Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of stealing property of a value of more than $500. As part of the plea agreement, Cooper waived his right to file any future motion for post-conviction relief under Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 in exchange for the State recommending a fifteen-year sentence on each count to run concurrently with a suspended execution of the sentences and a five-year probationary term. The circuit court rendered judgment and sentences in accord with the plea agreement. After Defendant violated the terms of his probation, his fifteen-year sentences were ordered executed. Defendant subsequently filed a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that defense counsel was ineffective. The motion court overruled the motion on the merits. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court's judgment, holding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his post-conviction rights. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Defendant's post-conviction motion. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

Several businesses filed a petition in the circuit court challenging the validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 573.525 to 573.540, which regulate certain aspects of sexually oriented businesses in Missouri. The businesses argued that the limitations contained in the statutes concerning, among other things, touching of dancers by patrons and buffer zones around dancers violated the businesses' freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the restrictions were not content-based limitations on speech but rather were aimed at limiting the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on the health, welfare, and safety of Missouri residents; (2) the statutes were reasonable time, place and manner or comparable restrictions, and accordingly, the statutes did not unconstitutionally limit speech; and (3) the General Assembly did not violate Mo. Rev. Stat. 23.140 in enacting the statutes. View "Ocello v. Koster" on Justia Law

Ashley Morse was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Director of Revenue administratively suspended Morse's license for ninety days. Morse completed the suspension as well as the other requirements for reinstatement of her license, including completing a substance abuse traffic offender program, showing proof of liability insurance coverage, and paying reinstatement fees. Morse was later convicted for DWI after violating the conditions of her probation. The Director informed Morse that her driving privileges would again be suspended Morse once more had to complete the requirements for reinstatement of her license. The district court granted Morse's petition for de novo review and entered a judgment in favor of Morse, concluding that Morse's first administrative suspension had to be credited against the second administrative suspension pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.525.4 because both suspensions arose from the same occurrence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in holding that giving Morse credit for her first period of suspension eliminated her obligation to offer proof of insurance and to pay reinstatement fees to obtain reinstatement of her driver's license. View "Morse v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Mahamad Ali Naji contracted with JAS Apartments to sell property that he owned together with his wife (Wife). Naji secured a preliminary title commitment from the title company, which included a preliminary title commitment stating that Wife must join in the real estate transaction. Wife refused to approve the transaction. JAS sought to enforce the contract in circuit court by legally extinguishing Wife's interest. Naji counterclaimed for breach of contract for JAS's refusal to close as scheduled. The circuit court denied relief to both parties. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for the circuit court to consider whether or not Naji breached the agreement. On remand, the circuit court found that JAS had breached the contract when it failed to close the transaction as scheduled. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded once again, holding (1) the circuit court did not make the appropriate determinations of law consistent with the decision of the court of appeals in the first remand; and (2) the language of the preliminary title commitment required Wife to join in the real estate transaction, and Naji's failure to do so constituted a breach of the real estate contract. View "JAS Apartments, Inc. v. Naji" on Justia Law

The City of Ferguson enacted an ordinance that made it unlawful for property owners to rent or lease their property without a rental license obtained after the owners undertook building inspections, filed affidavits stating whether any adult tenants were registered as sex offenders, and retained a property manager. The St. Louis Association of Realtors petitioned for a declaratory judgment, challenged the validity of the ordinance on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court dismissed the petition without addressing the merits of the challenge, holding that the Association lacked standing to file suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Association satisfied the requirements for associational standing by showing that at least one of its members would have standing to sue, that the interests the suit sought to protect were germane to the Association's purpose, and that neither the claim asserted nor relief requested required the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Remanded. View "St. Louis Ass'n of Realtors v. City of Ferguson" on Justia Law

Child was born out of wedlock to Mother. While Mother was preparing to move to Ohio, Father filed a paternity and custody action against her. Mother subsequently moved to Ohio. The trial court awarded sole physical custody of Child to Mother and ordered Mother to relocate Child to Missouri to reside in a designated three-county area. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial court's judgment requiring Mother's relocation, holding (1) the trial court had no statutory authority to compel Mother to relocate as part of its initial custody determination; and (2) Mother did not give the court the authority to compel her to move back to Missouri. Remanded. View "A.E.B. v. T.B." on Justia Law

Wehrenberg, Inc. operated a restaurant-style concession offering hotdogs, pizza, and similar items at four of its movie theaters. Wehrenberg charged its customers the four percent state sales tax imposed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.202. Wehrenberg then filed a sales tax refund claim with the Director of Revenue, asserting that the concession items should have been taxed at the one percent rate set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. The Director and the AHC denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the food for sale at Wehrenberg's concession stands was not intended for home consumption, the one percent state sales tax rate set forth in section 144.014 did not apply to Wehrenberg's food sales. View "Wehrenberg, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a judgment entered by the trial court. As part of the judgment, Husband was required to pay Wife monthly maintenance as agreed upon by the parties in a settlement agreement. After Wife remarried five years later, Husband filed a motion asking the trial court to terminate his obligation to pay Wife maintenance. The trial court dismissed the motion, finding that, according to the settlement agreement, the maintenance was non-modifiable and would terminate after the expiration of fifteen years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption that an obligation to pay maintenance is terminated by remarriage of the party receiving maintenance can be overcome by an agreement in writing between the parties that either expressly or by implication extends said obligation, and (2) Husband failed to demonstrate that the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law by dismissing his motion to terminate his obligation to pay maintenance to Wife. View "Simpson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Son was removed from Mother's custody after Mother was arrested for soliciting herself for prostitution. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding that (1) Mother had abused or neglected Son by clear and convincing evidence and (2) termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of Son. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the trial court articulated the correct burden of proof for the evidence it found supporting the termination, (2) the burden of proof articulated by the trial court was constitutional and did not violate Mother's due process rights, and (3) the trial court did not err in its consideration of Mother's mental capacity in relation to future harm. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

The State filed a felony complaint charging Melvin Davis, a registered sex offender, with violating Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.150 for knowingly being present within 500 feet of a public park that contains playground equipment or a public swimming pool. Davis moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that section 566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to him because it violated the prohibition against retrospective laws in Mo. Const. art. I, 13. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Davis, holding that because the statute was not enacted until after Davis's original guilty plea, the statute placed a new disability on Davis based on a prior conviction and, therefore, was unconstitutionally retrospective in operation. On appeal, the State argued the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws in art. I, 13 did not apply to section 566.150 because it was criminal in nature and the prohibition applied only to civil statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State's issue on appeal was not properly preserved for appellate review. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law