Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah. View "Gervich v. Condaire, Inc." on Justia Law

Arnaz Crawford was fired from his job in January 2009. Crawford subsequently applied for Social Security disability benefits (SSDI benefits) due to a mental condition, but the social security administration (Administration) denied the claim. Meanwhile, Crawford applied for state unemployment benefits. The division of employment security (Division) awarded unemployment benefits to Crawford until March 20, 2010. On March 2, 2010, the Administration determined Crawford had been disabled and eligible for SSDI benefits since January 29, 2009. The Division subsequently determined (1) Crawford was unable to work from December 20, 2009 to March 20, 2010 and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits; and (2) Crawford had received $3,080 in benefits that he was ineligible to receive. The labor and industrial relations commission (Commission) affirmed the determination that Crawford was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the Commission's decisions to the extent they authorized the Division to collect the overpayment from Crawford; but (2) otherwise affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Crawford v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law

In 2008, St. Louis County (County) assumed control of solid waste collection in County's unincorporated areas. Prior to that, waste collection services had been provided by private entities, including respondent Haulers. Following a 2007 amendment to Mo. Rev. Stat. to 260.247, which extended hauler-protective business regulations to counties that wish to provide trash collection, Haulers sued County for a declaratory judgment that County must comply with section 260.247. Haulers also claimed they suffered money damages as a result of County's failure to comply with the statute. The circuit court found County liable to Haulers on the theory of implied in law contract and awarded Haulers $1.2 million in damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's calculation of damages, holding that the circuit court was incorrect to exclude discovery or evidence of Haulers' expenses or net profit; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Remanded. View "Am. Eagle Waste Indus. v. St. Louis County" on Justia Law

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant unemployment benefits after it found that Appellant engaged in willful misconduct by repeatedly and deliberately disregarding her supervisor's instructions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that she engaged in misconduct because although she may have acted negligently, she did not deliberately violate her supervisor's instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Appellant willfully failed to follow her supervisor's instructions, although able to do so, on eleven separate occasions after her supervisor warned her three times she needed to comply with the instructions. View "Fendler v. Hudson Servs." on Justia Law

Lonnie Lewis died when the tractor trailer in which he was a passenger overturned. The driver of the truck, Nathan Gilmore, was employed by Buddy Freeman, and Freeman operated the tractor trailer pursuant to a contract with DOT Transportation. Neither Freedman nor DOT carried workers' compensation insurance. Lewis' dependents filed a claim for workers' compensation against Freeman and DOT and a wrongful death action against Freeman and Gilmore. An ALJ entered an award in favor of Lewis' dependents. After the entry of the workers' compensation award, DOT intervened in the Lewises' wrongful death action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gilmore and Freeman, finding the wrongful death action was barred because the Lewises had made an election of remedies when they obtained a workers' compensation award against DOT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Lewises' civil action against Freeman was not barred by their workers' compensation award from DOT, as Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.280 allowed the Lewises to proceed in a civil action against Freeman as a result of his failure to insure his liability under the Missouri workers' compensation laws even though the Lewises obtained a workers' compensation award against DOT. View "Lewis v. Gilmore" on Justia Law

Sandy Johme was employed by St. John's Mercy Healthcare as a billing representative, and her work involved typing charges at a computer in an office. After making a pot of coffee at an office kitchen at work, Johme fell and injured herself. Johme was "clocked-in" as an employee at the time of her fall. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded workers' compensation benefits to Johme after applying Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.3(2). The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision, holding that Johme was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because she failed to show that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as specified in section 287.020.3(2). View "Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare" on Justia Law

On November 7 2006, Courtney George was elected prosecuting attorney for Phelps County. George did not receive any salary increases during her term in office despite a report issued by the Missouri Citizens' Commission on Compensation for Elected Officials on December 1, 2006 increasing the salary for associate circuit judges in 2007 and 2008. In 2010, George filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the elected members of the county commission and others (Respondents), requesting a preliminary order compelling Respondents to approve increased compensation rates and to issue her underpayment of her salary for the duration of her term in office. The circuit court issued a preliminary order in mandamus but later quashed the order. At issue on appeal was whether a midterm increase in compensation for a full-time prosecuting attorney violates the provision of the Missouri Constitution prohibiting the compensation of government officers from being increased during the term of office. The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of mandamus, holding that because the midterm increase in compensation in this case resulted from the application of a statutory formula for calculating compensation in place before George took office, the increase did not violate the Constitution. View "State ex rel. George v. Verkamp" on Justia Law

MoGas Pipeline operated an interstate natural gas pipeline delivering natural gas to customers in Missouri. MoGas submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) two proposals for approval. In both instances, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) intervened as a party in the related FERC proceedings and to protest MoGas' proposals. MoGas subsequently filed a petition with the PSC alleging that the PSC did not have authority to intervene in matters before the FERC and requesting that the PSC terminate its intervention in FERC cases concerning MoGas' operations. The PSC denied MoGas' petition. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the PSC's order was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the PSC has no authority to intervene in matters pending before the FERC, and accordingly, the PSC erred in denying MoGas' request that it terminate its intervention in FERC proceedings. View "State ex rel. MoGas Pipeline, LLC v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

St. John's Mercy Health System challenged the validity of the Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee (MHFRC) rule that exempted new hospitals costing less than $1 million from the statutory requirement of obtaining a certificate of need. St. John's further sought to enjoin the MHFRC from applying the rule and granting Patients First Community Hospital an exemption from the certificate of need requirement. The trial court held that the case was not justiciable and dismissed the action without prejudice but proceeded to address the merits of St. John's claim, finding that the MHFRC had not exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding (1) the case was ripe for judicial review; and (2) the new hospital rule was valid, and the MHFRC was within its authority to promulgate the rule. View "Mercy Hosps. E. Cmtys. v. Mo. Health Facilities Review Comm." on Justia Law

Herschel Young was sworn in as presiding commissioner of Cass County in 2011. Teresa Hensley, the prosecuting attorney for the county, subsequently filed a quo warranto action in reliance upon Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.350, alleging that Young usurped the office of presiding commissioner because he was not qualified to be a candidate for elective public office due to a 1995 felony conviction. The circuit court granted Hensley's petition and ordered Young's ouster from office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 115.350, as applied to Young, did not operate retrospectively in violation of the state constitution; (2) quo warranto was the appropriate remedy, and the petition was based on applicable law; and (3) section 115.350 does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution because it had a rational basis under the law. View "State ex inf. Hensley v. Young" on Justia Law