Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance to a minor and attempted statutory sodomy in the second degree. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years' imprisonment and placed Defendant in the sex offender assessment unit program pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.115. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) gaps in the trial transcript did not deny Defendant of meaningful appellate review; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defense witnesses due to a discovery violation; (3) the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the evidence of marijuana seized from Defendant's home without a warrant because Defendant freely consented to the search of his home; and (4) Defendant's argument that section 559.115 was unconstitutional as applied was without merit. View "State v. Hillman" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted use of a child in a sexual performance in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 568.080. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his constitutional right to protected speech was violated because his e-mail exchange with an officer posing as the sixteen-year-old victim did not contemplate or solicit a criminal act. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, holding (1) because Defendant attempted to induce the victim to engage in a sexual performance, Defendant was not punished for fantasy speech, and thus, section 568.080 was not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View " State v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

In 2011, the State Board of Education voted to classify the Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS) district as "unaccredited", which required accredited school districts to accept transfer of KCPS's students pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.131. Taxpayers in five accredited school districts filed this action against KCPS and the State, asserting that section 167.131 violates the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution because it mandates that, in educating the transfer students, the school districts perform a new or increased level of activity. The trial court (1) concluded that the statute mandates a new activity but found that to violate the Hancock Amendment the activity must result in increased costs; and (2) entered judgment in favor of three school district taxpayers and against two school district taxpayers. While the case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court issued Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, which held that section 167.131 merely reallocates responsibilities for educating students among districts, which the Hancock Amendment does not prohibit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part based on Breitenfeld, holding that section 167.131 does not mandate a new or increased level of activity but merely reallocates responsibilities among school districts. View "Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City" on Justia Law

In this dissolution of marriage action involving child custody, Father moved the trial court to order the Department of Social Services to release all records concerning the children, including the identity of persons who placed several unsubstantiated hotline child abuse and neglect reports, asserting that the hotline caller's identity was relevant to prove that Mother had placed the hotline reports. The Department's Children's Division opposed Father's discovery request, arguing that the identity of the hotline caller was confidential. The trial court denied the motion and ordered the Division to produce the records disclosing the identity of the hotline reporters. The Division then filed a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its order to produce the records. The Supreme Court issued the requested permanent writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure of the identity of the hotline caller because the hotline reports were confidential and none of the exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality applied to this case. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Tucker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree statutory sodomy. Appellant's conviction was confirmed on appeal. Appellant filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor committed misconduct. The motion court overruled Appellant's post-conviction relief motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief failed to allege facts not refuted conclusively by the record to support his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the motion court did not clearly err in finding that the prosecutor's conduct was appropriate. View "McIntosh v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.070.1(1). Under a 2008 amendment to the statute, a defendant commits unlawful possession of a firearm if he has been convicted of any other felony. The third count of the indictment alleged that Defendant had been convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance in September 2002. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the third count of the indictment, asserting (1) when he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, that conviction did not prohibit him from owning a firearm under the version of section 571.070 in effect at that time; and (2) the 2008 amendment of the statute, as applied to him and his 2002 conviction, violated the Missouri Constitution's ban on retrospective laws by imposing a "new duty or obligation" on him. The circuit court sustained Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Constitution's ban on the passage of any law retrospective in its operation does not apply to criminal laws; and (2) because section 571.070.1(1) is a criminal law, the circuit court erred in dismissing the charge against Defendant on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to him. View "State v. Honeycutt" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned four separate decisions of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission that determined the Second Injury Fund was liable for compensation to injured claimants. On appeal, the Fund claimed that the Commission misapplied Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.1 by combining or "stacking" injuries to meet the statutory thresholds that trigger the Fund's liability and by considering injuries that did not meet the thresholds to calculate the extent of the Fund's liability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission misapplied section 287.220.1 in combining preexisting permanent partial disabilities to meet the thresholds for triggering the Fund's liability; (2) however, three Claimants in these appeals each had an individual preexisting permanent partial disability that met the statutory thresholds to trigger the Fund's liability, and therefore the Commission did not err when it found they were entitled to compensation and awarded an amount based on the combined disability of their preexisting injuries and the last injury; and (3) because the fourth Claimant did not have a preexisting permanent partial disability that met the statutory thresholds, the Commission erred in awarding compensation from the Fund to him. View "State Treasurer as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Witte" on Justia Law

After the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) implemented a stormwater user charge without prior voter approval, William Zweig and other named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated ratepayers (Ratepayers), filed a complaint against MSD, claiming MSD's action violated Mo. Const. art. X, 22(a), which prohibits political subdivisions from levying any new or increased tax, license or fees without prior voter approval. The trial court (1) declared MSD's action unconstitutional, enjoined future collection of the charge, and ordered MSD to pay the Ratepayers' attorneys' fees and expenses; and (2) refused to order MSD to pay damages or refund charges already collected. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) concluding that MSD levied the stormwater usage charge without prior voter approval in violation of section 22(a) and in awarding Ratepayers' attorneys' fees and expenses; and (2) refusing to enter a money judgment against MSD for the amounts already collected. View "Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist." on Justia Law

At issue here was whether the sale of an aircraft and subsequent purchase of another from different entities can be considered a "trade-in" for purposes of the "taken in trade" tax exemption under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.025 when an intermediary is used to facilitate the transaction. Here, Taxpayer purchased a 525B Cessna aircraft from Cessna Aicraft Company for $7.2 million. Taxpayer subsequently sold a 525A Cessna aircraft to C.B. Aviation for $4.7 million. Taxpayer used an intermediary in the sale. Taxpayer reported $2.5 million - the difference between the purchase price of the 525B aircraft and the sale price of the 525A aircraft - on its tax return. Taxpayer claimed it was entitled to a $4.7 million credit under section 144.025. The director of revenue determined Taxpayer was not entitled to the trade-in credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to receive a tax exemption under section 144.025, the taxpayer must demonstrate that its relinquished property was "taken in trade" for the acquired property; and (2) because the use of an intermediary did not transform the separate sale and purchase transactions into one trade-in transaction, Taxpayer could not claim a trade-in exemption. View "Loren Cook Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of burglary in the second degree and stealing. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a trespassing instruction as a lesser-included offense of burglary. The motion court overruled Appellant's claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motion court erred in failing to holding evidentiary hearing on Appellant's claims, as Appellant alleged facts, not clearly refuted by the record, showing he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to submit a lesser-included offense instruction. Remanded. View "McNeal v. State" on Justia Law