Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Kansas City (BZA) to deny the request of the Antioch Community Church (Church) for a nonuse zoning variance for a digital display on a sign it erected in front of the church building.The circuit court concluded that the BZA erred in denying the variance because (1) contrary to the BZA’s determination, the BZA had the authority to grant the variance; and (2) the Church adequately established the existence of “practical difficulties” so the denial of the variance was not supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the BZA, holding (1) the BZA had authority to grant a variance if the other requirements for a variance were met; but (2) the record supported the BZA’s decision that the Church did not show “practical difficulties” in operating without the variance. View "Antioch Community Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Kansas City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of the charge of resisting arrest, holding that the evidence did not support the submission of resisting arrest. Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s arrest had already been effected when he was restrained by law enforcement officers and under their control when Defendant’s alleged resistance occurred; and (2) because Defendant’s arrest and custody were chronologically and legally separate events under the statutory and common law framework, if Defendant committed any crime it would have been attempt to escape from custody, not resisting arrest. View "State v. Ajak" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded its authority in refusing to transfer venue of Defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.While detained in the Jackson County Detention Center, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his judgment of conviction and sentences for first-degree murder. Defendant was later returned to the Crossroads Correctional Center. The Director of the Jackson County Detention Center, who had been named as the respondent in Defendant’s petition, filed a motion to transfer the habeas corpus case to the proper venue in DeKalb County, where Defendant was located, and to substitute the Warden of the Correctional Center as the proper respondent. The Jackson County circuit court overruled the motion. Relator Joshua Hawley then filed a motion to transfer venue to DeKalb County and to substitute the proper respondent. The Jackson County circuit court overruled this motion. Relator sought a writ of prohibition from this Court. The Court granted relief, holding that the Jackson County circuit court exceeded its authority in refusing to transfer venue of Defendant’s petition because the Warden was the proper named respondent and DeKalb County was the proper venue for the habeas petition. View "State ex rel. Hawley v. Honorable Sandra Midkiff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dissolving the marriage of Jessica Bowers and Jason Bowers and designating Jason a third party in the dissolution proceeding for purposes of determining custody of Child.The circuit court awarded Jason sole legal and physical custody of Child, finding that it would not be in Child’s best interest for Jessica or Child’s biological father to have sole physical or legal custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in designating Jason as a third party in the dissolution action for the sole purpose of determining custody even where Jason was already a party to the dissolution; and (2) the circuit court’s award of third-party custody to Jason was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Bowers v. Bowers" on Justia Law

Because Plaintiffs in these two personal injury suits failed to allege a breach of a duty unrelated to employment or a breach of workplace safety that was so unforeseeable to the employer as to take it outside the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s co-employees (Defendants).Plaintiffs in both cases were injured on the job. Plaintiffs sued Defendants for common law negligence, arguing that Defendants breached a duty separate and distinct from their employers’ duty to provide a safe workplace. In each case, the trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted under Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Mo. banc 2016) and Peters v. Wady Industries, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 784, 789-90 (Mo. banc 2016). View "Conner v. Ogletree" on Justia Law

In this personal injury suit, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant under Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Mo. banc 2016) and Peters v. Wady Industries, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 784, 789-90 (Mo. banc 2016).Matthew Fogerty brought this action against Larry Meyer, his co-employee, seeking damages for injuries he sustained while the parties were working together. After the accident, Fogerty filed and settled a workers’ compensation claim for his injuries. Fogerty then filed this personal injury lawsuit against Meyer. Meyer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Fogerty failed to show that Meyer breached a duty separate and distinct from the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. The circuit court agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Meyer’s negligence was a breach of the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, not a breach of a duty “separate and distinct” from the employer’s duty. View "Fogerty v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Plaintiff’s wrongful death action was barred by the exclusivity provision in Missouri’s workers’ compensation statutes, Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.Edward McComb died while driving a vehicle for his employer. Plaintiff, McComb's widow, brought this suit against McComb’s supervisory co-employees (collectively, Defendants). The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that whether McComb’s death was attributable to his employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace was a question of fact for a jury to decide, thus precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants owed McComb a duty separate and distinct from his employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted under Parr v. Breeden, 489 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Mo. banc 2016) and Peters v. Wady Industries, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 784, 789-90 (Mo. banc 2016). View "McComb v. Norfus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court’s judgment denying Appellant postconviction relief on his twelve claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and claims challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 562.076 regarding voluntary intoxication and the time limits. Appellant filed his motion under Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15. In affirming, the Supreme Court held (1) the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous; and (2) the motion court’s judgment regarding an unpreserved claim of error was not plainly erroneous. View "Collings v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err in sustaining Defendants’ motions to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to warrant authorizing search of a residence for stolen items.On appeal, the State argued that, while no probable cause existed for a provision of the search warrant form authorizing a search for any deceased human fetus or corpse, the circuit court should have applied the severance doctrine to redact the invalid portion of the warrant and suppress only the evidence seized pursuant to the invalid portion. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to apply the severance doctrine and in suppressing all evidence seized because the invalid portions of the search warrant so contaminated the whole warrant that they could not be redacted pursuant to the severance doctrine. View "State v. Gaulter" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err in sustaining Defendants’ motions to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to warrant authorizing search of a residence for stolen items.On appeal, the State argued that, while no probable cause existed for a provision of the search warrant form authorizing a search for any deceased human fetus or corpse, the circuit court should have applied the severance doctrine to redact the invalid portion of the warrant and suppress only the evidence seized pursuant to the invalid portion. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to apply the severance doctrine and in suppressing all evidence seized because the invalid portions of the search warrant so contaminated the whole warrant that they could not be redacted pursuant to the severance doctrine. View "State v. Gaulter" on Justia Law