Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother applied for child support enforcement services, the Family Support Division (FSD) issued an administrative child support order stating the proposed rights and obligations of Mother and Father. Mother disagreed with the calculation of Father’s monthly support obligation and filed a petition for judicial review of the FSD support order. Before Mother’s petition could be heard, Mother and Father settled on terms more favorable for Mother than the FSD order. The trial court entered judgment on the basis of the parties’ stipulation. The court then dismissed Mother’s petition for judicial review as moot. Thereafter, Mother filed an application to have FSD pay her attorney fees under Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.087. The trial court dismissed the application, concluding that Mother did not prevail on her petition for judicial review because it became moot when the trial court entered a superseding judgment. Mother appealed, arguing that even though her petition for judicial review was dismissed, she nevertheless prevailed against FSD because the dismissal resulted from a more favorable judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Mother obtained a favorable settlement from Father in this case, rather than FSD, the trial court correctly dismissed Mother’s attorney fee application under section 536.087. View "Garland v. Ruhl" on Justia Law

The Labadie Environment Organization and several individuals (collectively, Appellants) filed a writ of certiorari challenging the legality of the Franklin County Commission’s adoption of zoning amendments allowing Ameren Missouri to build a coal-ash landfill adjoining its Labadie power plant. Count I of the petition alleged that the commission failed to conduct a legally sufficient hearing prior to adopting the zoning amendments, and Count II alleged that the zoning amendments were invalid for failing to promote public health, safety, and welfare. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the commission and Ameren. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal on Count I, as Appellants stated a viable claim that the zoning amendments were enacted without a legally sufficient public hearing; and (2) reversed the judgment upholding the merits of the commission’s decision to adopt the landfill zoning amendments, as the commission’s decision to adopt the amendments is premature until Count I is resolved on its merits by the trial court. View "Campbell vs. County Comm’n of Franklin County" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alberici Constructors, Inc. sought a use tax refund for use taxes paid on out-of-state crane and welder rentals it used to install and construct manufacturing equipment at a new cement manufacturing plant in Missouri. Alberici also sought a use tax refund for the delivery of one of the cranes to the manufacturing job site. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) denied Alberici’s claim for a refund of use taxes paid, finding, inter alia, that the cranes and welder were exempt from the imposition of use tax under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(5). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Alberici owed use taxes on the rentals of the cranes and the welder because the the term “materials” in section 144.030.2(5) does not include machinery such as cranes and welders; and (2) the delivery service was a part of the crane rental, and therefore, the delivery charge was subject to the use tax. View "Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2001, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company ("SWBT") created Southwestern Bell Texas Holdings, Inc., ("Holdings") a new Delaware corporation, which created Southwestern Bell Telephone Texas LLC. SWBT then converted to a Texas limited partnership and named Southwestern Bell Telephone LP (“LP”). Holdings was the sole owner of LP. In 2007, the Director of Revenue conducted an audit and determined that Holdings was engaged in business in Missouri in 2003-2005 through its interest in LP. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) determined that Holdings was not subject to Missouri franchise taxes for this period. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a foreign corporation that has been engaged in business in Missouri and paying Missouri franchise taxes for decades can escape liability for franchise taxes, even though it continues to be engaged in the same business in the same locations using the same assets, by merely inserting a wholly owned limited partnership to own and operate those assets. The Supreme Court vacated the AHC’s determination, holding that Holdings was engaged in business in the state from 2003-2005 and, as a result, was subject to franchise taxes for those years. View "Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Respondent was a Missouri corporation that sold rock base and asphalt from its quarries and asphalt plants to paving companies to be used to construct and resurface roads and parking lots. Respondent petitioned the Director of Revenue for a sales tax refund under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, claiming that the resurfacing process qualified for the exemption. The Director denied the refund. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) reversed and entered a decision in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the AHC misapplied section 144.054.2 when it determined that the paving companies were engaged in “manufacturing,” “processing,” “compounding,” or “producing” roads and parking lots, and therefore, Respondent was not entitled to a refund of sales tax paid on the products it sold to the paving companies. View "Fred Weber, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant in this case was a subcontractor that purchased steel beams and other steel components that were used to fulfill Appellant's contracts to construct steel frames for large-scale commercial buildings and structures. Appellant filed a petition with the Director of Revenue for sales and tax refunds under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, which exempts “materials used or consumed in the manufacturing, processing, compounding, mining, or producing of any product” from sales tax. The Director concluding that Appellant did not meet the requirements for a tax exemption under section 144.054.2. The Administrative Hearing Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant was using steel beams, plates, angles, and other components to fulfill its construction contracts, an activity not exempt under the plain and ordinary language of section 144.054.2, it failed to meet the statutory criteria for a sales and use tax exemption. View "Ben Hur Steel Worx, LLC v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant bought tobacco products from a Missouri wholesaler and sold the tobacco products to Missouri retailers. Appellant did not report the sale of the tobacco products on his tax returns. The Director of Revenue determined that Appellant was responsible for the first sale of the tobacco products within the state. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) agreed with the Director’s decision, determining that, although Appellant did not sell the tobacco products at retail to consumers, Appellant was liable for the ten-percent tax imposed on the “first sale of tobacco products, other than cigarettes” within the state. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the AHC correctly determined that the Director’s assessment of tax, interest, penalties, and costs was proper. View "Lalani v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Fenix Construction Company of St. Louis, Five Star Ready-Mix Concrete Company and Horstmeyer Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, Taxpayers) filed sales tax refund claims for their purchases of materials used to construct tilt-up concrete walls. Taxpayers asserted that the materials fell within the Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2 tax exemption for materials used in “manufacturing…any product.” The director of revenue denied the claims. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) also denied the refund claims, determining that the tax exemption was inapplicable because the tilt-up concrete walls were not a “product” pursuant to section 144.054.2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the AHC correctly determined that Taxpayers did not establish that the tilt-up concrete walls were a “product” as that term is used in section 144.054.2. View "Fenix Constr. Co. of St. Louis v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2012, St. Louis County adopted an ordinance that implemented a foreclosure mediation program requiring lenders to provide residential borrowers an opportunity to mediate prior to foreclosure. Two bankers filed suit against the County seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the ordinance was invalid. The circuit court sustained the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County possessed the charter authority to enact the ordinance, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the County’s police power, the ordinance was not preempted by state law, and the fees associated with the ordinance did not violate the Hancock Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was void and unenforceable ab initio because the County exceeded its charter authority in enacting the ordinance. View "Mo. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Mo." on Justia Law

Two retail stores offered customers the opportunity to finance their purchases through private label credit cards. The cards were issued by banks that paid to the retailer at the time of the sale the full amount of the purchase, including sales tax, for each transaction made using the credit cards. The retailer then remitted the applicable sales tax to the State. If a customer failed to pay his or her credit card debt, the issuing bank took any tax write off. The retailers in this case separately applied for refunds of the sales tax that the banks had written off. The Director of Revenue denied both requests. The Administrative Hearing Commission reversed and allowed the retailers to claim their respective sales tax refunds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because, at the time of the initial transaction, the banks fully reimbursed the retailers for both the amount of the sales tax and the amount of the purchase on which that tax was based, the retailers were not entitled under statute to seek a refund of taxes the banks subsequently wrote off. View "Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law