Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The underlying case was a civil claim of premises liability arising from the stabbing of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged the stabbing occurred on Defendant’s property. At issue during trial was whether the stabbing occurred on Defendant’s property or in an alley behind Defendant’s property, thereby negating any liability for the assault. During trial, Defendant’s expert crime scene analyst, Louis Akin, testified that the stabbing occurred in the alley. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that Akin committed perjury by falsely testifying about his credentials as an expert witness. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Akin willfully and deliberately testified falsely about a material fact and that an improper verdict was occasioned by the perjured testimony. View "March v. Midwest St. Louis, LLC" on Justia Law

In two separate underlying criminal cases, Defendants each received a suspended imposition of sentence and were placed on probation. When Defendants violated the conditions of their probation, the trial court suspended probation and scheduled revocation hearings. The court, however, did not issue a ruling at the hearings but continued to conduct case reviews until after each Defendant’s probation term ended. Defendants each sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from holding probation revocation hearings after their probation terms ended. The cases were consolidated for opinion. The Supreme Court made its preliminary writs permanent, holding that, in each case, the trial court did not have the authority to hold revocation hearings after Defendants’ probation terms ended because it did not make every reasonable effort to hold the hearings during the probation terms pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.036.8. View "State ex rel. Strauser, Relator v. Judge Martinez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and denied her motion for post-conviction relief. Approximately thirteen years later, Defendant filed a motion to re-open her post-conviction proceedings, claiming that she had been abandoned by her appointed counsel and that her conviction should be vacated to correct a manifest injustice. The motion court denied Defendant relief, finding that Defendant's motion was a prohibited successive motion. The Supreme Court affirmed after directing attorneys in such situations to file a motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in overruling Defendant's motion, as a motion to "re-open" does not exist in the Court's rules.View "Eastburn v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual misconduct involving a child pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.083 and two counts of attempted sexual misconduct involving a child. The convictions arose from incidents in which Defendant knowingly exposed his genitals to young girls from the front door or window of his house. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) section 566.083 is unconstitutionally overbroad because it infringes on activities protected by Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) the statute is unconstitutional as applied, and (3) insufficient evidence supported his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to show how section 566.083 serves to discourage citizens from engaging in protected speech, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the statute is overbroad; (2) section 566.083 is constitutional as applied to Defendant; and (3) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to convict Defendant of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.View "State v. Jeffrey" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, three defendants challenged their charges under Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.150, which prohibits any individual who has been found guilty of various sex offenses from being present in five hundred feet of real property comprising any public park with playground equipment or a public swimming pool. Specifically, the defendants contended that Mo. Const. art. I, 13, which prohibits the passage of retrospective laws, applies to criminal laws, and therefore, their charges under section 566.150 were unconstitutional as applied. The circuit court (1) dismissed the charges against two defendants, Jason Peterson and Edwin Carey, on the grounds that section 566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to them, and (2) overruled defendant Michael Wade's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments with respect to Peterson and Carey and affirmed the judgment with respect to Wade, holding (1) as recently reaffirmed in State v. Honeycutt, the prohibition of laws retrospective in their operation does not apply to criminal laws; and (2) section 566.150 is a criminal law. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of forcible rape and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in excluding his mother and grandmother as testifying as surrebuttal witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in excluding Appellant's grandmother and mother from testifying in surrebuttal, and because the excluded testimony, if believed by the jury, would have bolstered Appellant's defense of consent and corroborated his testimony and would have contradicted the State's evidence of a necessary element of the crime, the error was prejudicial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting Appellant from asking venire panel members whether they could consider the possibility that two teenagers had consensual sexual intercourse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Ousley" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate of the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), brought a declaratory judgment action claiming he was entitled to additional jail time credit against his sentence for (1) time he spent in custody in Kansas awaiting disposition of Kansas charges and (2) time he spent serving the Kansas sentence. The circuit court granted MDOC's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to jail time credit for time spent in custody in Kansas awaiting disposition of Kansas charges because Missouri did not exclusively compel that time; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to credit for time spent serving his Kansas sentence because that time was not related to the offense Appellant committed in Missouri. View "Farish v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for one of the murders. The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for a retrial of the penalty phase. At the retrial, Defendant was again sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief challenging various aspects of his penalty-phase retrial. The judge assigned to hear the Rule 29.15 motion had presided over Defendant's first trial, Defendant's first post-conviction motion hearing, and the penalty-phase retrial. The motion court overruled Defendant's second Rule 29.15 motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judge presiding over Defendant's post-conviction proceedings erred in overruling Defendant's motion to disqualify the judge for cause because a reasonable person could find an appearance of impropriety where the judge's references in the record to extrajudicial information in Defendant's first trial suggested that the judge relied on that information in ruling on Defendant's Rule 29.15 motion; and (2) therefore, recusal was required. Remanded. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

In 2007, Anita Johnson purchased a vehicle from a dealership operated by JF Enterprises. Johnson signed numerous documents at a single sitting, including a retail installment contract and a one-page arbitration agreement. In 2010, Johnson sued the dealership, its president (Franklin), and the vehicle manufacturer (American Suzuki), claiming negligent misrepresentation. Franklin and JF Enterprises moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that the installment contract did not refer to or incorporate the arbitration agreement and contained a merger clause stating that it contained the parties' entire agreement as to financing. The Supreme Court reversed after noting that contemporaneously signed documents will be construed together and harmonized if possible, holding that because the separate arbitration agreement was a dispute resolution agreement, not an additional financing document, it could be harmonized with the installment contract and was not voided by operation of the merger clause.View "Johnson v. JF Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault and armed criminal action. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) Defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that three of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes violated his equal protection rights and right to a fair trial pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, and thus the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant's Batson challenges to the peremptory strikes; and (2) the trial court did not err in failing to admonish the prosecutor sua sponte or declare a mistrial for alleged prejudicial statements the prosecutor made during closing arguments. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law