Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two groups of plaintiffs filed declaratory judgment actions to challenge the constitutional validity of the congressional redistricting map in H.B. 193, claiming that it failed to meet the constitutional requirements for compactness. The trial court ruled that Plaintiffs failed to prove the map violated Mo. Const. art III, 45 and entered judgments in favor of Defendants, the attorney general and secretary of state, as well as the intervenors, members of the General Assembly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the constitutional compactness standard; and (2) Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that the trial court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence. View "Pearson v. Koster" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Missouri citizens and voters, filed a declaratory judgment action against the State and secretary of state to challenge the constitutionality of the redistricting plan for the Missouri House of Representatives filed by the nonpartisan reapportionment commission. The trial court permitted three current members of the House of Representatives to intervene in the lawsuit. The court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding (1) Plaintiff failed to prove that the plan did not meet the constitutional requirements for population, contiguity, and compactness; and (2) the nonpartisan reapportionment commission did not violate the "sunshine law." The court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove the House reapportionment map was unconstitutional and in permitting intervention by the three House members; an (2) the trial court properly found that the nonpartisan reapportionment commission did not violate the sunshine law. Affirmed. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

On November 7 2006, Courtney George was elected prosecuting attorney for Phelps County. George did not receive any salary increases during her term in office despite a report issued by the Missouri Citizens' Commission on Compensation for Elected Officials on December 1, 2006 increasing the salary for associate circuit judges in 2007 and 2008. In 2010, George filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the elected members of the county commission and others (Respondents), requesting a preliminary order compelling Respondents to approve increased compensation rates and to issue her underpayment of her salary for the duration of her term in office. The circuit court issued a preliminary order in mandamus but later quashed the order. At issue on appeal was whether a midterm increase in compensation for a full-time prosecuting attorney violates the provision of the Missouri Constitution prohibiting the compensation of government officers from being increased during the term of office. The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of mandamus, holding that because the midterm increase in compensation in this case resulted from the application of a statutory formula for calculating compensation in place before George took office, the increase did not violate the Constitution. View "State ex rel. George v. Verkamp" on Justia Law

Jermane Clark was convicted of first degree murder and armed criminal action. The prosecution's case against Clark depended principally on the testimony of two witnesses. One of the witnesses, Maurice Payne, claimed to have been an eyewitness to the murder. Previously, Payne had pleaded guilty to unrelated charges before the same judge who presided over Clark's murder trial. Payne admitted that he subjectively hoped that his testimony against Clark would favorably affect his sentence even though Payne's decision to testimony in Clark's case was not motivated by a plea agreement in his own case. Clark's attorney was not permitted to question Payne concerning this potential bias. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing Clark the opportunity to cross-examine Payne on whether he was biased, and there was a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Remanded. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The director of revenue for the State revoked James Hill's driving privileges for a period of ten years beginning October 2000. In June 2005, Hill was convicted of the misdemeanor of possession of drug paraphernalia. In April 2011, Hill filed a petition for reinstatement of his driving privileges. The director asserted that Hill's 2005 conviction precluded reinstatement because Me. Rev. Stat. 302.060.1(9) barred reinstatement for persons convicted within the previous ten years of an offense related to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs. The trial court reinstated Hill's driving privileges and held that section 302.060.1(9) was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court versed, holding that section 302.060.1(9) was not unconstitutionally vague given the facts in this case. View "Hill v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A railroad employee (Plaintiff) was injured when his co-employee's personal pistol accidentally discharged. Plaintiff filed a vicarious liability claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act against the railroad for his injury. The incident occurred while the men were within their hours of employment, but each of the employee's proposed jury instructions failed to submit the issue of whether the co-employee was carrying the pistol in furtherance of the interests of the employer. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the railroad. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to submit his proposed verdict directing instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in refusing Plaintiff's incorrect proposed verdict directors where Plaintiff repeatedly failed to prepare a verdict director that correctly submitted the respondeat superior issue; and (2) the trial court did not err in failing to create its own verdict director property submitting respondeat superior in place of Plaintiff's erroneous proposed instructions. View "Cluck v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

While Myrna Roberts (Myrna) worked for Western Blue, a document printing and management service company, Myrna oversaw a contract with the University of Missouri. In the meantime, Mel Roberts (Mel) operated Graystone Properties, which was named part owner of DocuCopy. Acting on Western Blue's behalf, Myrna hired DocuCopy as a subcontractor for the university contract. Neither Myrna nor Mel disclosed their interest in DocuCopy to Western Blue. After Western Blue was purchased, Myrna and a large number of staff left their employment with Western Blue and began working for DocuCopy. Thereafter, the university awarded DocuCopy rather than Western Blue the renewal of its contract. As a result of losing the university contract, Western Blue lost another contract and was forced to close a branch office. Western Blue filed a petition against Myrna, Mel, DocuCopy, and Graystone Properties (Appellants), alleging breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with a valid business expectancy, computer tampering, and civil conspiracy. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Western Blue and awarded attorneys fees. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment finding Myrna owed Western Blue a fiduciary duty and affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "Western Blue Print Co. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

MoGas Pipeline operated an interstate natural gas pipeline delivering natural gas to customers in Missouri. MoGas submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) two proposals for approval. In both instances, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) intervened as a party in the related FERC proceedings and to protest MoGas' proposals. MoGas subsequently filed a petition with the PSC alleging that the PSC did not have authority to intervene in matters before the FERC and requesting that the PSC terminate its intervention in FERC cases concerning MoGas' operations. The PSC denied MoGas' petition. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the PSC's order was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the PSC has no authority to intervene in matters pending before the FERC, and accordingly, the PSC erred in denying MoGas' request that it terminate its intervention in FERC proceedings. View "State ex rel. MoGas Pipeline, LLC v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

St. John's Mercy Health System challenged the validity of the Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee (MHFRC) rule that exempted new hospitals costing less than $1 million from the statutory requirement of obtaining a certificate of need. St. John's further sought to enjoin the MHFRC from applying the rule and granting Patients First Community Hospital an exemption from the certificate of need requirement. The trial court held that the case was not justiciable and dismissed the action without prejudice but proceeded to address the merits of St. John's claim, finding that the MHFRC had not exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding (1) the case was ripe for judicial review; and (2) the new hospital rule was valid, and the MHFRC was within its authority to promulgate the rule. View "Mercy Hosps. E. Cmtys. v. Mo. Health Facilities Review Comm." on Justia Law

This case involved the question of how the amount of a deficiency owed by Fischer & Frichtel Inc, a commercial debtor, after a foreclosure sale of its property should be measured. The trial court submitted an instruction directing the jury to award the difference between the amount of the debt and the property's fair market value at the time of the foreclosure sale. The court then granted First Bank's motion for a new trial in light of its showing that Missouri case law instead requires the deficiency to be determined by the difference between the debt and the amount received at the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court affirmed after discussing Missouri common law, which requires that the deficiency should be measured by the amount received at the foreclosure sale, but if the sale price is so inadequate as to raise an inference of fraud, then the foreclosure sale can be voided. View "First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc." on Justia Law