Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the State charged Bob Beisly with the 2009 death of Belinda Beisley. Wilma Jean Irwin subsequently filed a wrongful death action against Beisly. Beisly moved to dismiss Irwin’s action, arguing that her claim was time-barred by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.100, the wrongful death statute of limitations. Irwin opposed the motion, arguing that Beisly should be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense due to his fraudulent concealment of his wrongdoing. The circuit court overruled Beisly’s motion, stating that allowing Beisly to escape civil liability on the basis of the statute of limitations was “shocking to the conscience.” Beisly sought a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. After opinion by that court, the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court quashed the preliminary order in prohibition, holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel foreclosed Beisly from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense due to the fraudulent concealment of his wrongdoing. View "State ex rel. Beisly v. Hon. Perigo" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating the City of Moline Acres Ordinance 395.010. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the Ordinance and the City’s Notice of Violation contradicted state law and/or violated due process. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s motion and dismissed the charge with prejudice on the ground that the Ordinance and Notice contradicted state speeding statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both the Ordinance and Notice are invalid because (1) the Ordinance’s rebuttable presumption that anyone driving an owner’s vehicle does so with the owner’s permission is not constitutionally permissible; and (2) the information charging Defendant is invalid because it is not supported by a notice that conforms to the requirements of Rule 37.33. View "City of Moline Acres v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful possession charges, claiming that the felon-in-possession law violates the Missouri Constitution’s protection of his right to bear arms. The circuit court sustained the motion. The State appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Missouri Constitution’s right to bear arms provision - article I, section 23 - was amended to state that courts must apply strict scrutiny to laws restricting the right to bear arms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prior version of article I, section 23 applies in this case; (2) as this Court held in Doston v. Kander, strict scrutiny applies under the prior version of article I, section 23; and (3) the felon-in-possession law survives strict scrutiny and does not violate article I, section 23’s protection of Defendant’s right to bear arms. Remanded. View "State v. Merritt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each received notices that they had violated ordinance 66868, the City of St. Louis’s red light camera ordinance. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the validity of the ordinance and seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is invalid and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. The City subsequently dismissed the pending prosecutions against Plaintiffs. After a bench trial, the court enjoined the City from enforcing ordinance 66868, concluding that the ordinance was invalid, but denied Plaintiffs’ petition as to the rest of the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs could maintain their action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief because, after the City dismissed the prosecutions for the ordinance violations, Plaintiffs no longer had an adequate legal remedy; (2) ordinance 66868 is constitutionally invalid because it creates a rebuttable presumption that improperly shifts the burden of persuasion onto the defendant to prove that the defendant was not operating the motor vehicle at the time of the violation; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding attorney’s fees. View "Tupper v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

The City of St. Peters enacted ordinance 4536 to authorize the use of an automated red light enforcement system. The ordinance creates an offense when a person fails to comply with the City Traffic Code and the violation is detected throughout the automated enforcement system. After a jury trial, Bonnie Roeder was found guilty of violating ordinance 4536. The trial court subsequently dismissed the charge against Roeder, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with state law by not assessing points against a violator’s driving record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ordinance 4536 conflicts with Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.302.1, which requires the assessment of two points for a moving violation, because ordinance 4536 creates a moving violation and states that no points will be assessed. View "City of St. Peters v. Roeder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the felon-in-possession law violates the Missouri Constitution’s protection of his right to bear arms. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Missouri Constitution’s right to bear arms provision - article I, section 23 - was amended to state that courts must apply strict scrutiny to laws restricting the right to bear arms. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the prior version of article I, section 23 applies in this case; (2) as this Court necessarily held in Doston v. Kander, strict scrutiny applies under the prior version of article I, section 23; and (3) the felon-in-possession law survives strict scrutiny and does not violate article I, section 23’s protection of Defendant’s right to bear arms. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to sixteen years in prison as a prior and persistent drug offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony from a witness to Defendant’s arrest, as the witness’s testimony was not relevant as a direct observation of the crime or surrounding circumstances, was not proper evidence to impeach the arresting officers’ credibility, and did not contradict the officers’ testimony; and (2) did not violate Defendant’s due process right to allocution during his sentencing hearing, as Defendant failed to show that the court did not consider mitigating evidence in determining his sentence, and the court received mitigating evidence when Defendant was heard on his motion for a new trial. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree trespass, second-degree assault, and armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six months in jail for trespass and seven years each in prison for the assault and armed criminal action convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to submit to the jury Defendant’s proffered jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of third-degree assault, as the offense of third-degree assault is a “nested” lesser-included offense within the offense of second-degree assault. Remanded. View "State v. Randle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree domestic assault and witness tampering. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences of five years imprisonment for second-degree assault and two years for witness tampering. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the trial court erred by refusing to submit Defendant’s proffered jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of domestic assault in the third degree; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining Defendant’s charges and overruling his motion for severance, as it is unlikely that joining the assault and witness tampering charges would confuse the jury or invite the jury to convict Defendant based on irrelevant evidence. Remanded. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In 1993, Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree sex abuse, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2012, Respondent filed a petition to be removed from Missouri’s sex offender registry and to be relieved from his obligation to register as a sex offender. The circuit court granted Respondent the relief he requested. The Missouri Attorney General subsequently filed a motion to intervene as a matter of right on behalf of itself, the State, and the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP), seeking to set aside the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in overruling the Attorney General’s motion to intervene because (1) the Attorney General had the unconditional statutory right to intervene in Respondent’s action; and (2) the MSHP had an absolute right to intervene. Remanded. View "Dunivan v. State" on Justia Law