Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marcellus Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following a jury trial. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and his postconviction relief was denied. Williams sought additional DNA testing through a habeas corpus petition, which led to a temporary stay of execution and the appointment of a special master to oversee the testing. The results did not demonstrate his innocence, and his habeas petition was denied. Subsequent petitions for writs of habeas corpus and declaratory judgment were also denied.The St. Louis County prosecutor filed a motion to vacate Williams' conviction and death sentence, citing potential actual innocence based on DNA evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial discrimination in jury selection. This motion remains pending in the circuit court. Despite this, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a warrant of execution for Williams, setting a new execution date.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution, arguing that the prosecutor's motion constituted a state postconviction motion, which should bar setting an execution date. The court found that Rule 30.30(c) only refers to postconviction motions filed by the defendant, not the prosecutor. Since Williams had already exhausted his state postconviction remedies, the court held that the execution date was properly set. The court also noted that the pending prosecutor's motion did not automatically warrant a stay of execution and that Williams had not demonstrated the necessary factors for equitable relief. Consequently, the court overruled Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Shawn Flaherty was convicted of second-degree domestic assault and armed criminal action following a violent altercation with his wife, during which he brandished a revolver and a bullet from the weapon struck his wife in the knee. Flaherty's defense at trial was that the shooting was accidental, and his counsel requested an instruction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree domestic assault, which the jury ultimately found him guilty of. Flaherty was sentenced to seven years for the assault count and three years for the armed criminal action count, to be served consecutively. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Flaherty subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included instruction for fourth-degree domestic assault. The motion court overruled Flaherty’s motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding that while his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient for failing to request the instruction for fourth-degree domestic assault, this did not prejudice Flaherty.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the motion court's judgment. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the motion court’s finding that counsel’s failure to request the lesser-included instruction for fourth-degree assault did not prejudice Flaherty. The court also noted that the motion court judge, who had also presided over Flaherty's criminal trial, was in a better position to assess the impact of the evidence on the jury and whether it was reasonably likely the jury would have been persuaded by arguments that Flaherty's acts were merely criminally negligent. View "Flaherty v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming its previous order emergently suspending Dr. Blake Donaldson's license and finding cause for discipline and the Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts' subsequent decision to discipline Donaldson's license, holding that there was no error.From 1995 to 2017, the Board licensed Donaldson as an osteopathic physician and surgeon. In 2017, the Board filed a complaint alleging that Donaldson had engaged in several instances of sexual misconduct with a patient. The AHC, acting pursuant to the emergency procedures set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 334.102, found probable cause to believe Donaldson engaged in sexual contact with a patient and emergently suspended Donald's license. The AHC then affirmed its previous order. Thereafter, the Board revoked Donaldson's license and prohibited him from applying for reinstatement for seven years. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the AHC's decision was authorized by law and was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Donaldson v. Missouri State Board of Registration for Healing Arts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming a jury's verdict in favor of Respondent on his legal malpractice claim, holding that public defenders are entitled to official immunity.Appellants were public defenders who were assigned to represent Respondent at his criminal trial. Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court later issued a writ of habeas corpus concluding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Respondent. Respondent sued Appellants alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary obligation for their failure to assert the jurisdictional challenge during their representation of him. The jury returned a verdict in Respondent's favor. Appellants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict alleging that they were shielded from liability due to official immunity. The circuit court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that public defenders have official immunity because they are public employees whose official statutory duties concern the performance of discretionary acts. View "Laughlin v. Perry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from taking any further action other than ordering Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice action to be transferred from St. Louis City to St. Charles County, holding that the circuit court exceeded its authority in issuing a ruling on Relators’ motion to transfer after the statutory ninety-day period expired.Plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice action against Relators and alleged venue was proper in St. Louis City. Relators moved to transfer for improper venue, contending that Plaintiffs were first injured in St. Charles County. The circuit court overruled Relators’ motion. Relators filed a writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court seeking to compel the circuit court to transfer the cause to St. Charles County. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, ordering the circuit court to take no further action in this matter. The Supreme Court then made permanent the writ, holding that the circuit court lacked authority to do anything other than transfer the cause to St. Charles County because the circuit court’s failure to rule upon Relators’ motion to transfer within the ninety-day period under Mo. Rev. Stat. 508.010.10 resulted in Relators’ motion being deemed granted. View "State ex rel. HeplerBroom, LLC v. Honorable Joan L. Moriarty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court quashing its preliminary writ in mandamus and denying Bryan Robison’s request for a permanent writ against the director of the Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions, and Professional Registration (Department), holding that Robison failed to demonstrate he was entitled to mandamus relief.One month before Robison’s license as a general bail bond agent was set to expire, he applied to renew his license with the director of the Department. As a result of Robison’s outstanding forfeitures and judgments, the director denied Robison’s application for renewal. Rather than exercising his right to file a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission, Robison filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the director denied his renewal application without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. The circuit court quashed its preliminary writ and denied Robison’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the director properly exercised her discretion by refusing the renewal request pursuant to her statutory authority and this Court’s rules. View "State ex rel. Robison v. Lindley-Myers" on Justia Law

Heartland Title Services, Inc. filed a petition in the circuit court of Jackson County alleging professional malpractice claims against Paul Hasty and Hasty and Associates, LLC (collectively, Hasty). Hasty filed a motion to dismiss Heartland’s professional malpractice claim for lack of venue, arguing that the tort injury alleged occurred outside Missouri. The circuit court dismissed the count for lack of venue. Heartland sought relief in the Supreme Court with this original proceeding in mandamus. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ and then made permanent the preliminary writ, holding that venue was proper in any county in Missouri, including Jackson County. View "State ex rel. Heartland Title Services, Inc. v. Honorable Kevin D. Harrell" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a medical negligence lawsuit alleging that Appellants negligently failed to timely drain Respondent’s prostate abscess, causing the abscess to rupture. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Respondent’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants did not preserve for review their argument that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain videotaped deposition testimony; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to find that the verdict was excessive due to jury passion and prejudice or because it exceeded fair and reasonable compensation for Respondent’s injuries; and (3) the Court will not address Appellants’ constitutional challenge to Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.300, which prohibits defendants in medical negligence cases from seeking remittitur, because the statutory prohibition in section 538.300 was not implicated in this case. View "Stewart v. Partamian" on Justia Law

Client retained Attorney to handle various legal claims pertaining to the management of a trust. Attorney later came to represent Client and his wife in matters of their own estate planning and administration. Upon Attorney’s advice, Client made loans to both the Attorney’s law firm and to a business from which Attorney received a commission for the referral. Attorney did not make a written disclosure or advise Client to seek independent legal advice regarding these transactions. The loans were never repaid. Client filed a malpractice action against Attorney for breach of fiduciary duty. Judgment was entered in favor of Client. Client subsequently filed an equitable garnishment action against Attorney’s malpractice insurer (Insurer) seeking to recover the judgment under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, concluding that coverage was excluded under the policy’s “legal representative of investors” exclusionary clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the trial court was correct in holding that the exclusionary clause unambiguously excluded coverage for Attorney’s injurious acts and omissions. View "Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Husch Blackwell Sanders, LLP represented Brian Nail in a dispute with his former employer over Nail’s stock options. Husch Blackwell negotiated a settlement that extended Nail’s option period, but Nail was prevented from obtaining the stock due to complications. Nail subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit against Husch Blackwell, arguing that the law firm negligently advised him regarding his remedies and negligently drafted the settlement agreement. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Husch Blackwell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Nail failed to prove that Husch Blackwell’s alleged negligence caused his claimed damages. View "Nail v. Husch Blackwell Sanders, LLP" on Justia Law