Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

During Petitioner's relationship with Mother, Mother gave birth to a son (Child). Although Petitioner was not listed on Child's birth certificate, Petitioner acted as Child's father. After the relationship between Petitioner and Mother soured, Petitioner took a DNA test that indicated he was not Child's biological father. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended petition alleging that Mother and the unknown biological father were unfit parents and sought a declaration of paternity, custody and visitation, and for equitable relief. The circuit court dismissed the petition based upon Petitioner's failure to put forth a theory under which Child's custody could be determined properly. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Petitioner sufficiently alleged the elements necessary under Mo. Rev. Stat. 452.375.5(5)(a) to establish third-party custody. View "M.M.A. v. L.L." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree. Before trial, a third amended information was filed that charged Defendant as a predatory sex offender on Counts I and III. A factual basis of Defendant's guilt and status as a predatory sex offender was established at the plea hearing. Defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) his constitutional right to a jury trial was denied when the circuit court overruled his motion challenging the trial court's determination of his classification as a predatory sexual offender under Mo. Rev. Stat. 558.018, and (2) his due process rights were violated when the trial court overruled his motion challenging the hearing classifying him as a predatory sexual offender under Mo. Rev. Stat. 558.021.2 before the commencement of the scheduled jury trial. The motion court overruled Defendant's post-conviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in determining Defendant waived his constitutional challenges when he pleaded guilty. View "Garris v. State" on Justia Law

In 1983, Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree sexual assault. In 1995, Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) became effective, requiring Respondent to register as a sex offender. In 2010, Respondent filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that SORA violates Mo. Const. art I, 13 and that he was not required to register pursuant to the federal Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The trial court (1) entered a declaratory judgment finding that, as applied to Respondent, SORA violated the bar against the enactment of retrospective state laws set forth in article I, section 13; and (2) declined to address the applicability of SORNA, therefore declining to order Defendants to remove Respondent's name from the registry and to destroy all registration records. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment to the extent it held that the trial court was without authority to address the applicability of SORNA and that the SORA registration requirements violated article I, section 13 as applied to Respondent; and (2) affirmed the judgment to the extent that it did not order Defendants to destroy the registration records. View "Doe v. Toelke" on Justia Law

Appellant operated an herbicide and pesticide manufacturing plant. After a tax audit, the director of revenue issued Appellant use tax assessments on its chemical purchases for its Missouri plant that covered tax period July 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. Appellant appealed the assessments to the administrative hearing commission, claiming that it was entitled to tax exemptions available to a material recovery processing plant. The commission determined that Appellant's chemical plant did not qualify as a material recovery processing plant for purposes of applying the claimed tax exemptions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commission did not err in rejecting Appellant's claims that it was entitled to tax exemptions related to operation of a material recovery processing plant. View "BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the circuit court's judgment convicting him of five counts of possession of child pornography. Defendant asserted three points on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to suppress an affidavit offered in support of the search warrant used to seize the evidence because the affidavit established probable cause; (2) the entry of five separate convictions did not constitute double jeopardy or violate Defendant's rights to due process and trial by jury; and (3) the trial court properly admitted evidence of the content of resumes found on Defendant's computer. View "State v. Roggenbuck" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, kidnapping, attempted forcible rape, and armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Appellant to death and three life sentences to be served consecutively. After the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions, Appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging several instances in which his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The motion was overruled after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment denying post-conviction relief, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in denying Appellant post-conviction relief, as Appellant's assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Two cities separately appealed judgments entered against each city and in favor of the Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 ordering the public employer to adopt collective bargaining procedures. In a consolidated opinion in the two cases, the Supreme Court held (1) the right to organize and bargain collectively recognized in the Missouri Constitution inherently imposes a duty on each city to bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative elected by its police officers and sergeants with a goal of reaching an agreement; (2) the cities here were not excused from carrying out this duty because the public employees represented by the union were not covered by the procedures codified in the public sector labor law; but (3) nevertheless, because the cities may not be able to meet their duty without establishing a framework, the trial courts erred in ordering them to do so. Furthermore, the Court entered judgment ordering the cities to recognize the union as the collective bargaining unit for the cities' police officers and sergeants and to begin to meet and confer with the union for collective bargaining. View "E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield" on Justia Law

The American Federation of Teachers, its St. Louis affiliate, and individual representatives appealed the trial court's summary judgment declaring that the board of education of the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the individual members of the board had no duty to "meet and confer" or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Mo. Const. art. I, 29 provides that all employees, public and private, have a right to organize and to bargain collectively, it necessarily requires the board to meet and confer with the union, in good faith, with the present intention to reach an agreement. Remanded. View "Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

The State appealed two judgments declaring Mo. Rev. Stat. 556.036 unconstitutional and dismissing, with prejudice, the criminal charges against Grant Mixon and Jeffrey Anderson. The judgments of the circuit court declared section 556.036 unconstitutional for conflicting with Mo. Const. art. I, 17, which prohibits felony prosecutions "otherwise than by indictment or information," because the circuit court determined the statute allowed for prosecution of a felony by complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mixon and Anderson failed to demonstrate that section 556.036.5 "clearly and undoubtedly" violated Mo. Const. art. I, 17. Remanded. View "State v. Mixon" on Justia Law