Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights over Child, determining that Mother, who had been under psychiatric care for three years before the termination hearing, had abused or neglected Child in that she had a mental condition that rendered her unable to provide Child the necessary care, custody and control and that she failed to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or education to Child even though she had the financial resources to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in discrediting testimony from Mother’s psychiatrist and therapist regarding her mental condition at the time of the termination hearing or in finding Mother’s custody of another child did not show Mother could provide the necessary care, control or custody to Child; (2) substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Mother’s personal relationships presented a potential harm for Child despite Mother’s therapy; and (3) the trial court did not err in finding that Mother’s de minimus financial support to Child did not show that she provided adequate support to Child before the termination hearing. View "In re Interest of Q.A.H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was formerly employed by Hospital, brought an eight-count petition against Hospital and Doctor (collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (the MHRA) and other common law claims related to the termination of her employment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's judgment with respect to Plaintiff's MHRA claims and wrongful discharge claim, holding (i) the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's MHRA claims on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for filing a lawsuit under the MHRA, and (ii) because Plaintiff's amended petition sufficiently invoked the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the circuit court erred in sustaining summary judgment in Hospital's favor on Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim; and (2) affirmed the circuit court's judgment as to all remaining counts. Remanded.View "Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr. " on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue calculated that AAA Laundry & Linen Supply Company, a commercial laundry operation, owed approximately $40,000 in use taxes for its soap and water treatment chemicals purchased from out-of-state vendors. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) concluded that AAA Laundry’s purchases of soap were exempt from use taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, and AAA Laundry’s purchases of water treatment chemicals were exempt under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(15). The State sought judicial review of the AHC’s decision. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether AAA Laundry should benefit from the type of sales and use tax exemptions that were denied the taxpayer in Unitog Rental Services, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, even though AAA Laundry brought substantially similar claims based on substantially similar facts. The Court reversed, holding that because AAA Laundry failed to distinguish to discredit Unitog, which held that various sales and use tax exemptions did not apply to commercial laundry operations, it was not entitled to the exemptions it sought. View "AAA Laundry & Linen Supply Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lonnie Brockmire (“Decedent”) died intestate. Decedent was survived by his only biological child, Sherri, and Sherri’s daughter, Bella. Sherri was adopted by her stepfather after she became an adult and prior to Decedent’s death. After Decedent died, Sherri sought a partial distribution of Decedent’s estate to Bella. The circuit court granted the distribution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bella had no right to inherit Decedent’s estate pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 474.060.1 and 474.010(2) because (1) Sherri was not a “child” of Decedent at the time he died, and (2) even if she was, Sherri did not predecease Decedent. View "In re Brockmire" on Justia Law

Schnucks grocery stores purchased electricity and natural gas from Union Electric Company, doing business as Ameren Missouri, to operate equipment such as ovens, retarders, and proofers in its bakery departments. Ameren sought a refund for sales tax paid on the energy provided to forty Schnucks stores, alleging that the bakery departments’ energy costs fell within a statutory sales tax exemption for energy used in “processing” products. The Director of Revenue denied the refund request. The Administrative Hearing Commission affirmed, finding that Schnucks’ use of energy to prepare the baked goods for sale and consumption did not constitute “processing” of products. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “processing,” as used in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, does not include in-store preparation of cooked goods for retail sale. View "Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Mother and Father’s divorce was dissolved in 2006 by a Texas district court. In 2009, Father initiated post-dissolution child custody proceedings in the St. Charles County circuit court. A guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed for the minor children. In 2011, the trial court entered a judgment deciding the custody and visitation rights of the parents and ordering Father to pay guardian ad litem fees, among other costs. Father appealed. In response to Father’s notice of appeal, the GAL filed a motion to secure costs on appeal seeking payment from Father or Mother so that she could draft and file an appellate brief. The trial court sustained the motion. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal. In 2012, the trial court ordered Father and Mother to each pay toward the GAL’s services rendered on appeal. Father appealed that judgment, arguing that the GAL had no legal authority to participate in the appeal from the trial court’s judgment and, if such authority did exist, the GAL’s claimed fees were not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Father was precluded from raising his claims, having failed to timely and properly pursue or preserve them. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1992, Mo. Rev. Stat. 273.327 was enacted, requiring persons engaged in commercial animal care to obtain a license and exempted pounds and animal shelters from paying annual licensing and per-capita fees. In 2010, the General Assembly passed S.B. 795, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327. The reenacted version of section 273.327 eliminated animal shelters from the entities exempt from the payment of fees. In 2011, the General Assembly passed S.B. 161, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327 and cured any procedural defects in the passage of S.B. 795. The Humane Society subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting that the amended version of section 273.327 was unconstitutional because S.B. 795 was amended during its passage to change its original purpose. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the Humane Society's cause of action was moot as a result of the General Assembly's repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 in S.B. 161. View "Humane Society of the United States v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. After the jury was unable to agree on punishment, the trial court conducted an independent review of the facts pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.030.4 and imposed the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) any errors in the preparation of the trial transcript did not impede adequate appellate review and were not prejudicial; (2) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury; (3) section 565.030.4 is not unconstitutional; (4) the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to hold a hearing regarding alleged the improper influence of a certain juror during jury deliberations; and (5) the death sentence in this case was proportional to the strength of the evidence.View "State v. Shockley" on Justia Law

Saint Charles County was the sole owner and operator of the Saint Charles County Family Arena (Arena). After collecting taxes for several years on the fees, charges, and sales at the Arena, the County sought a refund for a three-year period. Specifically, the County sought a tax exemption pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(17). The Director of Revenue denied the County's claims, and the Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County was not entitled to the sales and use tax exemption it claimed where it did not present clear and unequivocal proof it met the requirements of Section 144.030.2(17) to be entitled to an exemption.View "Saint Charles County v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A class of Plaintiffs brought suit against Insured, a hotel proprietor, alleging that Insured violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The class and Insured subsequently reached a settlement. The class then filed a garnishment action against Insurer. Insurer sought a declaratory judgment that its policy with Insured did not provide coverage because the policy did not cover damages awarded related to the TCPA. The trial found (1) Insurer owed Insured a duty to defend in the class actions because the class's claims were covered under the policy; and (2) Insurer had a duty to indemnify Insured for the full settlement plus interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that Insurer wrongly refused to defend Insured under its policy coverage; (2) Insurer was not entitled to a reassessment of the reasonableness of the settlement; and (3) policy limits did not bar Insurer's indemnification of the settlement.View "Columbia Cas. Co. v. HIAR Holding, LLC" on Justia Law