Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that Maryann Gray's applications for review were timely filed pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.480 and overruling Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital's motion to strike, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Gray's applications were timely filed.Gray, a registered nurse at Hawthorn, filed applications for review of the denial of her claims for injuries sustained during her employment. After a hearing, the Commission found Gray timely filed her applications and affirmed the denial of benefits as to a 2012 injury but ordered Hawthorn to pay Gray partial permanent disability benefits for 2013 and 2014 injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Gray's applications were timely filed under section 287.480. View "Gray v. Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Appellant's Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 motion for postconviction relief, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate Appellant's competency at his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings.In his Rule 24.035 motion, Appellant, who pleaded guilty to second-degree assault of a special victim and resisting arrest, brought this motion alleging that his attorney was ineffective at both his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings by failing adequately to address his competency to proceed. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in concluding that Appellant's attorney was not ineffective for failing to investigate his competency at Appellant's guilty plea and sentencing proceedings. View "Hecker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court overruling GoJet Airlines, LLC's motion to compel arbitration in this breach of contract action brought by Hampton Brown and remanded this case to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred in refusing to compel arbitration.Brown, who had worked for GoJet as a pilot, filed a class action suit alleging that GoJet breached the parties' bonus agreement by failing to issue bonuses to him and other employees. In response, GoJet filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the parties entered into a mutually binding and enforceable arbitration agreement requiring that this dispute be arbitrated. The circuit court overruled the circuit court's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the parties' agreement was governed by the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Agreement, and arbitration may be compelled under its provisions; (2) the circuit court erred by finding the arbitration agreement unenforceable due to its lack of statutory notice; and (3) Brown's motion to strike was overruled. View "Brown v. GoJet Airlines, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission determining that Walmart Starco LLC was exempt from use tax for its purchase and use of information technology equipment pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.018.1 and 144.615(6), holding that the Commission correctly concluded that the equipment was exempt from use tax.The Commission ultimately determined that Starco's use of the information technology equipment at issue was exempt from use tax under sections 144.018.1 and 144.615(6). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Starco showed that it held the equipment solely for resale pursuant to section 144.615(6); and (2) the second argument raised on appeal was unpreserved for appellate review. View "Walmart Starco LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by the State of an order and judgment dismissing with prejudice criminal charges against Defendant, holding that there was no final, appealable judgment, and therefore, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.200.Defendant, who was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sustained the motion in part and dismissed the murder and robbery charges with prejudice, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded those charges. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this was an improper appeal. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from taking any further action in Petitioner's criminal case other than dismissing the pending charges against him, holding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) mandated dismissal of Petitioner's case.As a basis for the writ, Petitioner claimed that the circuit court violated the IAD by continuing his criminal case and failing to conduct a trial within 180 days of his request to dispose of his pending charges of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the writ, holding (1) the IAD applied to the disposition of the state charges pending against Petitioner resulting in a detainer being lodged with the federal penitentiary where he was serving a federal sentence; (2) the State waived any post hoc objection as to the sufficiency of Petitioner's request to dispose of his pending charges; (3) good cause did not exist under the IAD warranting continuing Petitioner's trial; and (4) Petitioner's actions did not waive, toll or otherwise justify extending the timeline mandated by the IAD. View "State ex rel. Wishom v. Honorable Bryant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Caitlyn Williams and Tamara LaRue (together, Parents) of failing to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis in violation of Missouri's compulsory attendance law, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.031.1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case.On appeal, Parents argued, among other things, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that their conduct was a purposeful or knowing violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.031.1 and that the children's attendance was not sufficiently "regular" to constitute a statutory violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 167.031.1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case; and (2) there sufficient evidence to find that Parents knowingly failed to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis after their children were enrolled. View "State v. LaRue" on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court overruling the motion to intervene as a matter of right filed by St. Louis and Jackson counties (the Counties), holding that the circuit court erred in overruling the Counties' motion to intervene as a matter of right.Plaintiffs brought this suit against the Department of Health and Senior Services. The circuit court ultimately declared that 19 C.S.R. 20-20.050(3) was constitutionally invalid. Several entities filed motions to intervene, including the Counties. The circuit court overruled all motions to intervene. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that the circuit court erred in denying intervention where the motions were timely filed, the counties had an interest in the subject matter of the action, disposition of the action would impede their interests, and the existing parties no longer adequately represented their interest. View "Robinson v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ it issued granting Monsanto Company's petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus requiring the St. Louis circuit court to transfer venue of five of the six plaintiffs' claims, holding that Missouri law compelled this result.Plaintiffs brought this action claiming that they were injured as a result of exposure to a herbicide manufactured by Monsanto Company and seeking monetary damages. Monsanto filed a motion to transfer venue as to five of the six plaintiffs in this case to St. Louis County but failed to file a motion to transfer in the six plaintiff's case The circuit court subsequently consolidated Plaintiffs' individual claims. Monsanto filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that venue was inappropriate in St. Louis Valley. The circuit court overruled the motion, after which Monsanto sought relief by way of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 508.010.5(1) mandated that venue shall be where Monsanto's registered agent was located as of filing - St. Louis County. View "State ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Honorable Mullen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Public Service Commission granting the joint application of Missouri-American Water Company and DCM Land LLC for variances from Missouri-American Water Company's tariff absent explicit language in the traffic allowing for variances, holding that the Commission did not have the authority to grant the variance.Water Company and DCM sought three variances from the tariff, which governed the funding of water main extensions. Specifically, the parties sought variances from the language of Rules 23.A.39 and 23.C.6 in the tariff. The Commission granted the requested variances after finding that good cause existed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there was no language in the rules allowing for a variance, the Commission lacked the authority to grant such variances as those sought in this case. View "In re Joint Application of Missouri-American Water Co. & DCM Land, LLC" on Justia Law