Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of attempted enticement of a child, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Defendant was convicted of attempted enticement of a child, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.161, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err or deprive Defendant of a fair trial in failing to submit Defendant's proffered instructions; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's objection to the cross-examination of the victim's sister, from whom Defendant sought to elicit testimony as to whether the victim had a tendency to exaggerate. View "State v. Michaud" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission determining that certain pain treatment service items used in compounding medications do not fall under the use tax exemption in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2 for materials used or consumed in compounding a product, holding that the commission correctly determined that the Interventional Center for Pain Management (Center) did not qualify for the compounding exemption under section 144.054.2.The director of revenue assessed $69,311 in tax liability for a five-year period against Center after discovering that Center did not file a use tax return or pay use tax on certain out-of-state purchases. Center contested use tax liability for certain items used for the injection of prescription drug compounds, asserting that the devices were exempt from use tax as materials used in compounding operation under section 144.054.2. The administrative hearing petition upheld the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Center failed to meet its burden of proof to prove its purchases were used in the compounding of a product for sale, as required for the compounding exemption under section 144.054.2. View "Interventional Center for Pain Management v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court overruling Appellant's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 435.355 obligated the circuit court to order the parties to proceed to arbitration under the circumstances of this case.Prior to his discharge from the hospital, Theron Ingram executed a written Durable Power of Attorney naming Andrea Nicole Hall as his attorney in fact. Ingram was subsequently admitted to Brook Chateau, and Hall executed an arbitration agreement with Brook Chateau on Ingram's behalf. Ingram later filed a petition against Brook Chateau alleging negligence and seeking punitive damages. Brook Chateau responded by filing a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court overruled the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court was required under section 435.355 to compel arbitration because Brook Chateau attached a valid arbitration agreement alongside its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. View "Ingram v. Chateau" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed this Court's preliminary writ of prohibition, holding that the issuance of the writ of prohibition sought by Key Insurance Company directing the circuit court to dismiss claims filed against it by Josiah Wright and Phillip Nash for lack of jurisdiction would be inappropriate.After arbitration, Wright filed a lawsuit against Key and Nash seeking to collect insurance proceed's from Nash's child's insurance policy. Nash filed a cross-claim against Key alleging that Key breached its contractual duty to defend him. Key filed a motion to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court overruled the motion. Key then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court. The Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it then quashed, holding that where there had been no showing that the circuit court’s usurpation of jurisdiction was "clearly evident" and Nash adequately pleaded facts in his cross-claim that established personal jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of prohibition would be inappropriate. View "State ex rel. Key Insurance Co. v. Honorable Marco A. Roldan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the motion court to the extent it overruled Appellant's motion for postcondition relief on his driving while revoked conviction and affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that appellate counsel's failure to raise a sufficiency of evidence claim constituted deficient performance that prejudiced Appellant.Appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and driving while revoked. In his Mo. R. Civ. P. 29.15 motion for postconviction relief Appellant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call his physician to testify that certain prescription medications he took made him appear intoxicated by alcohol the night he was arrested and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue there was insufficient evidence to enhance his driving while revoked misdemeanor to a felony. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant's postconviction relief claim relating to his driving while intoxicated conviction was properly denied because there was no reasonable probability the trial court's finding would have been different had the physician testified at Appellant's trial; and (2) appellate counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency of the evidence claim constituted deficient performance by which Appellant was prejudiced. View "Hounihan v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court holding the City of Kansas City in civil contempt of a 1976 modified judgment, holding that the parties could not bring a contempt action to enforce the 1976 modified judgment because they were not parties to the litigation and the 1976 plaintiffs were not certified as a class.Sophian Plaza Association and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs brought claims of breach of injunction, breach of contract, specific performance, and civil contempt stemming from the City's termination of a trash rebate program. The court certified a class and then entered judgment in favor of the class on its claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the class could not avail itself of enforcement proceedings brought upon the 1976 modified judgment because they were not parties to the litigation nor were the 1976 plaintiffs certified as a class under Mo. R. Civ. p. 52.08. View "Sophian Plaza Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, Missouri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the constitutional validity of Senate Bill. No. 638 (SB 638) and Senate Bill 665 (SB 665), holding that the bills do not violate Mo. Const. art. III, 21 or 23 and that Appellant failed to state a claim for relief regarding his substantive title change claim.Specifically, Appellant argued (1) the original purpose of the bills were changed by amendments such that, as enacted, the bills violated article III, section 21; (2) the final bills violated the single subject requirement of article III, section 23; and (3) the substantive changes to the bills' titles during the legislative process violated article III, sections 21 and 23. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the bills maintained their original purpose throughout the legislative process; (2) the bills did not violate the single subject requirement; and (3) the circuit court did not err in dismissing Appellant's substantive title change claim for failing to state a claim. View "Calzone v. Interim Commissioner of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education Roger Dorson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of prohibition prohibiting the Jefferson County circuit court from taking any further action except to transfer the underlying action to Cole County, where venue was proper.Jefferson County 9-1-1 Dispatch filed this declaratory judgment action against the Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue in the Jefferson County circuit court seeking a declaration as to the meaning of subsections 5 and 6 of Mo. Rev. Stat. 190.460 and to enjoin the Director from applying section 190.460 to Dispatch. The Director filed a motion to change venue to the Cole County circuit court alleging that Cole County was the proper venue pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 508.010.2, the general venue statute. The circuit court overruled the Director's motion. The Director then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals, which ultimately denied the writ. The Director then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court. The Court issued a preliminary writ, which it made permanent, holding that venue was improper in Jefferson County and proper in Cole County. View "State ex rel. Zellers v. Honorable Stacey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling Defendant's Rule 29.15 motion for post conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant failed to plead facts showing his counsel was ineffective.In his Rule 29.15 motion Defendant claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression of methamphetamine found during a warrantless search of a cigarette pack seized from his pocket on the grounds that the search occurred thirty minutes after his arrest in an area outside his immediate control. The motion court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the search of Defendant's cigarette was a lawful search incident to arrest, and therefore, Defendant failed to plead facts showing his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the search. View "Greene v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court's judgment upholding Jeanette Huey's sale of her home located in the Clayton Terrace subdivision and holding the "one residence per lot" subdivision indenture provision was valid and precluded subdivision of the lot but reversed the portion of the judgment finding abuse of process on the part of the subdivision trustees as well as its awards of attorney's fees to Huey and the trustees, holding that the circuit court erred in part.The Supreme Court upheld the judgment upholding Huey's sale of her home despite allegations she failed to comply with the right of first refusal contained in the subdivision indentures as well as the circuit court's refusal to reject the amended indenture provision prohibiting the building of more than one residence per lot but reversed the circuit court's judgment holding the trustees' attempt to have the home sale set aside constituted an abuse of process and the court's award of attorney's fees to the trustees, holding (1) an abuse of process claim required more than the proof Huey offered that the trustees' purpose was allegedly improper; (2) the indenture provision not be avoided by attempting to divide the lot into two sub-lots; and (3) the attorney's fees awards were improper. View "Trustees of Clayton Terrace Subdivision, v. 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC" on Justia Law