Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Reva Billings and William Morrison worked at a Western Union Financial Services (Western Union) call center in Bridgeton. On July 3, 2008, Western Union advised Billings that she would be laid off on July 20 and Morrison that he would be laid off on August 7. The U.S. Department of Labor determined the employees were eligible for Trade Act benefits and set the impact date as July 15, 2008. Appellants subsequently applied for their benefits. The Missouri Division of Employment Security denied benefits to both on the grounds that they were separated from employment prior to the impact date, finding the date of separation for Appellants to be July 3, 2008. The Industrial Relations Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission erred in considering Appellants to have ceased work on the date they received their contractually required advance notice of the future dates on which they would be furloughed, as the correct dates were the dates Appellants' furloughs became effective, notwithstanding that Western Union chose not to be physically present at the workplace during the notice period. View "Billings v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law

In 2001, Taxpayers bought two parcels located within a residential subdivision that was zoned residential. In 2009, the county assessor reclassified the property from residential to agricultural. The assessor assumed a commercial use on the property and thus valued it as commercial. The county board of equalization affirmed the assessor's determinations. Taxpayers appealed to the State Tax Commission (STC). A hearing officer found the appropriate classification for the property was commercial and that it should be assessed at the commercial rate as opposed to the agricultural rate. The STC affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The circuit court affirmed the STC's decision as being supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the STC's application of the factors set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 137.016.5 to Taxpayers' property was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. View "Bateman v. Rinehart" on Justia Law

In 2010, the General Assembly enacted the Missouri Secure and Fair Enforcement Mortgage Licensing Act (Missouri SAFE Act), which provides that the director of the Missouri Division of Finance shall not issue a mortgage loan originator license to an applicant who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony within seven years prior to the date of the application. When Plaintiff subsequently submitted an application for a mortgage loan originator license, the director denied the license pursuant to the Act because Plaintiff had pleaded guilty to a felony in 2006. The circuit court entered a declaratory judgment finding that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to Plaintiff, the statute (1) was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder; (2) did not violate the Missouri Constitution's ban on retrospective laws; and (3) did not violate Plaintiff's right to procedural and substantive due process. View "Garozzo v. Mo. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Fin." on Justia Law

Appellants, Father and Son, were arrested for driving while intoxicated during separate traffic stops. Preliminary breath tests showed Appellants' blood-alcohol contest to be over the legal limit. Father agreed to take a breathalyzer test but refused to provide sufficient breath to perform the test, and Son refused to take the breathalyzer test. The director of revenue revoked Appellants' driving privileges for one year. Appellants filed petitions for review, which the circuit court denied. Appellants appealed, asserting (1) the trial court violated their due process rights by admitting the director's records into evidence without providing them the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the director's witnesses who created the records; and (2) Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.312, which authorizes the admission of the director's records in evidence in court and administrative proceedings, is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provision of section 302.312 authorizing the admission of the director's records by the trial court did not deny Appellants their constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination, as Appellants had the right to subpoena witnesses to appear at the trials on their petitions for review. View "Doughty v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

American Airlines submitted a request to the director of revenue for a refunds of sales tax it alleged it overpaid between 2004 and 2007, asserting that its sales of aviation jet fuel to two of its contractors were not subject to taxation under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020 because they did not constitute "sales at retail" as defined by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.010. American asserted that it never transferred title or ownership of the fuel to the purchasers because it restricted the use of the purchased fuel so as to exercise dominion and control over it. The director denied American's request. American filed a complaint with the administration hearing commission, which determined that American was not entitled to a refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record supported the factual determination that, upon delivery of the fuel, American transferred title and ownership to its contractors; and (2) therefore, the transactions constituted "sales at retail" and were subject to taxation under section 144.020. View "Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant operated an herbicide and pesticide manufacturing plant. After a tax audit, the director of revenue issued Appellant use tax assessments on its chemical purchases for its Missouri plant that covered tax period July 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. Appellant appealed the assessments to the administrative hearing commission, claiming that it was entitled to tax exemptions available to a material recovery processing plant. The commission determined that Appellant's chemical plant did not qualify as a material recovery processing plant for purposes of applying the claimed tax exemptions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commission did not err in rejecting Appellant's claims that it was entitled to tax exemptions related to operation of a material recovery processing plant. View "BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the imposition of municipal taxes on SLAH, LLC, a business entity that owned a hotel located in the city of Woodson Terrace. The city appealed from the declaratory judgment entered against it on SLAH's claim that the city was prohibited by Mo. Rev. Stat. 94.270.3 from imposing a hotel license tax rate in excess of $13.50 per room, per year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the remedy afforded to SLAH under Mo. Rev. Stat. 139.031 was adequate under the circumstances, and accordingly, it was the exclusive remedy for challenging the legality of the city's hotel license tax rates; and (2) because a declaratory judgment action is improper when an adequate remedy exists at law, the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of SLAH. View "State ex rel. SLAH, LLC v. City of Woodson Terrace" on Justia Law

This workers' compensation appeal raised the question of whether the fifteen-percent statutory violation penalty under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.4 applies to an employee's (claimant) compensation award from the Second Injury Fund (SIF). The ALJ here refused to award the claimant additional benefits, determining that the fifteen-percent penalty under section 287.120.4 was not applicable to enhance the claimant's award. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission found that the fifteen-percent penalty applied to the compensation awards entered by the ALJ. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the section 287.120.4 penalty was inapplicable to the award that claimant received from the SIF. View "Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc." on Justia Law

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah. View "Gervich v. Condaire, Inc." on Justia Law