Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Casey's Marketing Company was a convenience store engaged in the retail sale of gas, grocery items, nonfood items, and prepared foods. Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corporation was a utility that sold electricity to Casey's. Casey's filed a refund claim with the director of revenue for one month's tax paid for a portion of electricity Aquila sold to two Casey's locations. The director denied the claim. At Casey's request, Aquila challenged the director's final decision. The administrative hearing commission reversed, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, which provides a tax exemption for the "processing" of products," exempted Casey's food preparation operations. The Supreme Court reversed the commission, holding (1) the preparation of food for retail consumption is not "processing" within the meaning of section 144.054.2; and (2) therefore, Casey was not entitled to a sales and use tax exemption on electricity it purchased to power its food preparation operations. View "Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Craig Street requested a refund of the local sales taxes the Missouri Director of Revenue required him to pay to license the boat, outboard motor, and trailer he purchased from a dealer in Maryland. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) denied Street's request. Street appealed, claiming that the AHC erred because its interpretation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.069 and 32.087.12(2) to permit the County's assessment and collection of local sales tax on his out-of-state purchase was clearly contrary to the reasonable expectations of the General Assembly in enacting the local sales tax statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the plain and ordinary meaning of the Sales Tax Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.010 to 144.525, authorizes a county to impose sales taxes only on sales occurring within Missouri, the decision of the AHC upholding the Director's collection of a local sales tax on Street's out-of-state purchases was unauthorized by law. Remanded. View "Street v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Custom Hardware Engineering (CHE) appealed an Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) decision determining that CHE was liable for use tax plus interest and additions to tax on its purchases of parts for use in fulfilling maintenance contracts. CHE asserted that is was not liable for any use tax because it did not use the parts and, instead, retained them for "temporary storage" as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.605(13). The Supreme Court affirmed the AHC decision, holding (1) the record demonstrated that CHE used the parts for testing and certification on behalf of its customers; and (2) therefore, CHE was liable for use tax as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.610. View "Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc. v. Dir. of Rev." on Justia Law

Missouri law provides for two sales tax rates: a standard rate of four percent that applies to most retail sales, and a reduced rate of one percent that applies to some, but not all, sales of food. Krispy Kreme sought review of a decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that Krispy Kreme must collect tax at the four percent rate on all retail food sales at its Missouri locations. At issue on appeal was whether Krispy Kreme's product fell under the definition of "food" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014.1, which establishes the lower sales tax rate for purchases of food. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the phrase "food prepared by such establishment for immediate consumption on and off the premises" in section 144.014.1 means all food that is eaten at the place of preparation and purchase, or while traveling to, or immediately upon arrival at another location without any further preparation; (2) affirmed the AHC's decision to overrule Krispy Kreme's motion for summary decision because neither party was entitled to summary decision; and (3) reversed the portion of the AHC's decision sustaining the director's motion. Remanded. View "Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Wehrenberg, Inc. operated a restaurant-style concession offering hotdogs, pizza, and similar items at four of its movie theaters. Wehrenberg charged its customers the four percent state sales tax imposed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.202. Wehrenberg then filed a sales tax refund claim with the Director of Revenue, asserting that the concession items should have been taxed at the one percent rate set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. The Director and the AHC denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the food for sale at Wehrenberg's concession stands was not intended for home consumption, the one percent state sales tax rate set forth in section 144.014 did not apply to Wehrenberg's food sales. View "Wehrenberg, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Catherine Stone was employed as a nurse at a nursing facility when she physically restrained a patient in an attempt to force-feed the patient medication. The Department of Health and Senior Services placed Stone on the employee disqualification list for eighteen months after finding that Stone knowingly abused a patient. Stone sought review of the Department's decision, arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the decision because expert testimony was required to prove that she knowingly abused a patient with dementia and mental disabilities, and (2) the Department deprived her of due process of law by allegedly failing to provide notice of her violations. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Department. The Department appealed, and after opinion by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the Department's lay witnesses' testimony was substantial and competent evidence that Stone knowingly abused a patient; (2) the Department provided her with notice of her violations, and therefore, Stone's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the decision of the Department was authorized by law and supported by substantial and competent evidence. View "Stone v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs." on Justia Law

The Public Service Commission (PSC) approved Great Plain Energy's acquisition of Aquila, a Missouri utility company. Before approval was granted, Praxair, AG Processing, and Sedalia Industrial Energy Users' Association (collectively, Praxair) intervened. During evidentiary hearings, Great Plains, Aquila, and a subsidiary of Great Plains filed a motion to limit the scope of the proceedings, seeking to preclude any evidence as to their gift and gratuity policies. The regulatory law judge granted the motion, finding the evidence was wholly irrelevant to the merger. After the merger was approved, Praxair and the Office of Public Counsel filed petitions for writs of review. The circuit court affirmed the regulatory law judge's order. After opinion by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Court affirmed, holding (1) while the evidence as to Great Plains' gift policy should have been admitted, its exclusion was not prejudicial as the gift policy could not have substantially impacted the weight of the evidence evaluated to approve the merger; and (2) although certain PSC commissioners who heard the merger application had been subject to ex parte contact with executives from Great Plains, Public Counsel did not overcome the presumption that the PSC acted impartially. View "State ex rel. Praxair, Inc. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n " on Justia Law

The State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts is an agency with the authority to register and supervise all state physicians, surgeons, and midwives. After receiving a series of letters regarding the propriety of instances in which a physician delegates certain pain management procedures to advance practice nurses (APNs), the Board published a letter stating that APNs did not have the appropriate training or experience to perform those procedures. Appellants, medical professionals, filed a petition in the circuit court seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from enforcing its "letter rule" and claiming that (1) the Board's letter failed to adhere to statutory public rulemaking requirements, and (2) the Board's letter exceeded the authority of the Board insomuch as it defined the scope of practice for nurses. The trial court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Board failed to comply with rulemaking procedures and therefore the letter had no legal effect; and (2) it was unclear whether the Board was attempting to regulate the practice of physicians or the practice of nursing. Therefore, the record did not support summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Mo. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts" on Justia Law

Tonya Lindhorst and Eric Lindhorst divorced in 1998. The dissolution decree ordered Eric to pay $1,100 monthly in child support and $1,000 monthly in maintenance. In 2003, Tonya began receiving Social Security disability benefits. In 2008, both parties filed motions to modify the decree. The trial court reduced Eric's maintenance obligation but increased his child support obligation and did not make the modified child support award retroactive to the date that Tonya served her motion to modify. Tonya appealed. At issue was whether the trial court erred in imputing income to Tonya from part-time employment while assuming the continued receipt of Social Security disability benefits. The Supreme Court held (1) the level of work and income imputed to Tonya would disqualify her from Social Security benefits and therefore the trial court erred in considering both the imputed income and Tanya's Social Security disability benefit as a basis for reducing Eric's maintenance obligation; and (2) because Tonya demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in its modification of the child support award, that part of the judgment declining to make the increased child support obligation retroactive is reversed. Remanded. View "Lindhorst v. Lindhorst" on Justia Law