Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, IBM Corp. filed a use tax return for its sales of hardware and software to MasterCard International, LLC for MasterCard’s use in processing credit and debt card transactions, claiming that the equipment it sold to MasterCard was exempt from use tax because MasterCard’s activities qualify as “manufacturing” under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2. The Administrative Hearing Commission granted IBM a refund, finding that MasterCard’s use of the hardware and software qualified as “manufacturing a product” as that term is used in the tax exemption set out in the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MasterCard’s use of the hardware and software does not qualify as the “manufacturing of any product” under section 144.054.2, and therefore, IBM is not entitled to an exemption from use tax. View "IBM Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Macon County Emergency Services Board (Board) filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Macon County Commission (Commission) seeking a judgment that it was entitled to receive a share of Mason County’s use tax revenue proportionate to its share of the county sales tax revenue. The circuit court denied the Board’s request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.757 does not direct third-class counties as to the disbursement of county use tax revenue, it is within the discretion of the Commission whether to share that revenue with the Board. View "Macon County Emergency Servs. Bd v. Macon County Comm’n" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Director of Revenue’s final determination regarding Harry Fischer’s 2007 income tax liability. Fischer appealed the Director’s decision to the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC), arguing that the Director erred in assessing additions and interest under Mo. Rev. Stat. 143.741.1 and 143.731.7 in calculating his tax liability for 2005, 2006, and 2007. The AHC affirmed the Director’s final determination. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the AHC, holding (1) the addition to Fischer’s 2007 tax liability was properly assessed; and (2) interest on Fischer’s 2007 tax liability was properly assessed. View "Fischer v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Director of Revenue assessed Miss Dianna’s School of Dance, Inc. $23,215 plus interest in unpaid taxes. Miss Dianna’s charged fees for dance classes that instruct participants on various styles of dance. The Commission determined that Miss Dianna’s was liable for $23,984 in unpaid tax, ruling that the dance fees were taxable under Mo. Rev. Stat. $144.020.1(2) as fees to a place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because amusement or recreational activities comprise more than a de minimus portion of Miss Dianna’s business activities, it is considered a place of amusement or recreation with fees taxable under section 144.020.1(2); and (2) therefore, the Commission’s decision is authored by law and supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the record. View "Miss Dianna's Sch. of Dance, Inc., v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against Employer and the Second Injury Fund for an ankle injury. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Employee was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits but was not entitled to permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Employee filed an application for review. The Commission modified the ALJ’s award, determining that Employee was entitled to an additional award of TTD benefits for past medical expenses. Both Employee and Employer appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in (1) denying Employee PTD benefits; and (2) modifying the ALJ’s decision and awarding Employee an additional period of TTD benefits. View "Greer v. Sysco Food Servs." on Justia Law

Gerald Geier, an accountant, was the treasurer of Stop Now!, a Missouri political action committee (PAC). Geier was required to register the PAC with the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC). Stop Now! became inactive after 2003, and the PAC’s bank account closed in 2006. When Stop Now! failed to file disclosure reports for the first three quarters of 2011, the MEC opened an investigation. The MEC subsequently filed a complaint against Geier and Stop Now!, alleging that they violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 13.046.1, 130.021.4(1) and 130.021.7 by failing to timely file disclosure reports and failing to notify the MEC of the closure of the PAC’s bank account. After a hearing, the MEC found probable cause that Geier and Stop Now! knowingly violated the applicable statutes. Geier sought judicial review, challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of the reporting statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the MEC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reporting statutes are constitutional as applied; (2) Geier’s challenges to the facial validity of the reporting statutes are not ripe; (3) section 105.961.3, the statute that requires the MEC’s hearings be closed to the public, does not violate the First or Sixth Amendments; and (4) the MEC had authority to investigate Geier. View "Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Robinwood West Community Improvement District, alleging that Robinwood violated the Sunshine Law by not disclosing various public records, including those relating to Robinwood’s settlement of a personal injury lawsuit. Appellant also requested attorney fees and a civil penalty, asserting that Robinwood knowingly and purposely violated the Sunshine Law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellant and ordered Robinwood to disclose the documents regarding the settlement agreement and the sums of money expended on the lawsuit. The court, however, denied Appellant’s request for attorney fees and a civil penalty. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Robinwood could not have knowingly or purposely violated the Sunshine Law. Remanded. View "Strake v. Robinwood W. Cmty. Improvement Dist." on Justia Law

New Garden Restaurant, Inc. received “estimated audit assessments” from the Department of Revenue notifying New Garden that it owed $43,738 in unpaid sales tax. New Garden claimed it never received final assessment notices sent by the Department of Revenue. New Garden appealed the Director of Revenue’s tax assessments against it more than two weeks past the deadline. The Administrative Hearing Commission entered a summary decision dismissing New Garden’s appeal, ruling that it had no authority to hear New Garden’s appeal because the appeal was not filed within the time limitation for doing so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, there was no due process violation; (2) equitable estoppel does not excuse New Garden’s late filing; and (3) the Commission did not err in its findings. View "New Garden Restaurant, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating the City of Moline Acres Ordinance 395.010. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the Ordinance and the City’s Notice of Violation contradicted state law and/or violated due process. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s motion and dismissed the charge with prejudice on the ground that the Ordinance and Notice contradicted state speeding statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both the Ordinance and Notice are invalid because (1) the Ordinance’s rebuttable presumption that anyone driving an owner’s vehicle does so with the owner’s permission is not constitutionally permissible; and (2) the information charging Defendant is invalid because it is not supported by a notice that conforms to the requirements of Rule 37.33. View "City of Moline Acres v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each received notices that they had violated ordinance 66868, the City of St. Louis’s red light camera ordinance. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the validity of the ordinance and seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is invalid and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. The City subsequently dismissed the pending prosecutions against Plaintiffs. After a bench trial, the court enjoined the City from enforcing ordinance 66868, concluding that the ordinance was invalid, but denied Plaintiffs’ petition as to the rest of the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs could maintain their action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief because, after the City dismissed the prosecutions for the ordinance violations, Plaintiffs no longer had an adequate legal remedy; (2) ordinance 66868 is constitutionally invalid because it creates a rebuttable presumption that improperly shifts the burden of persuasion onto the defendant to prove that the defendant was not operating the motor vehicle at the time of the violation; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding attorney’s fees. View "Tupper v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law