Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial Kenneth Baumruk was found guilty of the first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to death. Baumruk timely filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The motion court denied some of the claims without an evidentiary hearing and held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. The court then issued a judgment overruling all claims put forth by the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court's judgment, holding that the motion court did not err by overruling Baumruk's claims that his competency hearing counsel, trial counsel, and appellate counsel were ineffective for numerous reasons. View "Baumruk v. State" on Justia Law

Ronald Sanders recovered judgments against Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed and Iftekhar Ahmed, P.A. (collectively, Defendants) for the wrongful death of his wife. After the jury returned a verdict awarding $9.2 million in non-economic damages, the trial court entered a judgment providing just over $1 million in non-economic damages in accordance with a statutory cap on non-economic damages. On appeal, Sanders challenged the constitutionality of the damages award cap, and Defendants appealed the judgment, the denial of reduction pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.060, and the denial of periodic payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects except as to reduction under section 537.060, which permits a defendant's liability to be reduced by the amounts of settlements with joint tortfeasors. The Court reversed the judgment in respect to that section, as a discovery denial prejudiced Defendants' ability to plead and prove the affirmative defense of reduction, and insofar as the settlements included economic damages, the statutory cap would not obviate statutory reduction. Remanded. View "Sanders v. Ahmed" on Justia Law

A developer attempted to plat a new subdivision within an existing subdivision, and sought the County's approval to use Bridle Parc Lane (BP Lane) as a public road. Several owners of lots in the subdivision brought an action against the County asserting that BP Lane could not have been dedicated to public use because the owners of private easements on which BP Lane was situated had never consented to the dedication. The circuit court entered a judgment declaring BP Lane to be a private road. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' action was not barred by the ten-year limitation period provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.010; and (2) BP Lane did not become a public road through statutory dedication, common law dedication and the establishment of a prescriptive easement. View "Bateman v. Platte County" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Tisius was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for killing two law enforcement officers and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court did err in (1) admitting the certified court record of the complaint for Defendant's conviction for possession of a prohibited item in the department of corrections; (2) overruling Defendant's objections to the State's cross-examination of his expert; (3) failing to intercede sua sponte at multiple times during the State's closing argument; (4) submitting verdict mechanics instructions or mitigating circumstances instructions; and (5) sentencing Defendant to death, as the imposition of the death penalty met the statutory requirements. View "State v. Tisius" on Justia Law

Herschel Young was sworn in as presiding commissioner of Cass County in 2011. Teresa Hensley, the prosecuting attorney for the county, subsequently filed a quo warranto action in reliance upon Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.350, alleging that Young usurped the office of presiding commissioner because he was not qualified to be a candidate for elective public office due to a 1995 felony conviction. The circuit court granted Hensley's petition and ordered Young's ouster from office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 115.350, as applied to Young, did not operate retrospectively in violation of the state constitution; (2) quo warranto was the appropriate remedy, and the petition was based on applicable law; and (3) section 115.350 does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution because it had a rational basis under the law. View "State ex inf. Hensley v. Young" on Justia Law

Borrower brought suit against a payday loan company (Company), arguing that its arbitration agreement containing a class waiver was unenforceable. The trial court found that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable because its class waiver deprived borrowers of a meaningful remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that that the trial court erred in finding that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable based on its class waiver and should have instead adjudicated whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable in light of Borrower's evidence relevant to her claims regarding ordinary state-law principles that govern contracts but that do no single out or disfavor arbitration. Remanded. View "Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc." on Justia Law

Jordan Danielle King-Willmann filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Webster Groves school district to enroll her in the district pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131.2. The school district contested certain material facts alleged by King-Willmann and asserted several defenses, including a claimed violation of Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 21, the Hancock amendment. The school district requested an evidentiary hearing, which the trial court did not hold. The court issued the writ granting King-Willmann relief. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded because contested issues of fact existed. On remand, the Court instructed the trial court not to consider the Hancock amendment claim as the school district had no standing to bring such a claim. View "King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2007, the General Assembly enacted a series of statutes regulating the private investigator profession. Appellant subsequently applied for licensure as a private investigator. The Board of Private Investigator Examiners initially denied Appellant's application, but later the Administrative Hearing Commission ordered the board to grant Appellant a license. After Appellant was awarded a license, he continued to pursue a lawsuit he had filed against the board and its members, arguing that the statutory scheme violated the free speech clauses of the state and federal constitutions and that his procedural due process rights were violated when the board denied his application before giving him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The circuit court (1) dismissed Appellant's procedural due process claim as moot, and (2) dismissed Appellant's free-speech claims after concluding that the statutes were not unconstitutional on their face. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Gurley v. Mo. Bd. of Private Investigator Exam'rs" on Justia Law

After My Truong's home was foreclosed on, a trustee's sale was held, and Fannie Mae purchased Truong's home. Despite the sale, Truong continued to maintain possession of his home. Fannie Mae filed a petition for unlawful detainer. The circuit court granted Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment and awarded Fannie Mae $6,000 in damages. Truong appealed, challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 534.010, among other things. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that Truong's failure to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 512.180.1, prior to seeking relief in the Supreme Court, deprived the Court of the authority to adjudicate his claims. View "Fannie Mae v. Truong" on Justia Law

Insured appealed the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to Broker on Insured's claims that Broker violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Insured by not disclosing that Broker received contingent commissions from Insurers for directing Insured's business to them and that Broker kept all interest earned on the premiums Insured sent it between the time Broker received them and the time they were forwarded to the Insurers. In addition, Insured argued that Broker breached a duty to find it the least costly policy possible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) brokers do not have a duty to find insureds the lowest possible cost insurance available to meet their needs; (2) Missouri law specifically authorizes a broker to receive commissions from the insurer and to deposit premiums in an account pending their payment to the insurer or refund to the insured; but (3) the trial court erred by dismissing the petition because it could not be said as a matter of law that Emerson could not recover on one or more of its claims. Remanded. View "Emerson Elec. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos." on Justia Law