Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of St. Peters enacted ordinance 4536 to authorize the use of an automated red light enforcement system. The ordinance creates an offense when a person fails to comply with the City Traffic Code and the violation is detected throughout the automated enforcement system. After a jury trial, Bonnie Roeder was found guilty of violating ordinance 4536. The trial court subsequently dismissed the charge against Roeder, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with state law by not assessing points against a violator’s driving record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ordinance 4536 conflicts with Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.302.1, which requires the assessment of two points for a moving violation, because ordinance 4536 creates a moving violation and states that no points will be assessed. View "City of St. Peters v. Roeder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the felon-in-possession law violates the Missouri Constitution’s protection of his right to bear arms. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Missouri Constitution’s right to bear arms provision - article I, section 23 - was amended to state that courts must apply strict scrutiny to laws restricting the right to bear arms. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the prior version of article I, section 23 applies in this case; (2) as this Court necessarily held in Doston v. Kander, strict scrutiny applies under the prior version of article I, section 23; and (3) the felon-in-possession law survives strict scrutiny and does not violate article I, section 23’s protection of Defendant’s right to bear arms. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to sixteen years in prison as a prior and persistent drug offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony from a witness to Defendant’s arrest, as the witness’s testimony was not relevant as a direct observation of the crime or surrounding circumstances, was not proper evidence to impeach the arresting officers’ credibility, and did not contradict the officers’ testimony; and (2) did not violate Defendant’s due process right to allocution during his sentencing hearing, as Defendant failed to show that the court did not consider mitigating evidence in determining his sentence, and the court received mitigating evidence when Defendant was heard on his motion for a new trial. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree trespass, second-degree assault, and armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six months in jail for trespass and seven years each in prison for the assault and armed criminal action convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to submit to the jury Defendant’s proffered jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of third-degree assault, as the offense of third-degree assault is a “nested” lesser-included offense within the offense of second-degree assault. Remanded. View "State v. Randle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree domestic assault and witness tampering. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences of five years imprisonment for second-degree assault and two years for witness tampering. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the trial court erred by refusing to submit Defendant’s proffered jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of domestic assault in the third degree; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining Defendant’s charges and overruling his motion for severance, as it is unlikely that joining the assault and witness tampering charges would confuse the jury or invite the jury to convict Defendant based on irrelevant evidence. Remanded. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In 1993, Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree sex abuse, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2012, Respondent filed a petition to be removed from Missouri’s sex offender registry and to be relieved from his obligation to register as a sex offender. The circuit court granted Respondent the relief he requested. The Missouri Attorney General subsequently filed a motion to intervene as a matter of right on behalf of itself, the State, and the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP), seeking to set aside the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in overruling the Attorney General’s motion to intervene because (1) the Attorney General had the unconditional statutory right to intervene in Respondent’s action; and (2) the MSHP had an absolute right to intervene. Remanded. View "Dunivan v. State" on Justia Law

Larry Welch pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree involuntary manslaughter and two counts of second-degree assault. Defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of the offenses. Welch was sentenced to two concurrent fifteen-year terms of imprisonment on the involuntary manslaughter counts and two concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment on the assault counts, to be served consecutively to the involuntary manslaughter sentences. Welch later moved for a reduction of his sentences under Mo. Rev. Stat. 558.046, which permits a reduction of sentence only when the inmate has been convicted of an alcohol-related crime that does not involve violence or the threat of violence. The circuit court granted the motion and ordered Welch’s involuntary manslaughter sentences to be reduced to two concurrent seven-year sentences. The prosecutor filed a petition for writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to reduce Welch’s involuntary manslaughter sentences. The Supreme Court granted a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it made permanent, holding that the trial court had no authority to reduce Welch’s involuntary manslaughter sentences pursuant to section 558.046 because violent conduct was a necessary component of Welch’s crime. View "State ex rel. Richardson v. Hon. Daniel R. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony criminal nonsupport. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt of criminal nonsupport. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented evidence as to what would constitute “adequate support”; (2) contrary to Defendant’s argument, the State must not present evidence of a lack of in-kind support - such as food, clothing, medicine, or lodging - in order to make a prima facie case of lack of support under Mo. Rev. Stat. 468.040; and (3) there was adequate evidence to make a prima facie case that Defendant failed to provide adequate support for his child. View "State v. Claycomb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree arson. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder. Before the jury began deliberating, the trial court excused Juror 14, who was an alternate juror. After the jury had begun deliberating, Juror 12 was excused due to health concerns, and Juror 14 was substituted for Juror 12. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly substituted Juror 14 after deliberations had begun. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by substituting a discharged alternate juror after the jury had retired to consider its verdict, and the error deprived Defendant of his statutory right to have the same twelve jurors deliberate and decide his case. View "State v. Amick" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery. Defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because he did not forcibly steal the money through the use or threatened use of force. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Defendant committed the crime of second-degree robbery because he forcibly stole the money by means of an actual or attempted threat. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law