Articles Posted in Personal Injury

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The circuit court awarded Plaintiff $500,000 in damages on his claim against the Kansas City School District for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Supreme Court remitted the award to $403,189 and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in all other respects, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in overruling the district’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) did not err in overruling the district’s motion for new trial based on alleged errors in a jury instruction; but (3) erred in overruling the district’s motion for remittitur because the award exceeded that which is allowed by law. View "Newsome v. Kansas City, Missouri School District" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, who ran a kennel, filed a petition against the Humane Society of the United States and Missourians for the Protection of Dogs alleging that various statements made in documents related to the ballot initiative entitled the Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act were defamatory and placed her in a false light. The circuit court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the statements were absolutely privileged opinions and because Petitioner failed to plead any facts cognizable under a false light cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the petition because none of the statements pleaded in the defamation claims were actionable as a matter of law and because Petitioner did not plead any facts cognizable in a false light claim. View "Smith v. Humane Society of the United States" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury

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Russel Parker, an Indiana resident, brought a personal injury action against Norfolk Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, alleging cumulative trauma sustained during his years of employment with Norfolk in Indiana. Norfolk moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction alleging that Missouri had no personal jurisdiction. The trial court overruled the motion without stating the grounds for its ruling. Norfolk sought a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it subsequently made permanent, holding that Missouri did not have specific or general personal jurisdiction over Norfolk in the underlying personal injury action. View "State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Hon. Colleen Dolan" on Justia Law

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When Plaintiff’s utility terrain vehicle (UTV) overturned the roof of the UTV failed and caused Plaintiff injuries. Plaintiff sued Chesterfield Valley Sports, Inc. (Defendant). Prior to trial, Plaintiff designated Herbert Newbold as an expert witness. Plaintiff then rescinded Newbold’s expert witness designation without disclosing Newbold’s expert analysis or conclusions. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to amend the scheduling order to permit Newbold’s deposition. Plaintiff objected, asserting that Newbold’s opinions and conclusions were protected from discovery by the work product doctrine. The trial court sustained Defendant’s motion, concluding that Plaintiff had waived the protections afforded by the work product doctrine by designating Newbold as an expert witness. Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it made permanent, holding (1) designating an expert witness does not, standing alone, irrevocably waive the protections afforded by the work product doctrine; and (2) in this case, there was no disclosing event that waived the work product privilege. View "State ex rel. Malashock v. Honorable Michael T. Jamison" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, who was formerly employed by Hospital, brought an eight-count petition against Hospital and Doctor (collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (the MHRA) and other common law claims related to the termination of her employment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's judgment with respect to Plaintiff's MHRA claims and wrongful discharge claim, holding (i) the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's MHRA claims on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for filing a lawsuit under the MHRA, and (ii) because Plaintiff's amended petition sufficiently invoked the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the circuit court erred in sustaining summary judgment in Hospital's favor on Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim; and (2) affirmed the circuit court's judgment as to all remaining counts. Remanded.View "Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr. " on Justia Law

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Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant for the injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Plaintiff was not present during voir dire or at the beginning of the second morning of trial before opening statements commenced. Upon the motion of Defendant, the trial court excluded Plaintiff from the trial and allowed Defendant to argue an adverse inference. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in both excluding Plaintiff from trial and then allowing Defendant's attorney to make an adverse inference about Plaintiff's absence from the courtroom, rulings that, taken together, resulted in manifest injustice to Plaintiff.View "Bair v. Faust" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury

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In 2007, Anita Johnson purchased a vehicle from a dealership operated by JF Enterprises. Johnson signed numerous documents at a single sitting, including a retail installment contract and a one-page arbitration agreement. In 2010, Johnson sued the dealership, its president (Franklin), and the vehicle manufacturer (American Suzuki), claiming negligent misrepresentation. Franklin and JF Enterprises moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that the installment contract did not refer to or incorporate the arbitration agreement and contained a merger clause stating that it contained the parties' entire agreement as to financing. The Supreme Court reversed after noting that contemporaneously signed documents will be construed together and harmonized if possible, holding that because the separate arbitration agreement was a dispute resolution agreement, not an additional financing document, it could be harmonized with the installment contract and was not voided by operation of the merger clause.View "Johnson v. JF Enters., LLC" on Justia Law