Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and denied her motion for post-conviction relief. Approximately thirteen years later, Defendant filed a motion to re-open her post-conviction proceedings, claiming that she had been abandoned by her appointed counsel and that her conviction should be vacated to correct a manifest injustice. The motion court denied Defendant relief, finding that Defendant's motion was a prohibited successive motion. The Supreme Court affirmed after directing attorneys in such situations to file a motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in overruling Defendant's motion, as a motion to "re-open" does not exist in the Court's rules.View "Eastburn v. State" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, three defendants challenged their charges under Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.150, which prohibits any individual who has been found guilty of various sex offenses from being present in five hundred feet of real property comprising any public park with playground equipment or a public swimming pool. Specifically, the defendants contended that Mo. Const. art. I, 13, which prohibits the passage of retrospective laws, applies to criminal laws, and therefore, their charges under section 566.150 were unconstitutional as applied. The circuit court (1) dismissed the charges against two defendants, Jason Peterson and Edwin Carey, on the grounds that section 566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to them, and (2) overruled defendant Michael Wade's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments with respect to Peterson and Carey and affirmed the judgment with respect to Wade, holding (1) as recently reaffirmed in State v. Honeycutt, the prohibition of laws retrospective in their operation does not apply to criminal laws; and (2) section 566.150 is a criminal law. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of forcible rape and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in excluding his mother and grandmother as testifying as surrebuttal witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in excluding Appellant's grandmother and mother from testifying in surrebuttal, and because the excluded testimony, if believed by the jury, would have bolstered Appellant's defense of consent and corroborated his testimony and would have contradicted the State's evidence of a necessary element of the crime, the error was prejudicial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting Appellant from asking venire panel members whether they could consider the possibility that two teenagers had consensual sexual intercourse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Ousley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for one of the murders. The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for a retrial of the penalty phase. At the retrial, Defendant was again sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief challenging various aspects of his penalty-phase retrial. The judge assigned to hear the Rule 29.15 motion had presided over Defendant's first trial, Defendant's first post-conviction motion hearing, and the penalty-phase retrial. The motion court overruled Defendant's second Rule 29.15 motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judge presiding over Defendant's post-conviction proceedings erred in overruling Defendant's motion to disqualify the judge for cause because a reasonable person could find an appearance of impropriety where the judge's references in the record to extrajudicial information in Defendant's first trial suggested that the judge relied on that information in ruling on Defendant's Rule 29.15 motion; and (2) therefore, recusal was required. Remanded. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault and armed criminal action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) Defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that three of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes violated his equal protection rights and right to a fair trial pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, and thus the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant's Batson challenges to the peremptory strikes; and (2) the trial court did not err in failing to admonish the prosecutor sua sponte or declare a mistrial for alleged prejudicial statements the prosecutor made during closing arguments. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance to a minor and attempted statutory sodomy in the second degree. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years' imprisonment and placed Defendant in the sex offender assessment unit program pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.115. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) gaps in the trial transcript did not deny Defendant of meaningful appellate review; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defense witnesses due to a discovery violation; (3) the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the evidence of marijuana seized from Defendant's home without a warrant because Defendant freely consented to the search of his home; and (4) Defendant's argument that section 559.115 was unconstitutional as applied was without merit. View "State v. Hillman" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted use of a child in a sexual performance in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 568.080. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his constitutional right to protected speech was violated because his e-mail exchange with an officer posing as the sixteen-year-old victim did not contemplate or solicit a criminal act. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, holding (1) because Defendant attempted to induce the victim to engage in a sexual performance, Defendant was not punished for fantasy speech, and thus, section 568.080 was not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View " State v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

In 2011, the State Board of Education voted to classify the Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS) district as "unaccredited", which required accredited school districts to accept transfer of KCPS's students pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131. Taxpayers in five accredited school districts filed this action against KCPS and the State, asserting that section 167.131 violates the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution because it mandates that, in educating the transfer students, the school districts perform a new or increased level of activity. The trial court (1) concluded that the statute mandates a new activity but found that to violate the Hancock Amendment the activity must result in increased costs; and (2) entered judgment in favor of three school district taxpayers and against two school district taxpayers. While the case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court issued Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, which held that section 167.131 merely reallocates responsibilities for educating students among districts, which the Hancock Amendment does not prohibit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part based on Breitenfeld, holding that section 167.131 does not mandate a new or increased level of activity but merely reallocates responsibilities among school districts. View "Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree statutory sodomy. Appellant's conviction was confirmed on appeal. Appellant filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor committed misconduct. The motion court overruled Appellant's post-conviction relief motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief failed to allege facts not refuted conclusively by the record to support his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the motion court did not clearly err in finding that the prosecutor's conduct was appropriate. View "McIntosh v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.070.1(1). Under a 2008 amendment to the statute, a defendant commits unlawful possession of a firearm if he has been convicted of any other felony. The third count of the indictment alleged that Defendant had been convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance in September 2002. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the third count of the indictment, asserting (1) when he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, that conviction did not prohibit him from owning a firearm under the version of section 571.070 in effect at that time; and (2) the 2008 amendment of the statute, as applied to him and his 2002 conviction, violated the Missouri Constitution's ban on retrospective laws by imposing a "new duty or obligation" on him. The circuit court sustained Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Constitution's ban on the passage of any law retrospective in its operation does not apply to criminal laws; and (2) because section 571.070.1(1) is a criminal law, the circuit court erred in dismissing the charge against Defendant on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to him. View "State v. Honeycutt" on Justia Law