Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jessica Goodman, the Saline County Assessor, filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding the correct classification of Saline County under Missouri law. Goodman argued that Saline County should be classified as a third-class county based on its assessed valuation over five years, rather than its current classification as a second-class county. The County moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the statute in question, section 48.020.1, exempts Saline County from reclassification regardless of changes in assessed valuation.The Circuit Court of Saline County dismissed Goodman’s petition. Goodman appealed the decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, believing that the case involved the validity of a state statute, which would fall under the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that it did not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction because Goodman did not properly raise a constitutional challenge to the statute in question. Goodman’s arguments against the County’s interpretation of the statute did not amount to a direct claim that the statute was unconstitutional. As a result, the Supreme Court of Missouri retransferred the case back to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, for further proceedings. View "Goodman vs. Saline County Commission" on Justia Law

Phillip Weeks filed a lawsuit against the City of Webster Groves and St. Louis County, alleging violations of Missouri’s Sunshine Law for failing to produce public records he requested. Weeks sought raw data files from vehicle stop forms, including officer identification numbers (DSNs), for specific years. Webster Groves and St. Louis County, which use the Regional Justice Information Services (REJIS) for data storage, did not fully comply with his requests. Webster Groves claimed the Sunshine Law did not require creating new records, while St. Louis County initially provided some data but later redacted the DSNs, arguing they were exempt from disclosure.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted summary judgment in favor of Webster Groves and St. Louis County. The court found that the DSNs were not responsive to Weeks' requests and that the Sunshine Law did not require the creation of new records. Additionally, St. Louis County argued that the DSNs were exempt under sections 610.021(3) and (13) of the Sunshine Law, which pertain to personnel records and information related to employee performance.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment. The court held that the record did not establish whether the DSNs were part of the requested vehicle stop data or if they were exempt from disclosure. The court emphasized that the Sunshine Law requires public records to be open unless specifically exempt and that the exemptions must be strictly construed. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the DSNs are public records and if any exemptions apply. View "Weeks vs. St. Louis County, MO." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Benjamin Ramirez, who, on behalf of a putative class, sued the Director and the Treasurer of the Missouri Department of Revenue in their official capacities. Ramirez had resolved criminal charges against him by pleading guilty and paying court costs, including certain mandatory surcharges. These surcharges were then paid to various funds, as authorized by Missouri statute. Ramirez alleged that the Director and the Treasurer received payment of, collected, and deposited the surcharges in and otherwise managed these funds. He claimed a single count of unjust enrichment and asserted the statutes authorizing the surcharges violate a section of the Missouri Constitution.The Director and the Treasurer moved for summary judgment, asserting that Ramirez’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity and the statutes authorizing the surcharges do not violate the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court sustained the motion, concluding the statutes authorizing the surcharges do not violate the Missouri Constitution. Ramirez appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that sovereign immunity, a common law judicial doctrine barring suit against a government or public entity, applied to Ramirez's claim for unjust enrichment. The court noted that sovereign immunity is the default rule in all suits against the state and applies to non-tort claims. The court found that the state had not waived its sovereign immunity through express statutory consent or a recognized common law exception. Therefore, Ramirez's unjust enrichment suit against the Director and the Treasurer was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Ramirez vs. Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys' & Circuit Attorneys' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants, collectively referred to as "Challengers", who appealed judgments declaring section 67.1175.1 of the Missouri Statutes constitutionally invalid. This provision, in conjunction with section 67.1177, required a political subdivision to grant public money to a private entity, which was deemed to violate article VI, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court attempted to rectify the constitutional invalidity by modifying section 67.1175.1. The Challengers, however, argued that despite the modification, the sections still required a political subdivision to grant public money to a private entity in violation of the constitution. They further argued that the entire statutory scheme must be struck down because the sections were not severable.The circuit court had declared section 67.1175.1 constitutionally invalid because it mandated the lake area business districts to transfer tax funds to the advisory board, a private nonprofit entity. The court modified the section by removing the phrase "which shall be a nonprofit entity". The Challengers appealed this decision, arguing that the modified sections still violated the constitution.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the circuit court erred in modifying section 67.1175.1. The court concluded that the section, as modified, and section 67.1177, still required political subdivisions to grant public money to a private entity, violating the Missouri Constitution. The court also concluded that the void provisions were not severable from the remaining provisions of the statutory scheme. As a result, the entire statutory scheme was declared constitutionally invalid. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed, and the Supreme Court entered the judgment the circuit court should have entered, declaring sections 67.1170, 67.1175, 67.1177, and 67.1170 constitutionally invalid and void in their entireties. View "Salamun v. The Camden County Clerk" on Justia Law

