Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding $8 million in punitive damages against the board of trustees (the board) of the petroleum storage tank insurance fund (the fund) on the City of Harrisonville's claim of fraud and ordering post-judgment interest to accrue from the date it entered judgment, holding that that the city's claim of fraud against the board was barred by sovereign immunity.When it was not paid funds to which it claimed it was entitled, the city sued the fund, asserting claims for negligent misrepresentation. In 2011, a jury returned a verdict for the city. The Supreme Court reversed only the award of punitive damages against the fund. On remand, the city filed a second amended petition that, for the first time, named the board as a defendant. Relying on the jury verdict from 2011, the circuit court entered judgment against the board for $8 million in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court misapplied the law in entering judgment against the board because the board was a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity. View "City of Harrisonville v. Bd. of Trustees of MO Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and quashed an order of mandamus requiring the City of Creve Coeur to issue a conditional use permit (CUP), holding that the circuit court erroneously applied the law.Property Owners, which owned adjacent parcels of property in the City, entered into a contingent agreement to sell their property to QuikTrip, a sale that was contingent upon the City issuing a CUP allowing QuikTrip to construct a new service station. The City denied the application. The circuit court entered an order in mandamus finding that the City's ordinances required the City to issue the CUP. The Supreme Court reversed and quashed the mandamus order, holding that the circuit court improperly overrode the City's discretion in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.150.1. View "BG Olive & Graeser, LLC v. City of Creve Coeur" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled two motions in this case where Kevin Johnson was scheduled for execution on November 29, 2022, holding that the two motions to stay Johnson's execution did not show a likelihood of success.Johnson was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Fourteen days before Johnson's execution date, the special prosecutor filed a motion to vacate his conviction under Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.031, claiming that his prosecution violated equal protection because it was motivated, in part, by discriminatory intent. The circuit court denied the motion, and both the special prosecutor and Johnson appealed. While the appeals were pending, the special prosecutor filed a motion for stay of Johnson's execution, and Johnson filed a motion for stay of execution in the direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court overruled both motions, holding that neither the special prosecutor nor Johnson showed a likelihood of success on their claims. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of prohibition it issued directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying Missouri Highway Patrol Trooper Mayela Barron's motion for summary judgment and sustain Trooper Barron's motion for summary judgment against Justin Osborn, holding that Trooper Barron was entitled to official immunity.Osborn brought this action alleging negligence claims against Trooper Barron in her official capacity after Osborn's vehicle collided with Trooper Barron's vehicle. Osborn moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Trooper Barron was not entitled to official immunity or immunity because of the public duty doctrine. The circuit court denied the motion and granted partial summary judgment for Osborn, concluding that Trooper Barron was not entitled to official immunity. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the record established that Trooper Barron was a public official, working in the scope of her employment, performing a function that was not ministerial, and Trooper Barron performed these duties without malice; and (2) therefore, Trooper Barron was entitled to official immunity, and a writ of prohibition was appropriate. View "State ex rel. Barron v. Honorable Beger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court entering summary judgment for Employer and dismissing Employee's class action claiming that Employer violated the Missouri Prevailing Wage Act by failing to pay its employees the prevailing wage for work performed on properties in Kansas City, Missouri, holding that a genuine dispute existed, precluding summary judgment.Employee, individually and on behalf of a class of all similarly situated, filed a petition alleging that Employer violated the State's prevailing wage act and minimum wage law. The circuit court sustained Employer's motion for summary judgment as to all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record supported two plausible but contrary inferences as to whether Employee was employed "on behalf of any public body engaged in the construction of public works" within the meaning of the Prevailing Wage Act; and (2) therefore, a genuine dispute of material fact existed, barring summary judgment. View "Brockington v. New Horizons Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of driving while intoxicated as a persistent offender and sentencing him to four years' imprisonment, suspended in favor of supervised probation, holding that the circuit court did not err.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in overruling his pretrial motion to suppress and his pretrial motion in limine and allowing testimony of his breath test results. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that a review of the facts and circumstances of this case failed to reveal any error in the circuit court proceedings that was evidence, obvious, or clear. View "Petersen v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission that Saddle and Sirloin Club of Kansas City was not entitled to a refund of sales tax on monthly membership dues paid by Club members because the dues were fees paid to a place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.021.1, holding that the Club was not owed a refund.On appeal, the Club argued that the monthly membership dues were not subject to sales tax because, in addition to recreation services, Club members received the right to participate in the operation and control of the Club and an increase in the value of their equitable interests in the Club. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the Club failed to meet its burden of proving that members receive more than recreational services in exchange for monthly membership dues; and (2) therefore, the monthly membership dues were subject to sales tax pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020.1(2). View "Saddle & Sirloin Club of Kansas City v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) denying the complaint brought by Plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of James Townsend, that the director of the department of revenue was not authorized to assess unpaid sales tax owed by Green Duck Lounge, Inc. against Townsend as a responsible party under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.157.3, holding that the AHC's decision was authorized by law.On appeal, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that a prior judgment denying the department's attempt to collect the company's unpaid sales tax from Townsend's estate was res judicata, barring the director's assessment of the unpaid sales tax against Townsend personally. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the AHC did not err in finding that res judicata did not bar the director's assessment against Townsend, personally, as a responsible party; and (2) neither Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.220.3 nor section 144.157.3 required the director to mail notice of his intent to make an assessment against Townsend, as a responsible party, within years after the company's returns were filed. View "LaBlanche v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of several unions (Unions) and issuing a permanent injunction enjoining the State from altering existing collective bargaining agreements with the Unions pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1007 and ordering the State to bargain in good faith with the Unions without constraint from SB 1007, holding that the circuit court's judgment erroneously declared and applied the law.SB 1007 removed most state employees from the merit system by designating their employment statuses as at-will. The circuit court determined that SB 1007 did not impact collective bargaining or mandate at-will employment and that SB 1007 violated Mo. Const. art. I, 29 and 13. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SB 1007 mandates at-will employment and restricts the State's ability to agree to terms of employment inconsistent with at-will employment; and (2) SB 1007 does not violate the right to bargain collectively as guaranteed by article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution. View "American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Council 61 v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) finding beyond Housing, Inc. and Pagedale Town Center II, LLC (PTC II) qualify for sales and use tax exemptions as charitable organizations pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(19), holding that the AHC's decision was proper.On appeal, the director of the department of revenue argued, among other things, that the HAC erred in determining that Beyond Housing and PTC II could qualify as a charitable organization because Beyond Housing was previously granted civic exemptions and, the director claimed, the statutory categories of charitable and civic exemptions are mutually exclusive classifications. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the AHC did not err in finding Beyond Housing and PTC II qualified for the charitable exemption; and (2) the AHC’s determination that Beyond Housing and PTC II qualified for sales and use tax exemptions as charities was supported by competent and substantial evidence and comported with the law. View "Beyond Housing, Inc. v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law