal. The circuit court made findings of fact and entered a judgment overruling Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally effective assistance; (2) Appellant’s due process rights recognized under Brady v. Maryland were not violated; and (3) Appellant’s claim that the delay between his sentencing and execution violated his due process rights lacked merit. View "Barton v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with fourteen offenses, including one count of forcible rape, one count of aggravated stalking, and five counts of violating a protective order. Appellant was convicted of all counts and sentenced to a fifty-year term of imprisonment for forcible rape under Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.030.2. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence for forcible rape did not exceed the maximum sentence for that offense where section 566.030.2 authorizes a range of punishment from five years to life imprisonment; and (2) Appellant’s convictions for aggravated stalking and violating a protective did not violate double jeopardy. View "State v. Hardin" on Justia Law

After Appellant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI), the director of revenue suspended Appellant’s driving privileges for a minimum of ten years. Appellant later filed a petition for limited driving privileges. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s petition, determining that Appellant was statutorily ineligible for limited driving privileges pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.309.3(6)(b) due to his felony conviction. Appellant appealed, asserting that section 302.309.3 violated the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions by allowing DWI court participants and graduates to obtain reinstatement of limited driving privileges while denying a similar opportunity to non-participants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish that section 302.309.3 violated his right to equal protection. View "Amick v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was formerly employed by Hospital, brought an eight-count petition against Hospital and Doctor (collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (the MHRA) and other common law claims related to the termination of her employment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's judgment with respect to Plaintiff's MHRA claims and wrongful discharge claim, holding (i) the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's MHRA claims on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for filing a lawsuit under the MHRA, and (ii) because Plaintiff's amended petition sufficiently invoked the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the circuit court erred in sustaining summary judgment in Hospital's favor on Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim; and (2) affirmed the circuit court's judgment as to all remaining counts. Remanded.View "Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr. " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. After the jury was unable to agree on punishment, the trial court conducted an independent review of the facts pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.030.4 and imposed the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) any errors in the preparation of the trial transcript did not impede adequate appellate review and were not prejudicial; (2) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury; (3) section 565.030.4 is not unconstitutional; (4) the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to hold a hearing regarding alleged the improper influence of a certain juror during jury deliberations; and (5) the death sentence in this case was proportional to the strength of the evidence.View "State v. Shockley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree and armed criminal action. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the trial court's practice of permitting qualified jurors to opt out of jury service by agreeing to perform community service constituted a fundamental and systemic failure to comply with the statutory jury selection requirements. The circuit court and court of appeals denied the motion. Defendant then filed his writ petition with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that allowing five prospective jurors to opt out of service during Defendant's trial did not constitute a "substantial failure" to comply with the jury selection statutes or undermine the confidence in the verdict.View "State ex rel. Sitton v. Norman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of twenty-six counts of first-degree murder, burglary, and related crimes for actions he took during a robbery and home invasion when he was sixteen years old. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison with no possibility of parole for first-degree murder. The circuit court dismissed four counts on which the jury had found Defendant guilty, finding it had no jurisdiction over the charges because they were outside the scope of the juvenile court's certification. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, (1) the trial court erred in dismissing the four counts related to one of the victims of Defendant's crimes because she was not named in Defendant's juvenile petition; (2) the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove first-degree murder; and (3) Defendant's sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment because it was imposed with no individualized consideration of the myriad of factors discussed in Miller v. Alabama. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Nathan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action for shooting a killing a victim during the second of two robberies he committed when he was seventeen years old. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not reversibly err in playing Defendant's videotaped interrogation at trial; and (2) Defendant's sentence of life without parole violated the Eighth Amendment because it was imposed without any opportunity for the sentencing court to consider whether this punishment was appropriate in light of Defendant's age, maturity, and other factors discussed in Miller v. Alabama. Remanded.View "State v. Hart" on Justia Law

Driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Director of Revenue (DOR) subsequently suspended Driver's license and disqualified him from driving a commercial motor vehicle. Driver filed a petition for a trial de novo in the trial court challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.700 and 302.755, which disqualify drivers who are convicted of an alcohol-related traffic offense from driving a commercial vehicle for not less than one year. The trial court ruled that sections 302.500 and 302.700 violated the U.S. Constitution based on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter NFIB) and reinstated Driver's driving privileges, including his commercial driver's license (CDL). The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court's judgment as to the constitutional validity of section 302.700 under NFIB, holding that NFIB was inapplicable to Driver's argument; and (2) denied Driver's due process and equal protection arguments, finding that they were without merit.View "Bone v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law