Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two retail stores offered customers the opportunity to finance their purchases through private label credit cards. The cards were issued by banks that paid to the retailer at the time of the sale the full amount of the purchase, including sales tax, for each transaction made using the credit cards. The retailer then remitted the applicable sales tax to the State. If a customer failed to pay his or her credit card debt, the issuing bank took any tax write off. The retailers in this case separately applied for refunds of the sales tax that the banks had written off. The Director of Revenue denied both requests. The Administrative Hearing Commission reversed and allowed the retailers to claim their respective sales tax refunds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because, at the time of the initial transaction, the banks fully reimbursed the retailers for both the amount of the sales tax and the amount of the purchase on which that tax was based, the retailers were not entitled under statute to seek a refund of taxes the banks subsequently wrote off. View "Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

On May 7, 2014, the General Assembly passed the Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolution 36 (SJR 36). On June 13, 2014, the secretary of state certified the official ballot title. The ballot title was then placed on the August 5, 2014 state primary election ballot pursuant to the governor’s decision calling for a special election on SJR 36. After the ballot title was certified, two groups of Appellants filed suit challenging the fairness and sufficiency of the summary statement in the ballot title. The trial court consolidated the cases and, on July 1, 2014, determined that the cases were moot because Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.125.2 prohibits changes to a ballot title within six weeks of the election. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that, pursuant to section 115.125.2, the Court could not grant effectual relief to Appellants. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

John C. Middleton, an inmate under a sentence of death, was scheduled to be executed on July 16, 2014. After Middleton’s execution was scheduled to occur, Middleton field a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment because he was incompetent to be executed. The Supreme Court denied Middleton’s habeas petition on the merits because Middleton failed to make a substantial threshold showing that he lacked the competence to be executed and therefore was not entitled to a full hearing to determine his competence. View "Middleton v. Russell" on Justia Law

In 2002, three months after she married her fourth husband, Patricia Watson created a trust that left substantially all of her property to her half siblings. The trust expressly stated that Watson’s husband, Arnold Smith, would not receive any part of the trust estate. Thereafter, Watson’s mental health began deteriorating, and in 2007, Watson began making changes to her trust. Watson signed two trust amendments, signed changes to several of her bank and retirement accounts, and signed documents retitling several of her accounts and vehicles. The effect of the changes was that almost all of Watson’s personal property passed to Smith when Watson died. After Watson’s death, the half siblings filed this action seeking to set aside the trust amendments, beneficiary designations, and property transfers. The circuit court ruled that the changes to the estate plan were void due to a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s judgment that Watson lacked testamentary capacity to make the changes to her estate plan and that the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Ivie v. Smith" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ordered the Children’s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services (Division) not to include Mother’s name in the child abuse and neglect central registry as a sanction for the Division’s failure to comply with the ninety-day statutory deadline for investigations and determinations. The Division noted that its investigation into Mother’s alleged neglect of her children would be extended for “good cause” before it eventually determined that the evidence substantiated the allegations of Mother’s neglect. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the legislature did not provide for a sanction in the event that the Division fails to meet the statutory deadline, and courts are not authorized to create one. View "Frye v. Levy" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) requires employers to withhold RRTA taxes on a personal injury plaintiff’s Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) suit. Plaintiff in this case received a judgment on his FELA claim against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF). BNSF tendered less than what it owed on the judgment, claiming that it was required to treat the judgment as if it were for lost wages and therefore subject to RRTA withholding taxes. The trial court concluded that BNSF failed to satisfy the judgment and ordered Safeco Insurance Company, BNSF’s surety, to pay Plaintiff the withheld amount. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that damages received through a suit or settlement for personal injuries are normally not subject to retirement taxes, and holding that BNSF was incorrect in arguing that the RRTA creates an exception to this law for railroad retirement taxes. View "Mickey v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

The day after the Children’s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services (Division) began an investigation into allegations of child abuse by Taryn Williams, the Division stated that its investigation would be delayed beyond the thirty-day limit set forth by statute, noting that it had “good cause” to do so. Approximately 133 days after beginning its investigation, the Division notified Williams that it substantiated the report of abuse. The Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board upheld the Division’s decision. The trial court concluded that the Division had no good cause to extend its investigation beyond the initial thirty-day period and ordered the Division not to include Williams’ name on the central registry of child abuse and neglect perpetrators. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment based on the same reasoning in Frye v. Department of Social Services, handed down this same day, holding that the trial did not have the authority to review the Division’s good cause determination. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the first degree and armed criminal action. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included crime of second-degree robbery. The trial court reasoned that a lesser included offense instruction was not required because there was no basis in the evidence for a reasonable juror to determine that the victim did not reasonably believe that Defendant was holding a gun to her back during the robbery. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s judgment of conviction as to both counts, holding (1) a trial court cannot refuse a defendant’s request for a “nested” lesser offense instruction based solely on its view of what evidence a reasonable juror must believe or what inferences a reasonable juror must draw, as the jury’s right to disbelieve the evidence and its right to refuse to draw needed inferences is a sufficient basis for a jury to conclude that the state has failed to prove the differential element; and (2) in this case, there was a basis in the evidence for the jury to find that the victim did not reasonably believe Defendant held a gun on her. Remanded. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with second-degree trafficking and resisting arrest. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial. After a retrial, Defendant was found guilty of the charges. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court lacked the authority to retry him after the end of the court term following the term in which his earlier trial ended in a mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest and vacated Defendant’s conviction for second-degree trafficking, holding (1) the trial court had the authority to retry Defendant after the deadline had passed because Defendant failed to assert that deadline when it was still possible for the trial court to comply; (2) the trial court erred in not giving Defendant’s requested instruction regarding possession as a lesser included offense of second-degree trafficking; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Patrick O’Basuyi filed suit against several defendants (collectively, “TriStar”) for breach of contract, quantum meruit and fraudulent conveyance. TriStar responded by filing a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. O’Basuyi filed a motion for separate trial of TriStar’s counterclaims. The trial court overruled the motion for separate trial, determining that Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.06, which governs joinder of claims, authorized its denial of O’Basuyi’s motion for separate trial of the malicious prosecution claim. O’Basuyi subsequently sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the request writ, holding (1) Rule 55.06 does not permit either joinder or trial of a malicious prosecution counterclaim with the underlying claim; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the joint trial of the defendants’ counterclaim and O’Basuyi’s claims. View "State ex rel. O'Basuyi v. Hon. David Lee Vincent III" on Justia Law