Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Molly Teichman, as a citizen and qualified voter, filed a petition for permanent writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent the secretary of state from holding an election based on either the original or revised Senate plan and map submitted by the nonpartisan senate reapportionment commission. The Supreme Court sustained the petition and directed that a writ of prohibition issue to the secretary of state, holding (1) the commission had no authority to revise the reapportionment process on its own volition even if a majority of the members of the commission recognized a constitutional infirmity in the plan and map that had been unanimously signed and filed; (2) the original plan and map violated a clear and express constitutional limitation regarding the splitting of counties and was, therefore, invalid; and (3) Mo. Const. art. III, 7 compelled the legislative process to be redone in accordance with its terms. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Teichman v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

The city of Winchester and its collector (Winchester) filed a class action lawsuit against Charter Communications on behalf of itself and other similarly situated Missouri municipal corporations and political subdivisions, seeking a declaratory judgment requiring Charter and other telephone service providers to comply with ordinances requiring them to pay a license tax on gross receipts derived from fees and services connected to their operations and an order requiring Charter to pay all license taxes owed to the class. The circuit court struck Winchester's claims on the basis of Mo. Rev. Stat. 71.675, which bars cities and towns from serving as class representatives in suits to enforce or collect business license taxes imposed on telecommunications companies. The Supreme Court quashed the court's preliminary writ of prohibition and granted Winchester's request for a permanent writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the court exceeded its authority in striking Winchester's class action allegations pursuant to section 71.675, as the statute violated Mo. Const. art. V, 5 because it amended a procedural rule of the Court. View "State ex rel. Collector of Winchester v. Circuit Court (Jamison)" on Justia Law

Six state citizens and qualified voters residing in various areas of the state brought an action against the attorney general and secretary of state. A second group of citizens and qualified voters filed an action against the secretary of state, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Both sets of plaintiffs alleged that a redistricting map and configuration of certain districts were not valid under Mo. Const. art. III, 45. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The circuit court granted both motions and dismissed both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments, holding that the pleadings raised issues of fact concerning whether various districts were "composed of contiguous terrority as compact...as may be" under Mo. Const. art. III, 45, and therefore, the motions to dismiss could not be sustained because the facts alleged met the elements of a recognized cause of action. Remanded. View "Pearson v. Koster" on Justia Law

Jesse Dorris, Jose Lopez-McCurdy and Louis Hill were denied the right to appeal their post-conviction relief motions on the merits because they were filed out of time. The State did not raise the issue of timeliness below. The Supreme Court (1) held that, pursuant to Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 and 24.035 (the Rules), the motion court had no authority to hear the motions, regardless of the State's failure to raise the issue, because the motions were filed out of time; (2) affirmed the dismissal of Dorris' and Lopez-McCurdy's cases because they were filed outside the mandatory time limits provided in the Rules and resulted in Dorris and Lopez-McCurdy completely waiving their post-conviction relief claims; and (3) remanded Hill's case for a hearing on the timeliness of his motion. View "Dorris v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ines Letica was found guilty of first degree assault and armed criminal action. During voir dire, defense counsel used peremptory challenges to strike four Caucasion females from the panel, to which the State raised a reverse-Batson objection, alleging that a certain venireperson was struck with the peremptory challenge on the basis of gender, race or ethnic origin. The circuit court sustained the objection as to the venireperson. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it ruled prematurely on the reverse-Batson challenge and did not require the State to demonstrate that racial or gender discrimination was the motivating factor for the peremptory strike, but the error was harmless under the facts in this case; (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict; (3) Letica's sentences did not constitute plain error; (4) there was no prosecutorial misconduct in this case; and (5) the admission into evidence of certain photographs did not constitute manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. View "State v. Letica" on Justia Law

This case involved four appeals that were consolidated because each involved the issue of whether evidence obtained in a search of a motor vehicle incident to a traffic arrest was admissible. In each case, there was no reason to believe that evidence of the crime for which each Defendant was arrested was in any of their vehicles. The searches were performed in compliance with binding appellate precedent, but while these cases were pending, Arizona v. Gant was decided, holding that such searches were unlawful. Each defendant, relying on Gant, filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the exclusionary rule suppresses evidence obtained in a search conducted in compliance with binding precedent when such precedent was later overturned. The Supreme Court held (1) in accord with Davis v. U.S., the exclusionary rule did not apply because the searching officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on settled, binding appellate precedent; and (2) the trial court's judgments sustaining the motions to suppress in three cases were reversed and remanded, and the trial court's judgment in the remaining case overruling the defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious restraint, deviate sexual assault, and first-degree sexual misconduct. Prior to sentencing, Defendant entered into an agreement with the State in which Defendant would plead guilty to two additional criminal counts and waive his rights to a jury trial, to direct appeal, and to seek post-conviction relief. In exchange, the State recommended that Defendant be sentenced to a combined total of fifteen years incarceration on all counts. The circuit court rendered and judgment and sentence in accord with the agreement. Defendant subsequently filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for, inter alia, incorrectly advising Defendant to waive his rights to a direct appeal. The motion court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court's judgment, holding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to waive his post-conviction rights after his trial. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Defendant's post-conviction motion. View "Krupp v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of stealing property of a value of more than $500. As part of the plea agreement, Cooper waived his right to file any future motion for post-conviction relief under Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 in exchange for the State recommending a fifteen-year sentence on each count to run concurrently with a suspended execution of the sentences and a five-year probationary term. The circuit court rendered judgment and sentences in accord with the plea agreement. After Defendant violated the terms of his probation, his fifteen-year sentences were ordered executed. Defendant subsequently filed a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that defense counsel was ineffective. The motion court overruled the motion on the merits. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court's judgment, holding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his post-conviction rights. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Defendant's post-conviction motion. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

Several businesses filed a petition in the circuit court challenging the validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 573.525 to 573.540, which regulate certain aspects of sexually oriented businesses in Missouri. The businesses argued that the limitations contained in the statutes concerning, among other things, touching of dancers by patrons and buffer zones around dancers violated the businesses' freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the restrictions were not content-based limitations on speech but rather were aimed at limiting the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on the health, welfare, and safety of Missouri residents; (2) the statutes were reasonable time, place and manner or comparable restrictions, and accordingly, the statutes did not unconstitutionally limit speech; and (3) the General Assembly did not violate Mo. Rev. Stat. 23.140 in enacting the statutes. View "Ocello v. Koster" on Justia Law

Ashley Morse was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Director of Revenue administratively suspended Morse's license for ninety days. Morse completed the suspension as well as the other requirements for reinstatement of her license, including completing a substance abuse traffic offender program, showing proof of liability insurance coverage, and paying reinstatement fees. Morse was later convicted for DWI after violating the conditions of her probation. The Director informed Morse that her driving privileges would again be suspended Morse once more had to complete the requirements for reinstatement of her license. The district court granted Morse's petition for de novo review and entered a judgment in favor of Morse, concluding that Morse's first administrative suspension had to be credited against the second administrative suspension pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.525.4 because both suspensions arose from the same occurrence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in holding that giving Morse credit for her first period of suspension eliminated her obligation to offer proof of insurance and to pay reinstatement fees to obtain reinstatement of her driver's license. View "Morse v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law