Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fenix Construction Company of St. Louis, Five Star Ready-Mix Concrete Company and Horstmeyer Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, Taxpayers) filed sales tax refund claims for their purchases of materials used to construct tilt-up concrete walls. Taxpayers asserted that the materials fell within the Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2 tax exemption for materials used in “manufacturing…any product.” The director of revenue denied the claims. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) also denied the refund claims, determining that the tax exemption was inapplicable because the tilt-up concrete walls were not a “product” pursuant to section 144.054.2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the AHC correctly determined that Taxpayers did not establish that the tilt-up concrete walls were a “product” as that term is used in section 144.054.2. View "Fenix Constr. Co. of St. Louis v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted and sentenced for two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on each count. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion to vacate his convictions and sentences pursuant to Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The motion judge overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s claims relating to the disclosure and investigation of an autosomal DNA profile were not preserved for review; and (2) the motion court did not clearly err in overruling Appellant’s Brady violation claim and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. View "Dorsey v. State" on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old Jessica Chavez filed a negligence suit against Cedar Fair, LP after she was injured on a ride at Oceans of Fun Water Park. Cedar Fair owned and operated the water park. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Chavez. Cedar Fair appealed, asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred in submitting a jury instruction that defined “negligence” as the failure to use the “highest degree of care.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Cedar Fair’s liability should be assessed using the highest degree of care standard for negligence rather than the ordinary degree of care standard. View "Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a motorcycle training course sponsored by Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group, Inc. (Harley-Davidson) and conducted by employees of Gateway Harley-Davidson (Gateway). Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Harley-Davidson and Gateway (together, Defendants). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of a liability release Plaintiff had signed before participating in the course. The circuit court sustained the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the liability release was unenforceable against claims of gross negligence or recklessness and that there was a genuine dispute as to whether Defendants were grossly negligent or reckless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to show that a genuine dispute existed regarding whether Defendants acted in reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s safety, and therefore, whether the release was unenforceable. View "DeCormier v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Twelve Plaintiffs filed suit against Synergy, LLC and Kenoma, LLC (collectively, Synergy), alleging that Synergy’s large-scale hog operations constituted a temporary nuisance. The trial court entered judgment against Synergy awarding Plaintiffs damages on their tort claims. After the court of appeals issued its mandate, Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court to award post-judgment interest, set the post-judgment interest rate, and affix their costs. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and entered a nunc pro tunc journal entry awarding Plaintiffs statutory post-judgment interest on the damages awarded on their tort claims. The Supreme Court reversed the provisions of the judgment setting an interest rate and awarding post-judgment interest in the judgment, holding that the trial court erred in issuing a nunc pro tunc judgment to retroactively include post-judgment statutory interest in its original judgment. View "McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, St. Louis County adopted an ordinance that implemented a foreclosure mediation program requiring lenders to provide residential borrowers an opportunity to mediate prior to foreclosure. Two bankers filed suit against the County seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the ordinance was invalid. The circuit court sustained the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County possessed the charter authority to enact the ordinance, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the County’s police power, the ordinance was not preempted by state law, and the fees associated with the ordinance did not violate the Hancock Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was void and unenforceable ab initio because the County exceeded its charter authority in enacting the ordinance. View "Mo. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Mo." on Justia Law

Property Owners filed a lawsuit against a Mortgage Company, claiming that, by preparing deeds of trust and promissory notes for the Property Owners, the Mortgage Company (1) violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.010.2 and 484.020 by engaging in the "law business"; (2) committed an unlawful practice in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act; and (3) was unjustly enriched because it charged for services it did not perform or did not perform lawfully. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Mortgage Company. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Property Owners did not dispute that the Mortgage Company did not charge a separate fee or vary its customary charges for preparation of legal documents, there were no disputed material facts, entitling the Mortgage Company to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Binkley v. Am. Equity Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

In a court-tried case, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the second degree for robbing a bank. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State did not present sufficient evidence that he used or threatened to immediately use physical force against the bank teller. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant’s actions constituted a threat of immediate physical force to the bank teller for the purpose of both defeating resistance to the theft of the bank’s money and compelling its surrender. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

This dispute surrounded the inter vivos trust of K.R. Conklin. Conklin’s children (the “Children”) became trustees of Conklin’s trust upon his death in 2009. Conklin’s stepchildren (the “Stepchildren”) sued the Children in their individual capacities, seeking, among other things, a declaration that they were beneficiaries of the trust. The circuit court entered judgment for the Children on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding (1) the Stepchildren were not beneficiaries under the trust; (2) Conklin did not amend the trust with a letter he wrote; and (3) the Children did not violate the trust’s no-contest provision by resisting the Stepchildren’s claims and subsequent lawsuit. View "Rouner v. Wise" on Justia Law

Lillian Lewellen brought an action against Chad Franklin National Auto Sales North, LLC (National) and its owner, Chad Franklin, for fraudulent misrepresentation and unlawful merchandising practices under the Missouri Merchandising Practice Act. A jury awarded Lewellen actual damages of $25,000, assessed jointly and severally against both defendants. The jury also awarded Lewellen $1 million in punitive damages against Franklin and National on both counts. Pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.265, the circuit court reduced the punitive damages awards against Franklin and National to $500,000 and $539,050, respectively. Lewellen appealed her punitive damages award, claiming that her constitutional right to trial by jury was violated when the trial court reduced the punitive damages award on her fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Franklin. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all respects except for the portion applying section 510.265 to the punitive damages award assessed against Franklin for fraudulent misrepresentation, holding that the mandatory reduction of Lewellen’s punitive damages award against Franklin under section 510.265 violated Lewellen’s right to a trial by jury. View "Lewellen v. Franklin" on Justia Law