In 2019, MO CANN Do, Inc. (MCD) applied for a medical marijuana cultivation license in Missouri. However, the Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) rejected MCD's application as it failed to include a certificate of good standing demonstrating its authorization to operate as a business in Missouri. An administrative hearing commission upheld DHSS's decision, and MCD appealed to the circuit court, which also affirmed the decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that MCD's application did not meet the minimum standards for licensure, as it failed to provide a certificate of good standing from the Secretary of State, as required by DHSS's regulations. MCD argued that its certificate of incorporation satisfied the standard requiring proof of authorization to operate as a business in Missouri, but the Court disagreed, stating that the regulatory language was unambiguous and the certificate of good standing was a specific requirement.MCD further argued that DHSS waived the certificate of good standing requirement by failing to specify it in the deficiency letter sent to MCD. The Court rejected this argument, stating that DHSS never affirmatively waived the deficiencies in MCD's application.Lastly, MCD claimed that DHSS should be estopped from denying its application based on the missing certificate of good standing due to its failure to notify MCD of this specific deficiency. The Court denied this claim, stating that it is generally inappropriate to estop governmental agencies tasked with administrating licensure in highly regulated industries, which include the marijuana industry. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "MO CANN Do, Inc. vs. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services" on Justia Law

The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in a case involving the St. Louis County Assessor ("Assessor") and a group of St. Louis County commercial property owners, referred to as "Taxpayers." The Taxpayers alleged that their properties were assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value (FMV) than other commercial properties in the county. This claim is known as a "ratio discrimination" claim. The Taxpayers appealed their assessments to the local board of equalization ("BOE") and the Missouri State Tax Commission ("STC"). In some of the appeals, the BOE and STC did not change the Assessor's original FMV and assessed value, while in others, they ordered reductions in the estimated FMV of the property, resulting in a lower assessed value and decreased tax liability.The STC found that the Taxpayers did not provide substantial and persuasive evidence of discrimination. The Taxpayers then filed a petition for judicial review, and the circuit court reversed the STC's decision and order and remanded the case for retrial. The Assessor appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which found that the STC's decision was authorized by law and supported by substantial evidence. The Court agreed with the STC that the Taxpayers did not provide persuasive evidence of discriminatory assessment. The Court held that the actual assessment level used to analyze a claim of discriminatory assessment and taxation is based on the assessed value that actually determines the tax liability. The Court also found that the STC did not abuse its discretion by denying certain discovery requests and quashing subpoenas for the deposition of the Assessor and several staff appraisers. The circuit court's judgment was vacated, and the STC's decision and order was reinstated. View "Crown Diversified Industries Corp. v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

