Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During Defendant's trial for assault and armed criminal action she and the State jointly proffered a defense-of-others instruction to the trial court that was submitted to the jury. Defendant sought reversal of her conviction, claiming that the submission of the erroneous instruction to the jury was plain error. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Defendant waived appellate review by proffering the instruction she complained of; and (2) the Court declined to use plain error review because there was no sua sponte duty for the trial court to correct Defendant's faulty proffered instructions. View "State v. Bolden" on Justia Law

Sneil, LLC sought to quiet title to certain property and to eject Tybe Learning Center, Inc. and Regions Bank from that property. The circuit court found in favor of Tybe and Regions, concluding that Sneil failed to provide adequate notice to Tybe and Regions of their right of redemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a purchaser is authorized to acquire a collector's deed for property purchased at tax sale one year after the sale; (2) accordingly, in order for the purchaser to send timely notice to the owner of that property of the right to redeem said property pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 140.405, the purchaser must send said notice ninety days prior to the one-year anniversary of the tax sale, and the notice must only inform the owner of the right to redeem the property; and (3) because Sneil did not meet these requirements, its notice was untimely pursuant to section 140.405. View "Sneil, LLC v. TYBE Learning Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. Defendant timely filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling his codefendant in the crime (Codefendant) at trial, alleging Codefendant would have testified that Defendant did not act as Codefendant's accomplice in the robbery. The motion court granted Defendant's motion for post-conviction relief. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Codefendant as a witness, and therefore, the motion court's judgment was not clearly erroneous. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

This case concerned the tax sale of certain property to KSSO, LLC. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment awarding quiet title to the property to Catherine Ndegwa as trustee of the Mrema family revocable trust. KSSO, LLC asserted that the circuit court improperly entered summary judgment in favor of Ndegwa and the trust because there was a sufficient question of material fact as to whether KSSO provided Ndegwa with timely and sufficient notice of Plaintiffs' right to redeem the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit court's order did not resolve a single, distinct judicial unit, and therefore, was neither a final nor appealable judgment in this case. View "Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, forcible rape, and armed criminal action and sentenced to death on the first-degree murder charge. Defendant's subsequent motion for post-conviction relief was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief, holding that the motion court did not (1) err in overruling Defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge, who sentenced Defendant to death, from presiding over Defendant's post-conviction relief proceeding, as Defendant failed to establish disqualifying bias or prejudice on the part of the judge; (2) clearly err in denying Defendant's eight claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) err in denying an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's claim that Missouri's death penalty was unconstitutional. View "McLaughlin v. State" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the circuit court's entry of summary judgment quieting title to certain property in favor of Edward and Nancy Bosch. Harpagon MO, LLC asserted that the circuit court should have entered summary judgment in its favor because it complied with the requirements of Mo. Rev. Stat. 140.405 by providing the Bosches with timely and sufficient notice of their right to redemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a purchaser is authorized to acquire a deed to property purchased at a tax sale one year after the sale; (2) therefore, a purchaser must notify the owner of that property of the owner's right to redeem at least ninety days prior to one year after the tax sale; (3) if the purchaser does not provide timely or sufficient notice, but still acquires the deed by presenting the certificate of purchase to the collector, then the owner can file a petition to set aside the tax sale asserting the purchaser's failure to comply with section 140.405; and (4) the circuit court did not err in finding that the notices provided to the Bosches were not timely and thus awarding the Bosches quiet title to the property. View "Harpagon MO, LLC v. Bosch" on Justia Law

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant unemployment benefits after it found that Appellant engaged in willful misconduct by repeatedly and deliberately disregarding her supervisor's instructions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that she engaged in misconduct because although she may have acted negligently, she did not deliberately violate her supervisor's instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Appellant willfully failed to follow her supervisor's instructions, although able to do so, on eleven separate occasions after her supervisor warned her three times she needed to comply with the instructions. View "Fendler v. Hudson Servs." on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the amendments to the state earnings tax statutes, Mo. Rev. Stat. 92.105 through 92.125, raising several arguments. The trial court dismissed Appellants' second amended petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the amendments did not violate Mo. Const. art. III, 51, as the initiative was not used for a de facto appropriation of money to pay the election costs to continue the earnings tax; (2) the requirement to hold recurring elections without providing state funds did not constitute an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment; and (3) Appellants did not state a claim for violation of an amendment to the city charter of Kansas City because the initiative process did not amend Kansas City's charter, and therefore, the constitutional requirements of Mo. Const. art. VI, 20 regarding amendments to a city's charter were not applicable. View "Dujakovich v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

This was the fifth action to come before the Supreme Court involving murders committed in 1996 by Carman Deck. Deck filed this Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 post-conviction proceeding, asserting (1) his counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses and for other alleged deficient performance, and (2) the motion court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Rule 29.15 relief and the denial of Deck's request for a new trial, holding (1) the motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was not ineffective; and (2) Deck was not entitled to a new trial based on the trial court's alleged destruction of juror questionnaires. View "Deck v. State" on Justia Law

Jamilah Nasheed appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of Robin Wright-Jones on Wright-Jones' petition challenging the qualifications of Nasheed to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state senator for the 5th district. The trial court found the residency requirement of the Missouri Constitution was ambiguous and Nasheed did not satisfy that requirement to run in the 5th district. An exception in Mo. Const. art. III, 6 provides that if the repportionment of the districts is less than one year before the general election, candidates may reside in any district from which a portion was incorporated into the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that incorporated portion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nasheed was eligible to run in the 5th district because the exception did not require Nasheed to live within the boundaries of the reapportioned senate district she sought to represent. View "Wright-Jones v. Nasheed " on Justia Law