Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarding permanent total disability (PTD) benefits to Jonathan Parker under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.2, holding that the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission erred in applying subsection 2 of section 287.220 rather than subsection 3 of the statute, and remand was required.Before the Supreme Court, the Second Injury Fund argued that Parker should be denied benefits under subsection 3. Parker, in turn, argued that the Supreme Court should award him benefits under subsection 3. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission's decision, holding (1) under Mo. Const. art. V, 18, the Supreme Court is permitted to review only the decisions and findings of the Commission, not to make such decisions in the first place; and (2) therefore, remand to the Commission was required to determine whether Parker was entitled to benefits under subsection 3. View "Treasurer of State as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of prohibition directing the circuit court to enter summary judgment in favor of Brian Henderson and Beutler, Inc., d/b/a George J. Shaw Construction Co. (Shaw), for injuries Joshua McArthur sustained while operating a dump truck on a construction site, holding that both Henderson and Shaw were immune from suit.In their motion for summary judgment, Henderson and Shaw asserted immunity from suit under the workers' compensation exclusivity doctrine. The circuit court overruled the motion, finding that the exception from workers' compensation exclusivity found in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.040.4 applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's findings regarding the application of section 287.040.4 were erroneous. View "State ex rel. Beutler, Inc. v. Honorable Sandra C. Midkiff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Marianist Provice of the United States and Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc. (together, Chaminade) and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that he suffered sexual abuse at the school in the early 1970s, holding that summary judgment for Chaminade on Plaintiff's claim of intentional failure to supervise was error.In granting summary judgment, the circuit court determined that Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. band 1997), barred Plaintiff's negligence-based claims and that his intentional failure to supervise clergy claim was not supported by sufficient competent evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in part, holding (1) Gibson was properly decided, and the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the negligence counts as required by Gibson; and (2) given Chaminade's statement of material fact and the deposition testimony of Plaintiff's expert, summary judgment was improper on Plaintiff's claims of intentional failure to supervise. View "John Doe 122 v. Marianist Province of the United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and order of the Judicial Finance Commission (JFC) dismissing the Franklin County Commission's petition for review, holding that the JFC properly dismissed the petition as untimely.In this budgeting dispute, the Franklin County Commission filed a petition for review with the JFC. JFC ordered the petition to be dismissed, determining that the petition was untimely and that the JFC had not authority to grant the relief sought. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Franklin County Commission failed to show good cause to excuse its late filing, and thus, the petition was properly dismissed as untimely; and (2) the Twentieth Judicial Circuit's motion for attorney fees is overruled without prejudice. View "Board of Commissioners of County of Franklin v. Twentieth Judicial Circuit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court retransferred this case to the court of appeals for consideration of the merits of Appellants' claims after the court of appeals dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court's orders were eligible for certification as final under Rule 74.01(b).Appellants sued certain doctors and curators of the University of Missouri for injuries related with unsuccessful surgeries that Appellants underwent, alleging several torts, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. The circuit court entered orders dismissing the curators from each case and then certified those judgments as final under Rule 74.01(b). The court of appeals dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted transfer and retransferred the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the merits of Appellants' claims, holding that the circuit court's orders were eligible for certification as final under Rule 74.01(b). View "Butala v. Curators of the University of Missouri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Defendant guilty of residing within 1,000 feet of George Washington Carver Middle School, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Defendant was within 1,000 feet of the Carver Middle School property line.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in concluding that the word "school" as used in Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.147, includes the Carver Middle School building as well as the adjoining school property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant's conviction for residing within 1,000 feet of the Carver Middle School property line. View "State v. McCord" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a permanent writ in prohibition directing Respondent, the Honorable Brian H. May, to vacate his orders in the case entered after Insurer filed its application for change of judge and to sustain the application for change of judge, holding that Insurer was entitled to the writ.In the underlying wrongful death suit Insurer filed a motion to intervene and stay proceedings while its contractual obligation to provide coverage was determined in a pending declaratory judgment action. Judge David Lee Vincent sustained the motion to intervene but overruled the motion to stay the proceedings. Thereafter, Judge Vincent entered an order of recusal, and the case was reassigned to Respondent. Insurer then filed this petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued the writ and directed Respondent to vacate his order overruling Insurer's application for change of judge and the order sustaining a motion to quash Insurer's notice of deposition, holding that Insurer was entitled to a change of judge. View "State ex rel. COUNTRY Mutual Insurance Co. v. Honorable Brian H. May" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) finding that David and Gale Collison were not entitled to a sales tax credit following their purchase of a vehicle to replace another vehicle declared a casualty loss by their insurance company, holding that the Collisons could not prevail in this matter.In denying the requested sales tax credit the AHC found that a revocable trust, not the Collisons, owned the new vehicle and that the Collisions, and not the revocable trust, owned the replaced vehicle. On appeal, the Collisons argued that they and the revocable trust were the same owner of the separate vehicles and the same entity for purposes of the sales tax credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Missouri law clearly considers a trust and the natural persons who create and control the trust to be separate and distinct entities, the Collisons and their revocable trust were legally separate owners. View "Collison v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's wrongful death lawsuit against Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Federal Employes' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, et seq. (FELA), holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her petition out of time.Plaintiff brought this action in her purported capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her husband (Decedent). In its motion to dismiss, Union Pacific argued that, prior to filing suit, Plaintiff was not appointed the personal representative of Decedent's estate, as required under 45 U.S.C 51. The circuit court granted Plaintiff thirty days to obtain the appointment and amend her petition. Plaintiff, however, was not appointed the personal representative of Decedent's estate until after the deadline. The circuit court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to further extend the deadline for Plaintiff to file an amended petition out of time. View "Holmes v. Holmes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Missouri's Legal Expense Fund had no obligation to satisfy a default judgment against Allen Merry, an employee of the St. Louis Public School District.S.M.H., a student in the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis, sued Merry, a former teacher, and obtained a default judgment against him for $4 million. Because the Transitional School District had lost its state accreditation, the Special Administrative Board (Board) of the Transitional School District governed the district and employed Merry. S.M.H. subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking satisfaction of the judgment from the Legal Expense Fund. The circuit court granted summary judgment for S.M.H. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board was not an "agency of the state" for purposes of the Legal Expense Fund, and therefore, the Fund was not liable for damages against employees of the Transitional School District; and (2) S.M.H. was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "S.M.H v. Schmitt" on Justia Law