Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Revenue calculated that AAA Laundry & Linen Supply Company, a commercial laundry operation, owed approximately $40,000 in use taxes for its soap and water treatment chemicals purchased from out-of-state vendors. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) concluded that AAA Laundry’s purchases of soap were exempt from use taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, and AAA Laundry’s purchases of water treatment chemicals were exempt under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(15). The State sought judicial review of the AHC’s decision. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether AAA Laundry should benefit from the type of sales and use tax exemptions that were denied the taxpayer in Unitog Rental Services, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, even though AAA Laundry brought substantially similar claims based on substantially similar facts. The Court reversed, holding that because AAA Laundry failed to distinguish to discredit Unitog, which held that various sales and use tax exemptions did not apply to commercial laundry operations, it was not entitled to the exemptions it sought. View "AAA Laundry & Linen Supply Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Schnucks grocery stores purchased electricity and natural gas from Union Electric Company, doing business as Ameren Missouri, to operate equipment such as ovens, retarders, and proofers in its bakery departments. Ameren sought a refund for sales tax paid on the energy provided to forty Schnucks stores, alleging that the bakery departments’ energy costs fell within a statutory sales tax exemption for energy used in “processing” products. The Director of Revenue denied the refund request. The Administrative Hearing Commission affirmed, finding that Schnucks’ use of energy to prepare the baked goods for sale and consumption did not constitute “processing” of products. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “processing,” as used in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, does not include in-store preparation of cooked goods for retail sale. View "Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Claimant worked part-time for Design Design from July 2008 until she obtained full-time employment in March 2010. Claimant received $320 in unemployment benefits and $25 in federal stimulus benefits for each of forty-eight weeks from May 2009 to March 2010. After the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission discovered Claimant’s employment with Design Design, the Commission found that Claimant willfully failed to disclose that she was working during the period she was receiving benefits. Therefore, the Commission determined that Claimant must return part of her benefits and pay certain penalties. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, the Commission’s decisions, holding that sufficient competent evidence in the record supported all of the Commission’s actions, except for the amount of one of the penalties. Remanded with instructions to reassess that penalty. View "Coday v. Div. of Employment Sec’y" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was HB 1171, which authorized the establishment of a county municipal court. Petitioners, residents and taxpayers of Franklin County, filed a declaratory judgment action against the commissioners of the County after the commissioners entered an order establishing a municipal court. Petitioners alleged that (1) HB 1171’s enactment violated the original purpose provision of Mo. Const. art. III, 21 and the single subject provision of Mo. Const. art. III, 23; and (2) the commissioners’ order was unconstitutional as a result of HB 1171’s constitutional invalidity. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the lawsuit was not ripe for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to proceed with their claim that the legislation at issue was enacted in violation of procedural constitutional provisions; and (2) the suit was ripe for review. Remanded. View "LeBeau v. Comm’rs of Franklin County" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned four separate decisions of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission that determined the Second Injury Fund was liable for compensation to injured claimants. On appeal, the Fund claimed that the Commission misapplied Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.1 by combining or "stacking" injuries to meet the statutory thresholds that trigger the Fund's liability and by considering injuries that did not meet the thresholds to calculate the extent of the Fund's liability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission misapplied section 287.220.1 in combining preexisting permanent partial disabilities to meet the thresholds for triggering the Fund's liability; (2) however, three Claimants in these appeals each had an individual preexisting permanent partial disability that met the statutory thresholds to trigger the Fund's liability, and therefore the Commission did not err when it found they were entitled to compensation and awarded an amount based on the combined disability of their preexisting injuries and the last injury; and (3) because the fourth Claimant did not have a preexisting permanent partial disability that met the statutory thresholds, the Commission erred in awarding compensation from the Fund to him. View "State Treasurer as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Witte" on Justia Law

At issue here was whether the sale of an aircraft and subsequent purchase of another from different entities can be considered a "trade-in" for purposes of the "taken in trade" tax exemption under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.025 when an intermediary is used to facilitate the transaction. Here, Taxpayer purchased a 525B Cessna aircraft from Cessna Aicraft Company for $7.2 million. Taxpayer subsequently sold a 525A Cessna aircraft to C.B. Aviation for $4.7 million. Taxpayer used an intermediary in the sale. Taxpayer reported $2.5 million - the difference between the purchase price of the 525B aircraft and the sale price of the 525A aircraft - on its tax return. Taxpayer claimed it was entitled to a $4.7 million credit under section 144.025. The director of revenue determined Taxpayer was not entitled to the trade-in credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to receive a tax exemption under section 144.025, the taxpayer must demonstrate that its relinquished property was "taken in trade" for the acquired property; and (2) because the use of an intermediary did not transform the separate sale and purchase transactions into one trade-in transaction, Taxpayer could not claim a trade-in exemption. View "Loren Cook Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2002, Respondent purchased an airplane from an estate. In 2010, the Director of Revenue determined that Respondent should have paid use taxes because he had not paid sales tax on the purchase and because he stored the airplane in Missouri. The Administrative Hearing Commission determined that Respondent did not owe use tax because the Director did not prove that Respondent purchased the airplane out of state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Respondent did not owe the use tax assessed by the Director because the Commissioner's conclusion that the use tax applies only to goods that are purchased outside the state and then used or stored within the state was incorrect. View "Featherston v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

After the Missouri Governor allegedly withheld certain monies from the 2012 fiscal year state budget for the Legislature, the Supreme Court, and the Auditor's office, the state Auditor filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the Governor's authority under the Missouri Constitution to withhold those amounts. The trial court concluded (1) the Governor has discretion to control the rate of expenditures and to withhold or reduce expenditures at any time until the final day of the fiscal year; and (2) the Governor was authorized to increase appropriations based on an estimated, or "E" designation, on the line item. The Supreme Court dismissed the Auditor's claims, holding (1) the Auditor did not have standing to challenge the Governor's authority to withhold funds prior to the end of the fiscal year; (2) the Auditor did not have standing to challenge the "E" appropriations; and (3) the issue of the Governor's authority to withhold a portion of the Auditor's budget was not ripe for adjudication. View "Schweich v. Nixon" on Justia Law

The Director of Revenue determined that Jonathan Eilian underpaid his 2006 Missouri taxes because he used his federal "net operating loss" (NOL) to offset income that was taxable under Missouri law but not taxable under federal law. Eilian brought a complaint before the Administrative Hearing Commission challenging the Director's decision. The Commission ruled in favor of Eilian. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Brown Group Inc. v. Administrative Hearing Commission was dispositive of the legal issues in this appeal and precluded Eilian from using his NOL to offset all of his Missouri-taxable income. Remanded to the Commission to recalculate Eilian's Missouri tax liability for 2006. View "Eilian v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Veteran filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits alleging that he sustained an injury during the course of his employment with Employer. Veteran received care and treatment for that injury at a United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facility, which Employer did not authorize. The VA petitioned for a writ to compel the chief ALJ to allow the VA's intervention in the proceeding, claiming entitlement to intervene as a matter of right under 38 U.S.C. 1729 and the U.S. Constitution's supremacy clause. The circuit court denied the VA's petition. The Supreme Court reversed and issued a permanent writ of mandamus, holding that section 1729 and the supremacy clause gave the VA the right to intervene in Veteran's workers' compensation claim to assert its claim for recovery of health care provided to him. View "U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs v. Boresi" on Justia Law