Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor criminal nonsupport. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal claiming Mo. Rev. Stat. 568.040 violated his due process rights because it forced him to disprove an element of the offense. Specifically, Defendant asserted that section 568.040 was unconstitutional because it makes lack of good cause an element of the crime of criminal support but then shifts the burden of proving good cause to the defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the statute makes lack of good cause an element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that Defendant's failure to pay the ordered child support was without good cause. View "State v. Holmes" on Justia Law

After the St. Louis Public School District (SLPS) became unaccredited in 2007 and was operated by the Transitional School District of St. Louis, some parents sought to have their children obtain Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131 transfers that would enable the children to attend school in the Clayton school district. The parents (Plaintiffs) also requested that the transitional school district pay for their children's education in Clayton. The trial court held in favor of the school districts (Defendants). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 167.131, the "Unaccredited District Tuition Statute," was applicable to the transitional school district and required that it pay Plaintiffs' children's tuition costs for attending Clayton. On remand, the trial court allowed taxpayers from Clayton and SLPS to intervene. The trial court found in favor of Defendants, holding that section 167.131 was unenforceable as applied to Defendants because (1) it violated the Hancock Amendment of the Missouri Constitution, and (2) Defendants' compliance with the statute was impossible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 167.131, as applied to Defendants, did not violate the Hancock Amendment; and (2) the trial court erred in finding it would be impossible for Defendants to comply with the requirements of the statute. Remanded. View "Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton" on Justia Law

A port authority sought to purchase a parcel of land owned by trustees of a family trust. After negotiations failed, the port authority filed a petition for condemnation of the parcel. The trustees argued that the sole purpose for the taking was economic development, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 523.271, and that the taking was for private use, in violation of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court ordered condemnation hearing, concluding (1) the taking did not violate section 523.271 because the taking would facilitate construction of a loop track and improve river commerce in addition to promoting economic development; and (2) the taking served the public purpose of promoting economic development. The trustees petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ because the circuit court failed to find any purpose for the taking that was not included in the legislature's definition of "economic development," and therefore, held that the proposed taking was in excess of the port authority's condemnation authority. View "State ex rel. Jackson v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first degree assault and armed criminal action (ACA). Defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court dismissed the motion as untimely filed because Defendant filed it within 180 days of his delivery to the department of corrections for his first degree assault sentence, which triggered the period in which he could file a post-conviction relief motion challenging that conviction and sentence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the triggering event was Defendant's previous delivery to the department of corrections to serve his ACA sentence imposed in the same judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in dismissing Defendant's motion as to his claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel because the claim was not timely filed; and (2) Defendant's claim that his counsel at his probation revocation hearing on his assault conviction was ineffective was not cognizable in a Rule 24.035 proceeding. View "Swallow v. State" on Justia Law

Employee was terminated from her employment after her driver's license was suspended due to her epilepsy. Employee filed this action against Employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Employee in the amount of $11,250 for compensatory damages. Employee filed a motion for additur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The circuit court sustained Employee's motion and gave the parties thirty days to accept a higher amount of compensatory damages or elect a new trial on these damages only. Employer would not agree to an enhanced compensatory damage award, and the circuit court ordered a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Employee's motion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. View "Badahman v. Catering St. Louis" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a declaration of candidacy to run for the position of Director of Community Fire Protection District (Community Fire). Community Fire accepted Respondent's declaration of candidacy, but Respondent was subsequently disqualified because his financial interest statement had not been timely filed. Fire Chief Charles Coyne filed a petition requesting the circuit court enter an order directing Respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the ballot. The trial court ruled that Respondent was disqualified from running for the position and ordered that his name be removed from the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, as (1) Chief Coyne had capacity to bring this action on behalf of Community Fire, which had standing to bring the action; (2) Respondent received adequate notice of his obligation to file a financial interest statement; and (3) the statutory financial interest statement notice requirements are constitutionally valid. View "Coyne v. Edwards" on Justia Law

This appeal involved Missouri Senate Bill No. 7 (SB 7), which enacted fourteen new sections relating to science and innovation, with a contingent effective date. Section B of the Act hinged the effectiveness of SB 7 upon the passage of Senate Bill No. 8 (SB 8), which related to taxation. Despite the failure of the General Assembly to pass SB 8, various agencies began to implement Section A of SB 7 regarding science and innovation. Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. (Roundtable) filed suit seeking to enjoining the implementation of SB 7 and reverse any actions already taken to execute its provisions. The circuit court concluded that SB 7 was unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the single subject provision of Mo. Const. art. III, 23. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported (1) the circuit court's conclusion that SB 7 is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the single subject provision of article III, section 23, and (2) the court's factual finding and legal conclusion that Section B could not be severed from the remainder of SB 7 under the facts of this case. View "Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, forcible rape, attempted forcible rape, and forcible sodomy. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his incriminating statements to police because the statements were made involuntarily in reliance on an agreement the state failed to honor, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of two separate counts of first-degree robbery. The Supreme Court (1) vacated Defendant's for first-degree robbery as charged in the second count based on the state's concession Defendant was wrongfully subjected to multiple convictions for taking multiple items of property from the victim in the course of a single incident; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting Defendant's pretrial statements, as the facts clearly supported the trial court's finding that Defendant's statements were voluntary. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Plaintiff was found guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the trial court did not plainly err in its rulings regarding the jury and jury instructions; (2) the prosecutor did not engage in improper arguments or make improper comments; (3) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (4) the trial court did not err in its rulings during the penalty phase; and (5) in this case, the death penalty complied with all statutorily proportionality requirements. View "State v. McFadden" on Justia Law

In 2010, the General Assembly enacted the Missouri Secure and Fair Enforcement Mortgage Licensing Act (Missouri SAFE Act), which provides that the director of the Missouri Division of Finance shall not issue a mortgage loan originator license to an applicant who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony within seven years prior to the date of the application. When Plaintiff subsequently submitted an application for a mortgage loan originator license, the director denied the license pursuant to the Act because Plaintiff had pleaded guilty to a felony in 2006. The circuit court entered a declaratory judgment finding that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to Plaintiff, the statute (1) was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder; (2) did not violate the Missouri Constitution's ban on retrospective laws; and (3) did not violate Plaintiff's right to procedural and substantive due process. View "Garozzo v. Mo. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Fin." on Justia Law