Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful possession charges, claiming that the felon-in-possession law violates the Missouri Constitution’s protection of his right to bear arms. The circuit court sustained the motion. The State appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Missouri Constitution’s right to bear arms provision - article I, section 23 - was amended to state that courts must apply strict scrutiny to laws restricting the right to bear arms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prior version of article I, section 23 applies in this case; (2) as this Court held in Doston v. Kander, strict scrutiny applies under the prior version of article I, section 23; and (3) the felon-in-possession law survives strict scrutiny and does not violate article I, section 23’s protection of Defendant’s right to bear arms. Remanded. View "State v. Merritt" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the felon-in-possession law violates the Missouri Constitution’s protection of his right to bear arms. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Missouri Constitution’s right to bear arms provision - article I, section 23 - was amended to state that courts must apply strict scrutiny to laws restricting the right to bear arms. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the prior version of article I, section 23 applies in this case; (2) as this Court necessarily held in Doston v. Kander, strict scrutiny applies under the prior version of article I, section 23; and (3) the felon-in-possession law survives strict scrutiny and does not violate article I, section 23’s protection of Defendant’s right to bear arms. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Missouri Municipal League (MML) filed this lawsuit challenging the validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.341.2, as enacted in House Bill 103 (HB103), claiming that HB103 violated the bill-passage requirements in article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution and that HB103 violated various substantive provisions of the constitution. The circuit court granted the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the State. MML appealed. After this case was briefed, argued, and submitted, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, Senate Bill 5 (SB5), which repealed the language in section 302.341.2 that formed the basis for MML’s claims. The Supreme Court dismissed MML’s appeal, as all of MML’s procedural and substantive claims had become moot. View "Miss. Municipal League v. State" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Plaintiff challenged the sufficiency and fairness of the ballot title for a proposal modifying the right to bear arms in the state constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-election challenge to ballot titles can be brought under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 115. The Supreme Court held (1) a challenge to a ballot title may be brought either before an election under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 116 or after an election under chapter 115 if the issue has not been previously litigated and determined; and (2) because the ballot title’s description of the declarations added was sufficient and fair, Plaintiffs did not show an election irregularity under chapter 115. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

Airport Tech Partners, LLP and Stentor Company, LLC (collectively, Airport Tech) brought a declaratory judgment action against the State, arguing that section 137.115.1 violates the uniformity clause of the Missouri Constitution. Airport Tech claimed it had taxpayer standing to challenge the statute because a lower assessment of airport property owned by Kansas City likely would result in a high tax burden for Airport Tech. The trial court concluded that Airport Tech lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment because it presented only speculation that the statute relied on affected the level of the airport property’s assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that Airport Tech simply sought to attack the assessment of another’s property as a way to lower its own taxes. View "Airport Tech Partners, LLP v. State" on Justia Law

Shonda Ambers-Phillips and her husband, Richard Phillips, filed a medical malpractice action against SSM DePaul Health Center for leaving foreign objects in Ambers-Phillips’s abdomen nearly fourteen years earlier. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that Mo. Rev. Stat.’s ten-year statute of repose applied, making the Phillipses’ claims time-barred and subject to dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not holding that the statute of repose for foreign-object medical malpractice claims was equitably tolled until Ambers-Phillips discovered the wrong; and (2) statutes of repose are not unconstitutional if not subject to equitable tolling. View "Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree assault of a probation and parole officer. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion. The motion court appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Appellant in the proceeding. Ninety-one days later, Appellant’s appointed counsel filed an amended motion alleging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The amended motion was not timely. The motion court overruled the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed because the motion court did not make an independent inquiry under Luleff v. State into whether Appellant was abandoned by appointed counsel when the untimely amended motion was filed. Remanded for an independent inquiry into whether Appellant was abandoned by appointed counsel. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

Bohr Farms owned and operated a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) that accommodated more than 4,000 hogs. Cargill Pork, LLC owned the hogs. Appellants, several landowners and other individuals, brought this action against Cargill and Bohr Farms (together, Respondents), alleging damages for temporary nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy due to alleged offensive odors that emanated from the CAFO. Appellants did not claim damages for diminution in rental value or documented medical costs as authorized by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.296.2, but, rather, alleged that their damages for temporary nuisance consisted solely of the loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding, inter alia, that section 537.296 was constitutional and did not authorize an award of damages for Appellants’ alleged loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 537.296 is constitutional; and (2) Appellants’ nuisance, conspiracy and vicarious liability claims are inseparable from the nuisance allegations and are therefore barred by section 537.296.6(1). View "Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of forcible rape, one count of forcible sodomy, and five counts of armed criminal action. Defendant received two death sentences for the murder convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) failing to stop the trial and order a competency evaluation, as Defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he was not competent to stand trial; (2) granting Defendant’s requests to not remain in the courtroom during certain phases of his trial; (3) finding Defendant voluntarily waived his right to testify during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial; (4) overruling Defendant’s motion for a continuance to be medicated; (5) denying the jury’s request to view all of the exhibits admitted into evidence during the penalty phase; and (6) admitting victim impact testimony and evidence. Finally, the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty met the statutory requirements. View "State v. Driskill" on Justia Law

After the General Assembly enacted HB 1171, which amended Mo. Rev. Stat. 67.320 to permit any first-class county within a certain population range to establish a county municipal court division, the Franklin County Commission entered a county order establishing a municipal court division pursuant to the amended section 67.320. Taxpayers of Franklin County sued the members of the Commission, alleging that HB 1171’s enactment violated constitutional prohibitions against multiple subjects and change of original purpose and that the Commission’s order was void. On remand, the trial court concluded that HB 1171’s enactment was constitutional. While Taxpayers’ appeal was pending, the General Assembly passed SB 621, which repealed and reenacted section 67.320, including the language regarding establishment of a municipal court division. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, as Taxpayers’ appeal no longer represented an actual controversy. View "LeBeau v. Comm’rs of Franklin County" on Justia Law