Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition preventing the circuit court from taking any action in this case other than discharging Relator from probation, holding that the circuit court lacked authority over Relator and could not hold a hearing to revoke her probation.During Relator’s term of probation, the division of probation and parole issued notices of citation, but none of those notices resulted in the issuance of probation violation warrants or the suspension of Relator’s probation. After a field violation report was filed, however, the circuit court suspended Relator’s probation. After a probation violation hearing was scheduled, Relator sought a petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ, which it made permanent, holding (1) the notices of citation were not “initial violation reports” or “violation reports” pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 217.703, and therefore, the division’s issuances of notices of citation did not stop the accrual of earned compliance credits because Relator was not out of compliance with the terms of her probation; and (2) after the optimal discharge date passed, the circuit court did not have the authority to hold a probation revocation hearing and, rather, should have discharged Relator from probation. View "State ex rel. Coleman v. Honorable Horn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court against St. Luke’s Surgicenter-Lee’s Summit LLC on a negligent credentialing claim brought by Thomas and Paula Tharp, holding that the Tharps failed to make a submissible case of negligent credentialing.Thomas Tharp suffered injuries when a surgeon operating out of St. Luke’s damaged his hepatic duct and common bile duct. The Tharps filed suit against the surgeon and St. Luke’s and then settled with the surgeon. The Tharps proceeded to trial against St. Luke’s on the claim that St. Luke’s negligently granted the surgeon staff privileges at its hospital. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Tharps, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the Tharps. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the Tharps’s negligent credentialing claim. View "Tharp v. St. Luke's Surgicenter-Lee's Summit, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice R.M.A.’s petition alleging that Defendants, a school district and school board, unlawfully discriminated against him on the grounds of his sex in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.065, holding that R.M.A.’s petition alleged facts that, if taken as true, established the elements of a claim under section 213.065.R.M.A. filed suit alleging that his “legal sex is male” and that, by denying him access to the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms, Defendants discriminated against him in the use of a public accommodation “on the grounds of his sex.” The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding that R.M.A. stated a claim under section 213.065.2. View "R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Commission) on Appellants’ consolidated allegations of violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (Act), Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.010 et seq., holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Appellants’ claims failed under Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015).Specifically, the circuit court relied upon Pittman’s holding that the Act does not include claims for sex discrimination based upon sexual orientation and then extended that rationale to include claims for sex discrimination based upon sex stereotyping. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the Commission improperly characterized Appellants’ claims as sexual orientation discrimination, and therefore, the circuit court’s reliance on Pittman was misplaced; and (2) the circuit court erred in issuing summary judgment in favor of Defendant because the Act covers sex discrimination. View "Lampley v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the preliminary writ issued in this original proceeding in prohibition brought by Husband seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order compelling him to turn over all correspondence pertaining to his military retirement benefits and to sign an authorization releasing his military records related to reservist points he earned during his marriage to Wife, holding that Husband failed to establish that the circuit court exceeded its authority when it sustained Wife’s motion to compel.Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court’s order did not modify or otherwise grant Wife any relief from the division of property in the parties’ dissolution judgment, and therefore, the circuit court’s order was not governed by the one-year time limitation in Rule 74.06(c) and was not barred under the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata; and (2) the circuit court’s order did not violate Husband’s due process rights or privacy rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. View "State ex rel. Cullen v. Honorable Kevin Harrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent preliminary writs of prohibition preventing the circuit court from taking any further action other than to sever Michael Blaes’ claims from the separate claims made by multiple plaintiffs in the underlying case pending in St. Louis City and to transfer Blaes’ claims to St. Louis County, holding that venue was proper in St. Louis County.In the Swann action, Plaintiffs filed suit against Relators in St. Louis City alleging that they or their decedents developed ovarian cancer from using products manufactured by Johnson & Johnson with