Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought this negligence action against the Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation after he was allegedly injured when he was hit in the eye with a hotdog thrown by Sluggerrr, the Kansas City Royals mascot. During the trial, the trial judge gave an instruction to the jury asking the jurors to decide whether the risk of suffering an injury by being struck by a hotdog thrown by Sluggerrr was one of the inherent risks in watching a Royals baseball game that Plaintiff assumed merely by attending the game. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Royals. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding (1) whether a particular risk is inherent in watching a sporting event is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury; and (2) in this case, the risk of being injured by the mascot’s hotdog toss is not one of the inherent risks of attending a Royals game. View "Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp." on Justia Law

The Missouri Ethics Commission entered an order finding probable cause that John Impey violated the law by preparing and circulating pamphlets voicing his opposition to a ballot measure in Houston County without placing “Paid for by John Impey” on the pamphlets. Instead of appealing to the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC), Impey filed a petition for review in the circuit court. In his petition, Impey alleged that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961 violated the Missouri Constitution because it provided for review by the AHC before seeking judicial review of the MEC’s determination. The circuit court dismissed Impey’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 105.961 does not violate the Constitution and that Impey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Impey v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

Husch Blackwell Sanders, LLP represented Brian Nail in a dispute with his former employer over Nail’s stock options. Husch Blackwell negotiated a settlement that extended Nail’s option period, but Nail was prevented from obtaining the stock due to complications. Nail subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit against Husch Blackwell, arguing that the law firm negligently advised him regarding his remedies and negligently drafted the settlement agreement. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Husch Blackwell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Nail failed to prove that Husch Blackwell’s alleged negligence caused his claimed damages. View "Nail v. Husch Blackwell Sanders, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Ralston Purina Company shareholder when Ralston and Nestle Holdings, Inc. entered into a merger agreement providing that, at the time of the merger, Ralston stock would be converted and Ralson shareholders would receive payments. Plaintiff was not paid until four days after the stock was converted. Ten years later, Plaintiff filed a class action petition alleging that Nestle breached the agreement by failing to timely pay shareholders. The trial court dismissed the petition as barred by the five-year statute of limitations in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120(1), which applies to all actions upon contracts except those mentioned in Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.110. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not applying the ten-year statute of limitations in section 516.110, which applies to all actions “upon any writing…for the payment of money.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the five-year statute applied in this case; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that his petition was timely because the five-year limitations period was tolled by a pending class action against Nestle in another state was without merit. View "Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Schwarz Pharma Inc. was sued in seven individual actions by Plaintiffs, who filed suit in the St. Louis city court. Schwarz filed a motion to transfer venue in these seven individual actions under Mo. R. Civ. P. 51.045. The trial court ruled that the motions were untimely because they were not filed within the sixty-day period after Schwarz was served. Schwarz wrought writs of prohibition in the court of appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Schwarz’s motions to transfer venue were untimely; (2) Schwarz’s timely filed motions demonstrated that venue was improper in St. Louis city; and (3) therefore, the trial court was required to sustain the timely filed motions to transfer venue. View "State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Judge Dowd" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed wrongful death and lost chance of recovery claims against Defendants-health care providers. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their first case but refiled the same claims in a second case. The trial court dismissed the second case for failure to file health care affidavits as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225. In their third case, Plaintiffs refiled their petition, along with the required affidavits. The trial court dismissed the third case as barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the second and third cases, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to preserve their constitutional challenges to section 538.225 and failed to show they had substantially complied with the statute; and (2) the trial court correctly applied the statute of limitations in finding that the claims in the third case were time barred. View "Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City" on Justia Law

Franklin Quick Cash, LLC, a payday and title lending company, was sued for wrongfully repossessing a vehicle. Franklin had a commercial general liability insurance policy with Continental Western Insurance Co. that covered liability for accidents but precluded coverage of liability for property damage “expected or intended” by the insured. Continental Western refused to provide a defense on the grounds that Franklin’s actions leading to the suit were intentional. Franklin sued Continental Western for wrongful refusal to defend. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Franklin. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Continental Western did not have a duty to defend because Franklin intended to repossess the vehicle, and therefore, there was no potential for coverage at the outset of the underlying lawsuit. View "Allen vs. Continental W. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Employer terminated Employee for falsifying his doctor’s return-to-work certificate. Employee sought unemployment benefits, but the Division of Employment Security denied the application on the ground that Employee had been fired for misconduct connected with his work. The Labor and Industrial Commission affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in denying benefits, as (1) willfulness is not required for all forms of misconduct; (2) Employee disregarded a standards of behavior that Employer had a right to expect from its employees; and (3) Employee’s misconduct was “connected to” his work. View "Seck v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law

After five jury trials, Appellant was eventually convicted of the 1991 murder of Gladys Kuehler and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Appellant timely filed a motion for post-conviction relief, raising thirteen points on appeal. The circuit court made findings of fact and entered a judgment overruling Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally effective assistance; (2) Appellant’s due process rights recognized under Brady v. Maryland were not violated; and (3) Appellant’s claim that the delay between his sentencing and execution violated his due process rights lacked merit. View "Barton v. State" on Justia Law

Two police officers were patrolling a high-crime area when they passed Defendant, who was riding a bicycle, and observed what appeared to be a handgun protruding from Defendant’s waistband. The officers handcuffed Defendant and then discovered that what appeared to be a gun was an Airsoft toy gun. At that point, the officers called in a warrant check and learned there was a pickup order for Defendant. A subsequent search revealed Defendant was carrying cocaine base. Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court overruled. Defendant appealed, arguing that, although the police had reasonable suspicion to initially stop him when they saw him carrying what appeared to be a gun, they lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him further while they performed a warrant check after they discovered the gun was a toy gun. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress because even after the officers learned the gun was not real, the additional circumstances surrounding the encounter gave them reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Defendant. View "State v. Lovelady" on Justia Law