In the case of City of St. Louis and Heather Taylor (“Appellants”) versus State of Missouri (“State”), the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed Senate Bill No. 26 (“SB 26”) that was challenged for being unconstitutional. SB 26, introduced in December 2020 and signed into law in July 2021, contained 88 sections related to public safety, including procedures for imposing discipline on law enforcement officers and provisions for the offense of “unlawful traffic interference.”Appellants argued that SB 26 violated the Missouri Constitution on several grounds, including that it violated the original-purpose and single-subject rules, that it created an unfunded mandate, that it imposed additional duties on officers and employees of a constitutional charter city, that it used public funds for private purposes, and that it created unequal treatment between law enforcement officers and other city employees.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the City had sufficiently pleaded the elements of a Hancock Amendment violation, which prohibits the state from requiring new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state financing. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment was reversed on this point and the case was remanded for further proceedings.However, the court affirmed the judgment with respect to Appellants' other points. It found that SB 26 had the same purpose as enacted as introduced, did not impose new duties on city employees or allocate funds for public purposes, and had a rational basis for treating law enforcement officers differently from other city employees. The court also found that SB 26 did not violate the original-purpose and single-subject rules, did not impose additional duties on officers and employees of a constitutional charter city, did not use public funds for private purposes, and did not create unequal treatment between law enforcement officers and other city employees. View "City of St. Louis v. State" on Justia Law

On August 12, 2018, Rachel Sender suffered injuries in a bicycle accident on a bike path in Forest Park, St. Louis. Sender claimed her injuries were due to a defect on the path, and she notified the City of St. Louis of her injury, as per section 82.210. This statute states that a claimant should provide the mayor of the city with notice within 90 days of an injury occurring due to a defect in any city property listed in the statute. The City of St. Louis responded that Sender's notice was inadequate as it did not sufficiently identify the location of the incident. After the 90-day statutory period, Sender provided further information to the City. The City moved to dismiss Sender's claims based on the insufficiency of the notice, which was allowed by the circuit court.Sender appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The court first had to decide whether the bike path is considered a "thoroughfare" as per section 82.210. It concluded that the bike path was a thoroughfare because it was a publicly maintained exterior improvement facilitating pedestrian traffic. As such, Sender was required to provide notice of her claim to the City.The court then had to determine whether Sender's notice was sufficient. However, Sender did not provide any record of the evidentiary hearing held by the circuit court to determine the sufficiency of the notice. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss Sender's claims, as it could not review the sufficiency of the notice without the transcript of the hearing. View "Sender v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed an appeal from the City of Harrisonville and Brad Ratliff (collectively, "the City"), who were challenging a ruling by the lower court in favor of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") and the Board of Trustees for the Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund ("the Fund Board"). The case was initially about the City's requests for certain documents related to the conduct of the executive director of the Fund, which the MDNR and the Fund Board had refused to disclose, citing several Missouri statutes. The City alleged that the MDNR had knowingly violated Missouri's Sunshine Law. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the MDNR and the Fund Board, and the court of appeals affirmed that judgment. The City then appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal due to the City's failure to properly brief any allegations of reversible error, as required by Rule 84.13(a), and the City's failure to comply with the basic requirements of Rule 84.04(d). The court noted that the City's points of contention did not follow the required format and failed to identify any claim of reversible error in the circuit court's judgment. The court also pointed out that there is no right to appeal from a court of appeals decision, and such a claim is categorically unreviewable. Even if the court had decided to review the City's appeal, the circuit court's judgment would have been affirmed because the City only purported to appeal the summary judgment based on one subsection of § 610.021, while summary judgment was granted on two subsections of that statute. View "City of Harrisonville v. Missouri Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court's ruling and held that the Truly Agreed and Finally Passed House Bill 1606 (2022) (“TAFP HB 1606”) violated the single subject requirement of article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The bill was initially proposed to reduce the amount of information certain counties had to publish in their financial statements. However, the bill underwent several modifications, including the addition of section 67.2300, which imposed restrictions on the expenditure of state funds for combating homelessness and made unauthorized sleeping and camping on state-owned lands a class C misdemeanor. The appellants, including a group of individuals and a non-profit organization, argued that the addition of section 67.2300 altered the bill's original purpose, introduced a second subject to the bill, and rendered the bill's title unclear, thereby violating the single subject, clear title, and original purpose requirements of the Missouri Constitution. The court agreed, finding that the provisions of section 67.2300 did not fairly relate to or have a natural connection with the bill's general subject of "political subdivisions," but rather related to the completely different subject of homelessness. Consequently, the court declared TAFP HB 1606 invalid in its entirety. View "Byrd v. State of Missouri" on Justia Law