talc provided by Imerys Talc America, Inc. Blaes, whose wife died of ovarian cancer, was named as a plaintiff in the first amended petition. The circuit court subsequently designated Blaes’ claims for a separate trial. Relators renewed previously filed motions to sever and transfer for improper venue, which the circuit court overruled. Relators then sought writs of prohibition arguing venue in St. Louis City was improper and seeking to compel the circuit court to transfer Blaes’ separate claims to the proper venue in St. Louis County. The Court issued writs of prohibition, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in overruling Relators’ motions to sever Blaes’ claims and transfer the to St. Louis County, where Blaes’ wife was first injured. View "State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Honorable Rex M. Burlison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Mary Doe’s second amended petition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a portion of the Missouri Informed Consent Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 188.027 - which she alleged required her to read a booklet, have an ultrasound, and wait seventy-two hours before having an abortion - for failure to state a claim, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the petition.In her petition, Doe claimed that requiring her to read the booklet violated her rights under the Establishment Clause and that reading the booklet and requiring her to have an ultrasound violated her rights under the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.302.1. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Doe’s request for injunctive relief, holding (1) the informed consent law does not adopt any religious tenant but requires those seeking an abortion be offered a booklet that repeats two principles set out in Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.205; (2) the informed consent law does not require a pregnant woman to read the booklet or to have an ultrasound; and (3) Doe did not allege how the seventy-two hour waiting period conflicts with her religion or that it was an undue burden. View "Doe v. Parson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of mandamus directing Respondent, the Honorable Jodie Asel, to enter a judgment in Jennifer Henderson’s case against the Business Loop Community Improvement District, Tom May, and Carrie Gartner (collectively, Defendants), holding that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel Respondent to sign and file a judgment resolving Henderson’s claims.Henderson filed suit against Defendants asserting claims challenging the results of a sales tax election. Respondent sustained Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the cause without prejudice. Henderson then filed a motion for Respondent to denominate the dismissal order a “judgment” so she could appeal. The motion was overruled. Henderson later petitioned the court of appeals for a writ directing Respondent to denominate the dismissal order a judgment. The court of appeals denied the petition, and Henderson then petitioned the Supreme Court for the same relief. The Court issued a preliminary writ of mandamus, which it made permanent, holding that because the dismissal order was intended to resolve all of Henderson’s claims against Defendants it was a judgment and must be denominated as such. View "State ex rel. Henderson v. Honorable Jodie Asel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in these two cases that a probationer may not be discharged from probation as a result of Earned Compliance Credits (ECCs) accrued under Mo. Rev. Stat. 217.703 unless she has paid the full amount of any court-ordered restitution because Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.105.2, which prohibits such a discharge if the probationer has failed to pay the full amount of court-ordered restitution, takes precedence over section 217.703.7.In the case of Nettie Pallai, the judge sustained Pallai’s motion for discharge from probation, and the prosecutor, Kevin Hillman, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. In the case of Erica Long, the judge overruled Long’s motion to be discharged from probation. Both Pallai and Long accrued sufficient ECCs to be discharged under section 213.703.7 but failed to pay restitution. The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of probation in Hillman’s case and quashed the preliminary writ of prohibition in Long’s case, holding that a probationer may accrue ECCs under section 217.703.3, but she may not be discharged from probation by applying those ECCs to shorten her term of probation under section 217.703.7 unless she pays any court-ordered restitution in full pursuant to section 559.105.2. View "State ex rel. Hillman v. Honorable John D. Beger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s motion for revival of judgment on grounds it was filed out of time, holding that the motion was timely filed.On June 28, 2005 the circuit court entered a default judgment in favor of Unifund and against William Abright. Unified served garnishments on Abright’s employer, who paid the garnished funds into the circuit court registry, and the last payment into the registry was made July 26, 2007. On July 17, 2017, Unifund filed a motion for revival of the judgment against Abright. The circuit court overruled the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Unifund’s July 17, 2017 motion to revive the judgment was timely filed within ten years of the last prior revival of the judgment on July 26, 2007. View "Unifund CCR Partners, Assignee of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Abright" on Justia Law