Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Missouri American Water Company (MAWC) filed a petition to charge an infrastructure system replacement surcharge to its St. Louis County customers. The Public Service Commission (PSC) approved the petition. The Office of the Public Counsel appealed, arguing that the PSC lacked the authority to grant the petition because St. Louis County did not meet Mo. Rev. Stat. 393.1000-393.1006’s threshold population requirement at the time PSC approved the surcharge. The Office of the Public Counsel appealed. While the appeal was pending, MAWC and PSC reached an agreement establishing a new rate base that incorporated the costs of the MAWC projects for all then-existing surcharges. The Supreme Court dismissed this case as moot, holding (1) because the surcharge is no longer in effect and no effective relief may be granted, the issue as to whether MAWC can utilize the surcharge provisions of section 393.1003 is moot; and (2) the issues presented on appeal did not meet the requirements for an exception to the mootness doctrine. View "In re Petition of Missouri-American Water Company for Approval to Change its Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of second-degree statutory rape and the class D felony of incest. Appellant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. Appellant later filed a pro se motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.035. The circuit court overruled and denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant was not notified of any proceedings in his case and requested additional information. The circuit court failed to provide the requested information. On appeal, the court of appeals, sua sponte, determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the circuit court’s docket entry was not denominated a judgment. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed and remanded, holding that there could be no meaningful appellate review due to the circuit court’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.035.8. View "Mercer v. State" on Justia Law

St. Louis City’s Ordinance 70078 establishes a citywide local minimum wage. The trial court invalidated the Ordinance because it requires a higher minimum wage than the state requires in Mo. Rev. Stat. 290.502. In so ruling, the trial court concluded that Mo. Rev. Stat. 71.010, which includes a general prohibition on local laws that conflict with state laws, would bar such supplemental local minimum wage ordinances. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment invalidating Ordinance 70078, holding (1) the trial court correctly found that Mo. Rev. Stat. 67.1571 does not preempt Ordinance 70078 because section 67.1571 was enacted in a manner that violates Mo. Const. art. III, 23; (2) Missouri’s minimum wage law does not occupy the field of minimum wage laws, nor does it prohibit the adoption of local minimum wage ordinances such as Ordinance 70078; and (3) Ordinance 70078 is within the municipality’s police powers, and the City did not exceed its authority in enacting the minimum wage ordinance. View "Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

David DePriest and Natalie DePriest, brother and sister, were charged separately with offenses arising from their cultivation of marijuana plants. The DePriests were represented by the same counsel throughout their separate criminal proceedings. The DePriests jointly pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea deal on counsel’s recommendation. The trial court accepted both DePriests’ pleas. Thereafter, the DePriests filed separate motions for postconviction relief pursuant to Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel continued to represent both of them long after it became clear during the plea negotiations that there was an actual conflict of interest between them. The motion court denied both motions without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court’s judgments and remanded the cases for further proceedings, holding that both David and Natalie alleged sufficient facts to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule 24.035, and therefore, the motion court erred in denying the DePriests an evidentiary hearing. Remanded. View "DePriest v. State" on Justia Law

Russel Parker, an Indiana resident, brought a personal injury action against Norfolk Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, alleging cumulative trauma sustained during his years of employment with Norfolk in Indiana. Norfolk moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction alleging that Missouri had no personal jurisdiction. The trial court overruled the motion without stating the grounds for its ruling. Norfolk sought a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it subsequently made permanent, holding that Missouri did not have specific or general personal jurisdiction over Norfolk in the underlying personal injury action. View "State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Hon. Colleen Dolan" on Justia Law

