Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the State on Plaintiff’s action seeking a declaration that the State could not enforce Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.707 against him without violating Mo. Const. art. I, 23 and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.Plaintiff, a convicted felon who had completed his sentences, was required to surrender his federal firearms license, class 01 after the General Assembly, in 2008, amended section 571.070 to make it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to possess a firearm. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action raising facial and as-applied challenges to section 571.070. The circuit court rejected the State’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims were not ripe and found that section 571.070 did not violate the Missouri or United States Constitutions because felons categorically are removed from the group of people who can claim the protections of those constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff satisfied the requirements to bring a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutional validity of section 571.070; and (2) section 571.070 withstands constitutional scrutiny. View "Alpert v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court’s judgment denying Appellant postconviction relief on his twelve claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and claims challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 562.076 regarding voluntary intoxication and the time limits. Appellant filed his motion under Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15. In affirming, the Supreme Court held (1) the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous; and (2) the motion court’s judgment regarding an unpreserved claim of error was not plainly erroneous. View "Collings v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err in sustaining Defendants’ motions to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to warrant authorizing search of a residence for stolen items.On appeal, the State argued that, while no probable cause existed for a provision of the search warrant form authorizing a search for any deceased human fetus or corpse, the circuit court should have applied the severance doctrine to redact the invalid portion of the warrant and suppress only the evidence seized pursuant to the invalid portion. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to apply the severance doctrine and in suppressing all evidence seized because the invalid portions of the search warrant so contaminated the whole warrant that they could not be redacted pursuant to the severance doctrine. View "State v. Gaulter" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err in sustaining Defendants’ motions to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to warrant authorizing search of a residence for stolen items.On appeal, the State argued that, while no probable cause existed for a provision of the search warrant form authorizing a search for any deceased human fetus or corpse, the circuit court should have applied the severance doctrine to redact the invalid portion of the warrant and suppress only the evidence seized pursuant to the invalid portion. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to apply the severance doctrine and in suppressing all evidence seized because the invalid portions of the search warrant so contaminated the whole warrant that they could not be redacted pursuant to the severance doctrine. View "State v. Gaulter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administration Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (MEC) imposition of fees arising from the failure to Robin Wright-Jones and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, Appellants) to comply with the rules of Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 130. The court also affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the monetary fees assessed by the MEC violated Mo. Const. art. I, section 31. Specifically, Appellants argued that, pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or rules. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no improper delegation of authority to the MEC; (2) the AHC’s decision was supported by the record; and (3) the assessed fees were not excessive. View "Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administration Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (MEC) imposition of fees arising from the failure to Robin Wright-Jones and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, Appellants) to comply with the rules of Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 130. The court also affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the monetary fees assessed by the MEC violated Mo. Const. art. I, section 31. Specifically, Appellants argued that, pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or rules. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no improper delegation of authority to the MEC; (2) the AHC’s decision was supported by the record; and (3) the assessed fees were not excessive. View "Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief under Rule 29.15, holding that Appellant’s argument that his appellate counsel was ineffective was unavailing.Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, appellate counsel did not raise as points of error the trial court’s rejections of Appellant’s requested jury instructions. In his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, Appellant argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these issues. The motion court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellate counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient because appellate counsel did not fail to exercise the customary level of skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney. View "Meiners v. State" on Justia Law

Article I, section 35 of the Missouri Constitution, which protects “the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices” does not create a new constitutional right to engage in the illegal drug trade.Defendant appealed his convictions of producing more than five grams of marijuana, possession of more than five grams of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the statutes prohibiting marijuana cultivation and possession violate the constitutional right to farm guaranteed by article I, section 35. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain, ordinary, and natural meaning of article I, section 35 demonstrates no purpose to sub silentio repeal laws criminalizing the cultivation or possession of controlled substances; and (2) Defendant’s marijuana cultivation operation was not a farming practice to be protected by article I, section 35. View "State v. Shanklin" on Justia Law

In 1983, Carr was convicted capital murder for killing his brother, stepmother, and stepsister when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years. His sentences were imposed without any consideration of his youth. The Missouri Supreme Court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because, following the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole pursuant to mandatory sentencing schemes that preclude consideration of the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances. Carr was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing scheme that afforded no opportunity to consider his age, maturity, limited control over his environment, the transient characteristics attendant to youth, or his capacity for rehabilitation. Carr must be resentenced so his youth and other attendant circumstances surrounding his offense can be taken into consideration to ensure he will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "Carr v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Willbanks was 17 years old when he was charged with kidnapping, first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action, based on a carjacking. He was convicted and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the kidnapping count, life for the assault count, 20 years for each of the two robbery counts, and 100 years for each of the three armed criminal action counts. On appeal, he argued his sentences, in the aggregate, will result in the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence and that Missouri’s mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations violate his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in light of the Supreme Court holding in Graham v. Florida (2010). The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Missouri’s mandatory minimum parole statutes and regulations are constitutionally valid under Graham. Graham held that the Eighth Amendment barred sentencing a juvenile to a single sentence of life without parole for a nonhomicide offense. Graham did not address juveniles who were convicted of multiple nonhomicide offenses and received multiple fixed-term sentences. View "Willbanks v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law