Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rachel Johns sought the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76. She filed a declaration of candidacy with the Missouri Secretary of State, in which she stated under oath, that she “will qualify” to hold the office of state representative pursuant to the Missouri Constitution’s requirements for that office. Respondent Joshua Peters, another candidate for the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76, filed a petition pursuant to section 115.526, RSMo 2000, seeking to disqualify Johns as a candidate and have her name removed from any official election ballot. Peters argued that Johns could not meet the two-year durational voter registration requirement of article III, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution because she did not register to vote until February 4, 2015, which was less than two years before the general election date of November 8, 2016. Although Johns agreed that she did not meet the two-year voter registration requirement, she argued that such requirement is constitutionally invalid as applied to her. The circuit court determined that the voter registration requirement did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Johns appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The State’s justification for the durational voter registration requirement’s burden on voting rights is the same as the justification it offers for the burden on Johns herself. The State’s interests in regulating the fairness of its elections and ensuring that candidates for state representative demonstrate sufficient seriousness about the electoral systems and social and civic engagement are legitimate. The two-year durational voter registration requirement is rationally related to those interests and a reasonable method of furthering them. Accordingly, article III, section 4 does not violate the First Amendment voting rights of the voters of District 76." View "Peters v. Johns" on Justia Law

Gerald Geier, an accountant, was the treasurer of Stop Now!, a Missouri political action committee (PAC). Geier was required to register the PAC with the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC). Stop Now! became inactive after 2003, and the PAC’s bank account closed in 2006. When Stop Now! failed to file disclosure reports for the first three quarters of 2011, the MEC opened an investigation. The MEC subsequently filed a complaint against Geier and Stop Now!, alleging that they violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 13.046.1, 130.021.4(1) and 130.021.7 by failing to timely file disclosure reports and failing to notify the MEC of the closure of the PAC’s bank account. After a hearing, the MEC found probable cause that Geier and Stop Now! knowingly violated the applicable statutes. Geier sought judicial review, challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of the reporting statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the MEC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reporting statutes are constitutional as applied; (2) Geier’s challenges to the facial validity of the reporting statutes are not ripe; (3) section 105.961.3, the statute that requires the MEC’s hearings be closed to the public, does not violate the First or Sixth Amendments; and (4) the MEC had authority to investigate Geier. View "Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Plaintiff challenged the sufficiency and fairness of the ballot title for a proposal modifying the right to bear arms in the state constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-election challenge to ballot titles can be brought under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 115. The Supreme Court held (1) a challenge to a ballot title may be brought either before an election under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 116 or after an election under chapter 115 if the issue has not been previously litigated and determined; and (2) because the ballot title’s description of the declarations added was sufficient and fair, Plaintiffs did not show an election irregularity under chapter 115. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an election contest challenging the summary statement in the ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment, arguing that the ballot title was insufficient and unfair. At issue in this case, like Dotson v. Kander, was whether a challenge to a ballot title may be brought after voters have adopted the measure. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs were entitled to bring a post-election challenge to the ballot title because Dotson held that Mo. Rev. Stat. chapters 115 and 116 allow for such challenges; and (2) the ballot title was sufficient and fair, and therefore, the results of the election adopting the amendment were valid. View "Shoemyer v. Kander" on Justia Law

On May 7, 2014, the General Assembly passed the Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolution 36 (SJR 36). On June 13, 2014, the secretary of state certified the official ballot title. The ballot title was then placed on the August 5, 2014 state primary election ballot pursuant to the governor’s decision calling for a special election on SJR 36. After the ballot title was certified, two groups of Appellants filed suit challenging the fairness and sufficiency of the summary statement in the ballot title. The trial court consolidated the cases and, on July 1, 2014, determined that the cases were moot because Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.125.2 prohibits changes to a ballot title within six weeks of the election. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that, pursuant to section 115.125.2, the Court could not grant effectual relief to Appellants. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

Karen Chastain submitted to the Kansas City Clerk an initiative petition seeking adoption of an ordinance that would impose additional sales taxes for “capital improvements” and “transportation purposes.” The City filed a petition seeking a declaration that the proposed ordinance violated Mo. Const. art. III, 51. The trial court declared that the proposed ordinance was unconstitutional because the ordinance was used for the appropriation of money. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the ordinance violated article III, section 51 because the ordinance merely imposed additional sales taxes, and there was no appropriation. Remanded. View "City of Kansas City v. Chastain" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a declaration of candidacy to run for the position of Director of Community Fire Protection District (Community Fire). Community Fire accepted Respondent's declaration of candidacy, but Respondent was subsequently disqualified because his financial interest statement had not been timely filed. Fire Chief Charles Coyne filed a petition requesting the circuit court enter an order directing Respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the ballot. The trial court ruled that Respondent was disqualified from running for the position and ordered that his name be removed from the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, as (1) Chief Coyne had capacity to bring this action on behalf of Community Fire, which had standing to bring the action; (2) Respondent received adequate notice of his obligation to file a financial interest statement; and (3) the statutory financial interest statement notice requirements are constitutionally valid. View "Coyne v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The appeals consolidated in this opinion arose from lawsuits challenging three proposed initiatives - a tobacco tax initiative, a minimum wage initiative, and a payday loan initiative. The underlying suits sought to prevent the initiatives from appearing on Missouri's ballot for the November 2012 election. Each of the cases challenged the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 116.175, which directs that the state auditor "shall assess the fiscal impact of" any proposed initiative petition and prepare a fiscal note and fiscal note summary. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in the tobacco initiative case, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in the minimum wage case, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in the payday loan initiative cases, holding (1) section 116.175's statutory directives do not conflict with Mo. Const. art IV, 13, which provides that no duty shall be imposed on the state auditor by law which is not related to the supervising and auditing of the receipt and expenditure of public funds; and (2) the secretary of state's summary statements and the auditor's fiscal notes and fiscal note summaries for the proposed initiatives were fair and sufficient View "Brown v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the amendments to the state earnings tax statutes, Mo. Rev. Stat. 92.105 through 92.125, raising several arguments. The trial court dismissed Appellants' second amended petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the amendments did not violate Mo. Const. art. III, 51, as the initiative was not used for a de facto appropriation of money to pay the election costs to continue the earnings tax; (2) the requirement to hold recurring elections without providing state funds did not constitute an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment; and (3) Appellants did not state a claim for violation of an amendment to the city charter of Kansas City because the initiative process did not amend Kansas City's charter, and therefore, the constitutional requirements of Mo. Const. art. VI, 20 regarding amendments to a city's charter were not applicable. View "Dujakovich v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

Jamilah Nasheed appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of Robin Wright-Jones on Wright-Jones' petition challenging the qualifications of Nasheed to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state senator for the 5th district. The trial court found the residency requirement of the Missouri Constitution was ambiguous and Nasheed did not satisfy that requirement to run in the 5th district. An exception in Mo. Const. art. III, 6 provides that if the repportionment of the districts is less than one year before the general election, candidates may reside in any district from which a portion was incorporated into the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that incorporated portion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nasheed was eligible to run in the 5th district because the exception did not require Nasheed to live within the boundaries of the reapportioned senate district she sought to represent. View "Wright-Jones v. Nasheed " on Justia Law