Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) brought claims of inverse condemnation, trespass, and negligence against the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors for damages caused to MSD sewer lines during the course of a city street improvement project. The City moved to dismiss, alleging that inverse condemnation does not apply to public property and that sovereign immunity applied and had not been waived. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MSD failed to state an inverse condemnation claim, and sovereign immunity barred MSD’s tort claims against the City. View "Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action alleging that the negligent chiropractic services of Defendants caused the death of their relative. Plaintiffs filed an affidavit stating that they obtained the written opinion of a qualified health care provider in support of their claims as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed that action. Thereafter, Plaintiffs refiled an identical petition in the same court but did not attach the affidavit to their new petition. The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice under action 538.225 because Plaintiffs failed to file the affidavit within 180 days of filing the second action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly sustained Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the requirements of section 538.225. View "Lang v. Goldsworthy" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the State charged Bob Beisly with the 2009 death of Belinda Beisley. Wilma Jean Irwin subsequently filed a wrongful death action against Beisly. Beisly moved to dismiss Irwin’s action, arguing that her claim was time-barred by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.100, the wrongful death statute of limitations. Irwin opposed the motion, arguing that Beisly should be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense due to his fraudulent concealment of his wrongdoing. The circuit court overruled Beisly’s motion, stating that allowing Beisly to escape civil liability on the basis of the statute of limitations was “shocking to the conscience.” Beisly sought a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. After opinion by that court, the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court quashed the preliminary order in prohibition, holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel foreclosed Beisly from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense due to the fraudulent concealment of his wrongdoing. View "State ex rel. Beisly v. Hon. Perigo" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from five separate but essentially identical wrongful death claims brought by Plaintiffs against Hospital. The petitions alleged that a former employee of the hospital intentionally administered a lethal dose of medication that resulted in the decedents’ deaths and that the Hospital acted affirmatively to conceal the suspicious nature of the deaths. The trial courts entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Hospital, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred by the three-year limitation in Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.100. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their claims were not barred by the statute of limitation because Hospital intentionally and fraudulently concealed the tortious nature of the decedents’ deaths. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, despite the harsh result, Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the three-year statute of limitation had passed when the lawsuits were filed and because section 537.100 does not provide an exception for fraudulent concealment. View "Boland v. Saint Luke's Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

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Mother was charged with felony child abuse after an investigation by Detective. Mother was ultimately acquitted. Mother subsequently brought this action against Detective for malicious prosecution and for violating 42 U.S.C. 1983. Detective moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The trial court sustained the motion. Mother appealed, arguing that Detective was not entitled to summary judgment because the statements he made in his probable cause affidavit were intentionally false or made with a reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Detective was entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim, where there was no evidence that he acted with malice, and on the section 1983 claim, where there was probable cause to believe that Mother had committed a criminal offense. View "Copeland v. Wicks" on Justia Law

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Charles and Deborah Bate were both seriously injured in a head-on vehicle collision. After obtaining a judgment against the driver of the opposing vehicle the Bates sued Greenwich Insurance Company seeking underinsured motorist coverage under a policy allegedly issued to Charles Bate’s employer by Greenwich. Greenwich did not answer the petition, and the Bates obtained a default judgment in the amount of $3 million. More than two years later, Greenwich filed an amended motion to set aside the default judgment as void, arguing that service of process was invalid. The trial court set aside the default judgment as void, stating that there was no valid service of process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bates properly effected service of process under Mo. Rev. Stat. 375.906 and complied with all service requirements of that statute. View "Bate v. Greenwich Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff brought this action against Union Electric Company (UE) for wrongful death after her two children drowned in the Lake of the Ozarks, an impoundment created by Bagnell Dam. Both the Lake and the dam are owned by UE. Plaintiff alleged that her children encountered stray electric current that caused the children’s death from drowning, electrocution, or both. The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that UE was immune from Plaintiff’s claims under the Recreational Use Act (RUA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that UE was entitled to immunity under the RUA, and therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s petition. View "Anderson v. Union Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Plaintiff purchased a manufactured home from Defendant. The contract between Plaintiff and Defendant included an arbitration clause. Plaintiff later sued Defendant alleging fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the court action and to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposed arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality and was unconscionable on multiple grounds. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the agreement’s “anti-waiver clause” was unconscionable and invalid, but the anti-waiver provision could be severed; (2) Plaintiff’s remaining objections did not render the contract as a whole unconscionable; and (3) absent the anti-waiver clause, the contract was not unconscionable. View "Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

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Bohr Farms owned and operated a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) that accommodated more than 4,000 hogs. Cargill Pork, LLC owned the hogs. Appellants, several landowners and other individuals, brought this action against Cargill and Bohr Farms (together, Respondents), alleging damages for temporary nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy due to alleged offensive odors that emanated from the CAFO. Appellants did not claim damages for diminution in rental value or documented medical costs as authorized by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.296.2, but, rather, alleged that their damages for temporary nuisance consisted solely of the loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding, inter alia, that section 537.296 was constitutional and did not authorize an award of damages for Appellants’ alleged loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 537.296 is constitutional; and (2) Appellants’ nuisance, conspiracy and vicarious liability claims are inseparable from the nuisance allegations and are therefore barred by section 537.296.6(1). View "Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

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When two of Price Chopper’s employees saw Deborah Barkley head for the store’s exit without paying for certain items, they confiscated the items and detained her at the store’s security office on suspicion of shoplifting. Approximately forty-five minutes after Barkley was first detained, the police arrested her and escorted her from the store. Barkley was charged with shoplifting but was later acquitted of this charge. Barkley sued Price Chopper, alleging various torts arising out of her detention. At the close of the evidence, Barkley abandoned all of her claims except false imprisonment and battery. The jury found for Price Chopper on both counts. Barkley appealed, arguing that the merchant’s privilege extends to claims of battery, and the privilege ends when the merchant’s property is recovered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a merchant is privileged to detain a person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time if the merchant has probable cause to believe that person is shoplifting, and the merchant may continue the detention after the property is recovered to determine whether the person was actually shoplifting and to summon the police and instigate criminal proceedings. View "Barkley v. McKeever Enters., Inc." on Justia Law