Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The marriage of Husband and Wife was dissolved in 2003. In 2005 and 2006, the trial court reduced Husband's child support obligations and made no change to his maintenance obligation. While Husband's second appeal was pending, Wife filed a motion for attorney's fees on appeal. The trial court ordered Husband to pay $7,500 of Wife's attorney fees on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mo. Rev. Stat. 452.355, which grants the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction to enter an award of attorney fees on appeal while the appeal is pending, is not unconstitutional; (2) section 452.355 is not unconstitutionally vague because it provides sufficient guidance so as to allow a person of ordinary intelligence to understand the standards to be applied by the circuit court in making an award of attorney fees; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife attorney's fees on appeal.View "Goins v. Goins" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of failure to register as a sex offender pursuant to a plea agreement. After judgment was entered, Defendant filed a timely amended post-conviction motion seeking to vacate the judgment against him, contending that his plea counsel was ineffective and that the plea and sentencing court erred. Defendant’s post-conviction counsel subsequently withdrew from the case, and a second appointed lawyer filed a late second amended post-conviction motion. The circuit court overruled Defendant’s second amended motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the record refuted Defendant’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arguments raised in the late-filed second amended motion were time-barred; and (2) the motion court did not err in finding that Defendant was not entitled to a hearing on the claims raised in his first amended motion because the claims were refuted by the record. View "Stanley v. State" on Justia Law

Karen Chastain submitted to the Kansas City Clerk an initiative petition seeking adoption of an ordinance that would impose additional sales taxes for “capital improvements” and “transportation purposes.” The City filed a petition seeking a declaration that the proposed ordinance violated Mo. Const. art. III, 51. The trial court declared that the proposed ordinance was unconstitutional because the ordinance was used for the appropriation of money. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the ordinance violated article III, section 51 because the ordinance merely imposed additional sales taxes, and there was no appropriation. Remanded. View "City of Kansas City v. Chastain" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was HB 1171, which authorized the establishment of a county municipal court. Petitioners, residents and taxpayers of Franklin County, filed a declaratory judgment action against the commissioners of the County after the commissioners entered an order establishing a municipal court. Petitioners alleged that (1) HB 1171’s enactment violated the original purpose provision of Mo. Const. art. III, 21 and the single subject provision of Mo. Const. art. III, 23; and (2) the commissioners’ order was unconstitutional as a result of HB 1171’s constitutional invalidity. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the lawsuit was not ripe for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to proceed with their claim that the legislation at issue was enacted in violation of procedural constitutional provisions; and (2) the suit was ripe for review. Remanded. View "LeBeau v. Comm’rs of Franklin County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual misconduct involving a child pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.083 and two counts of attempted sexual misconduct involving a child. The convictions arose from incidents in which Defendant knowingly exposed his genitals to young girls from the front door or window of his house. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) section 566.083 is unconstitutionally overbroad because it infringes on activities protected by Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) the statute is unconstitutional as applied, and (3) insufficient evidence supported his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to show how section 566.083 serves to discourage citizens from engaging in protected speech, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the statute is overbroad; (2) section 566.083 is constitutional as applied to Defendant; and (3) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to convict Defendant of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.View "State v. Jeffrey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and denied her motion for post-conviction relief. Approximately thirteen years later, Defendant filed a motion to re-open her post-conviction proceedings, claiming that she had been abandoned by her appointed counsel and that her conviction should be vacated to correct a manifest injustice. The motion court denied Defendant relief, finding that Defendant's motion was a prohibited successive motion. The Supreme Court affirmed after directing attorneys in such situations to file a motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in overruling Defendant's motion, as a motion to "re-open" does not exist in the Court's rules.View "Eastburn v. State" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, three defendants challenged their charges under Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.150, which prohibits any individual who has been found guilty of various sex offenses from being present in five hundred feet of real property comprising any public park with playground equipment or a public swimming pool. Specifically, the defendants contended that Mo. Const. art. I, 13, which prohibits the passage of retrospective laws, applies to criminal laws, and therefore, their charges under section 566.150 were unconstitutional as applied. The circuit court (1) dismissed the charges against two defendants, Jason Peterson and Edwin Carey, on the grounds that section 566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to them, and (2) overruled defendant Michael Wade's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments with respect to Peterson and Carey and affirmed the judgment with respect to Wade, holding (1) as recently reaffirmed in State v. Honeycutt, the prohibition of laws retrospective in their operation does not apply to criminal laws; and (2) section 566.150 is a criminal law. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of forcible rape and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in excluding his mother and grandmother as testifying as surrebuttal witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in excluding Appellant's grandmother and mother from testifying in surrebuttal, and because the excluded testimony, if believed by the jury, would have bolstered Appellant's defense of consent and corroborated his testimony and would have contradicted the State's evidence of a necessary element of the crime, the error was prejudicial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting Appellant from asking venire panel members whether they could consider the possibility that two teenagers had consensual sexual intercourse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Ousley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for one of the murders. The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for a retrial of the penalty phase. At the retrial, Defendant was again sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief challenging various aspects of his penalty-phase retrial. The judge assigned to hear the Rule 29.15 motion had presided over Defendant's first trial, Defendant's first post-conviction motion hearing, and the penalty-phase retrial. The motion court overruled Defendant's second Rule 29.15 motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judge presiding over Defendant's post-conviction proceedings erred in overruling Defendant's motion to disqualify the judge for cause because a reasonable person could find an appearance of impropriety where the judge's references in the record to extrajudicial information in Defendant's first trial suggested that the judge relied on that information in ruling on Defendant's Rule 29.15 motion; and (2) therefore, recusal was required. Remanded. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault and armed criminal action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) Defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that three of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes violated his equal protection rights and right to a fair trial pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, and thus the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant's Batson challenges to the peremptory strikes; and (2) the trial court did not err in failing to admonish the prosecutor sua sponte or declare a mistrial for alleged prejudicial statements the prosecutor made during closing arguments. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law