David and Crystal Holm filed a wrongful foreclosure action against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. for allegedly foreclosing on their home without right. The Holms also filed a quiet title action against Freddie Mac, which took title to the property after the foreclosure sale. After a jury-waived trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Holms on their wrongful foreclosure claim, awarded them actual and punitive damages, and quieted title to the house in the Holms. The mortgage companies appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the mortgage companies for their discovery violations; (2) substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Wells Fargo wrongfully foreclosed on the Holms’ house; but (3) the trial court erred in awarding damages and quieting title to the house in the Holms because the mortgage companies had a constitutional right to have a jury determine the extent of the Holms’ actual and punitive damages on the wrongful foreclosure claim. Remanded for a new trial before a jury on the Holms’ damages for wrongful foreclosure. View "Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1998, 52 U.S. states and territories entered into the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with tobacco manufacturers (PMs), which released the PMs from tobacco-related consumer protection and product liability lawsuits in return for the PMs’ agreement to make annual payments to the states in perpetuity. This dispute concerned the application of the Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment (NPM Adjustment), a provision in the MSA that reduces the amount the PMs must pay to states that failed diligently to enforce certain legislation during a relevant year. PMs, Missouri, and other states arbitrated the dispute. More than twenty states and the PMs entered into a partial settlement agreement, but Missouri and other states did not join the settlement. The arbitration panel found that Missouri was not diligent in enforcing its legislative enactment and that the NPM Adjustment applied. Missouri sought relief. The trial court overruled Missouri’s motion to compel the PMS to engage in a single-state arbitration with Missouri over another dispute regarding application of the NPM Adjustment in a subsequent year but modified the award as requested by Missouri. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly refused to compel single-state arbitration; and (2) the trial court did not err in modifying the panel’s award. View "State ex rel. Greitens v. American Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, TracFone Wireless, Inc. sought refunds of the difference between the sales tax it paid on its sales to Missouri residents and the use tax it believes it should have paid, arguing that it qualified for the “in commerce” exemption from sales tax set out in section 144.030.1. The Director of Revenue denied the requested refunds. The Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the decision, finding that TracFone’s sales were subject to sales tax under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020.1(4) and that TracFone was not entitled to claim the “in commerce” sales tax exemption because the true object of the transactions was the sale of access to telecommunications services in Missouri, and the equipment was merely incidental to the sale of access to those services in Missouri. TracFone filed a petition for review, asserting that, while the sales at issue may be retail sales under section 144.020.1, they qualified for the “in commerce” exemption set out in section 144.030.1. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the transactions at issue did not qualify for the exemption set out in section 144.030.1 for sales “in commerce” between states. View "TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The court quashed its preliminary writ of prohibition to consider relator's claim that the new rule of evidence set forth in the 2014 amendment to article I, section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution could not be applied in his upcoming trial because the crimes with which he is charged occurred before the effective date of that constitutional amendment. The court held that article I, section 18(c) applies to all trials occurring on or after the effective date of the amendment, regardless of when the crimes are alleged to have occurred; claims that the trial court applied this new rule of evidence improperly, or that a proper application of this rule nevertheless violates the defendant’s substantive rights under the state or federal constitutions, are not before the court in this proceeding; and such objections must be properly raised and preserved during trial and properly presented on appeal if the defendant is convicted. View "State ex rel. Kendrick Tipler v. The Honorable Michael Gardner" on Justia Law

The Commission determined that Charles and Mary Harter improperly calculated their income eligibility for purposes of the Property Tax Credit (PTC), under sections 135.010 to 135.035 of RSMO Supp., and found that the entire amount of Mr. Harter's social security and annuity payments should be included in their “income” for PTC purposes under section 135.010(5). The Harters seek judicial review of the Commission's finding that the Harters were eligible only for a reduced PTC for the 2010 tax year under section 135.030.2 and that they were not eligible for any PTC for the years 2011-13 because their income exceeded the “maximum upper limit” of income eligibility under section 135.030.1(1). The court concluded that the Commission properly determined the Harters' PTC where the Harters met the disability eligibility criterion and the Commission properly calculated the Harters' "income" for PTC purposes. The court also concluded that the Commission did not err in refusing to estop the Director, and the Commission did not err in granting summary decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Harter v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law