Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Geteway Taxi Management, d/b/a Laclede Cab Company (Laclede), operated a taxi service in the St. Louis metropolitan area. The Division of Employment Security determined that Laclede was liable for unemployment tax because its taxi drivers performed services for “wages” in the “employment” of Laclede. under Mo. Rev. Stat. 288.034.5. The appeals tribunal reversed. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (LIRC) reversed, finding that the taxi drivers were “employees” of Laclede under Mo. Rev. Stat. 288.034.5. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was competent and substantial evidence on the record to support LIRC’s decision that Laclede’s drivers were employees of Laclede. View "Gateway Taxi Mgmt. v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law

Randy Spalding filed suit against Stewart Title Guaranty Company, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay in regard to a title insurance policy. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered an amended judgment in favor of Spalding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) overruling Stewart Title’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the title insurance policy was not time barred and where Spalding made a submissible case as to the existence and amount of the damages for the breach of contract; (2) refusing to give Stewart Title’s proposed instruction concerning its statute of limitations defense; (3) admitting evidence from an appraiser in regard to damages sustained from the title defect under the policy; and (4) giving a certain jury instruction regarding the measure of damages. View "Spalding v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the St. Louis Rams Partnership, filed an action claiming age discrimination against the Partnership and three of its affiliates. The Rams moved to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration provision of Plaintiff’s employment contract. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that the court action be stayed pending arbitration. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus preventing the trial court from compelling arbitration of this dispute. Four judges of the Supreme Court issued a permanent writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to compel arbitration and to issue an order to compel arbitration whereby the trial court appoints a neutral arbitrator and implies the specific terms of arbitration from applicable statutes in Missouri’s uniform arbitration act, holding (1) the terms of Plaintiff’s employment contract designating the commissioner of the National Football League (NFL) as the sole arbitrator with unfettered discretion to establish the rules for arbitration are unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable; and (2) Missouri’s uniform arbitration act provides a mechanism to imply the terms missing from the arbitration agreement and provides the rules for appointing an arbitrator to replace the NFL commissioner. View "State ex rel. Hewitt v. Hon. Kerr" on Justia Law

Shonda Ambers-Phillips and her husband, Richard Phillips, filed a medical malpractice action against SSM DePaul Health Center for leaving foreign objects in Ambers-Phillips’s abdomen nearly fourteen years earlier. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that Mo. Rev. Stat.’s ten-year statute of repose applied, making the Phillipses’ claims time-barred and subject to dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not holding that the statute of repose for foreign-object medical malpractice claims was equitably tolled until Ambers-Phillips discovered the wrong; and (2) statutes of repose are not unconstitutional if not subject to equitable tolling. View "Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Linda Nunley was killed while working for a charcoal manufacturer. Plaintiffs, Nunley’s three children and her mother, obtained a judgment for wrongful death against Junior Flowers, the company’s sole owner, director, and executive officer. Flowers requested a defense from his insurer (ILM), but ILM refused to defend Flowers. Flowers subsequently assigned his insurance claims to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued ILM for breach of duties to defend and indemnify under commercial general liability (CGL) and umbrella policies. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ILM after applying the policies’ employees exclusions, which prevented coverage for work-related injuries to employees of the insured. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policies barred Plaintiffs’ claims through unambiguous language that excluded liability to employees. View "Piatt v. Ind. Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree assault of a probation and parole officer. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion. The motion court appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Appellant in the proceeding. Ninety-one days later, Appellant’s appointed counsel filed an amended motion alleging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The amended motion was not timely. The motion court overruled the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed because the motion court did not make an independent inquiry under Luleff v. State into whether Appellant was abandoned by appointed counsel when the untimely amended motion was filed. Remanded for an independent inquiry into whether Appellant was abandoned by appointed counsel. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

Bohr Farms owned and operated a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) that accommodated more than 4,000 hogs. Cargill Pork, LLC owned the hogs. Appellants, several landowners and other individuals, brought this action against Cargill and Bohr Farms (together, Respondents), alleging damages for temporary nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy due to alleged offensive odors that emanated from the CAFO. Appellants did not claim damages for diminution in rental value or documented medical costs as authorized by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.296.2, but, rather, alleged that their damages for temporary nuisance consisted solely of the loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding, inter alia, that section 537.296 was constitutional and did not authorize an award of damages for Appellants’ alleged loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 537.296 is constitutional; and (2) Appellants’ nuisance, conspiracy and vicarious liability claims are inseparable from the nuisance allegations and are therefore barred by section 537.296.6(1). View "Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, and two counts of armed criminal action. Petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. In On February 25, 2015, the Supreme Court scheduled Petitioner’s execution for April 14, 2015. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, Panetti v. Quarterman, and Mo. Rev. Stat. 552.060.1. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate his claim of incompetency. Petitioner also sought a stay of execution while his incompetency claim was adjudicated. The Supreme Court denied the habeas petition on the merits and overruled the accompanying motion for a stay of execution as moot, holding that Petitioner was not incompetent to be executed under Ford, Panetti, or section 552.060.1. View "State ex rel. Cole v. Griffith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of forcible rape, one count of forcible sodomy, and five counts of armed criminal action. Defendant received two death sentences for the murder convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) failing to stop the trial and order a competency evaluation, as Defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he was not competent to stand trial; (2) granting Defendant’s requests to not remain in the courtroom during certain phases of his trial; (3) finding Defendant voluntarily waived his right to testify during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial; (4) overruling Defendant’s motion for a continuance to be medicated; (5) denying the jury’s request to view all of the exhibits admitted into evidence during the penalty phase; and (6) admitting victim impact testimony and evidence. Finally, the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty met the statutory requirements. View "State v. Driskill" on Justia Law

After the General Assembly enacted HB 1171, which amended Mo. Rev. Stat. 67.320 to permit any first-class county within a certain population range to establish a county municipal court division, the Franklin County Commission entered a county order establishing a municipal court division pursuant to the amended section 67.320. Taxpayers of Franklin County sued the members of the Commission, alleging that HB 1171’s enactment violated constitutional prohibitions against multiple subjects and change of original purpose and that the Commission’s order was void. On remand, the trial court concluded that HB 1171’s enactment was constitutional. While Taxpayers’ appeal was pending, the General Assembly passed SB 621, which repealed and reenacted section 67.320, including the language regarding establishment of a municipal court division. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, as Taxpayers’ appeal no longer represented an actual controversy. View "LeBeau v. Comm’rs of Franklin County" on Justia Law