Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the director of revenue to suspend Defendant's driver's license pursuant to Mo. Stat. 302.505, holding that the circuit court did not err in admitting testimony that a preliminary breath test was greater than 0.08 percent or in finding that Defendant was arrested upon probable cause for an alcohol-related offense.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the result of a preliminary breath test is a numerical percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood of the test person, and section 577.021.3 allows a court to admit the result as evidence of probable cause to arrest; (2) because the numerical result in this case was known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest the circuit court was allowed to consider it in determining that the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the judgment was supported by substantial evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Wilmoth v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of possessing a controlled substance, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 579.015.1, and unlawfully using a weapon while in possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.030.1, holding that Defendant's convictions did not infringe upon his right to be free from double jeopardy.On appeal, Defendant argued that his convictions violated double jeopardy protections because they arose from the same conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no double jeopardy violation existed because the plain language of the states combined with fundamental principles of statutory interpretation clearly demonstrated the legislature's intent to authorize multiple punishments under sections 579.015 and 571.030.1(11). View "State v. Onyejiaka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal of his delinquency adjudication, holding that Juvenile's appeal of the issue of whether he "knowingly and voluntarily" admitted to the conduct alleged in the juvenile officer's amended petition was untimely.The juvenile officer filed an amended petition alleging that Juvenile committed second-degree burglary, first-degree trespass, and two counts of second-degree property damage. After a restitution hearing, the juvenile division set restitution at $4,000. Juvenile appealed, seeking review of the adjudication hearing and order of disposition. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely. View "P.D.E. v. Juvenile Officer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of three counts of child molestation in the first degree and three counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.In this case, the Supreme Court was required sua sponte to determine whether Defendant's appeal was timely, whether a written judgment of conviction in the proper form had been entered of record, and whether the Court was stripped of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held (1) this Court had jurisdiction of Defendant's appeal; (2) Defendant did not establish a right to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (3) the circuit court did not plainly error in failing sua sponte to exclude certain testimony. View "State v. Vandergrift" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the required "substantial threshold showing of insanity" and that his mental illness claims were procedurally barred.On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court issued a warrant for Petitioner's execution. One month later, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was incompetent to be executed under the standard set forth in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and because he was severely mentally ill. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim and filed a motion for a stay of execution while his incompetency claim was adjudicated. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's habeas petition and overruled as moot his accompanying motion for a stay of execution, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by Panetti and Ford. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. Vandergriff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Meyer Electric Company on John Lisle's claim that Meyer Electric violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.780 by refusing to hire him because he exercised his chapter 287 rights during his prior employment relationship with the company, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Lisle argued that the circuit court misapplied the provisions of section 287.780 by requiring him to establish that he was an "employee" at the time Meyer Electric discriminated against him for exercising his workers' compensation rights. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) as strictly construed, section 287.780 gives an employee a civil action for damages against his or her employer for discharging or discriminating against the employee while employed because the employee exercised a right established under chapter 287; and (2) because it was an uncontroverted material fact that Lisle was not an employee of Meyer Electric when it refused to hire him, Meyer Electric established its right to judgment, as a matter of law. View "Lisle v. Meyer Electric Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a writ prohibiting the Honorable Steven A. Judge Privette from proceeding in the underlying proceeding initiated against Betty Grooms, the circuit clerk of Oregon County, for contempt of court, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order at issue.The subject court order directed Groom to prepare a spreadsheet of court costs assessed in criminal cases after local sheriff departments alleged that they had not received reimbursement for costs incurred incarcerating individuals in their county jails. Judge Privette subsequently ordered Grooms to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition requested by Grooms, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for her alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order. View "State ex rel. Grooms v. Honorable Privette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count of kidnapping in the first degree and one count of committing violence against an employee of the Department of Corrections, holding that there was no plain error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in failing to conduct a sufficient Faretta hearing to ensure his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and in ordering his sentence to consecutively to his prior sentence, in violation of his plea agreement with the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the circuit court plainly erred in sustaining Defendant's request to represent himself; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ordering Defendant's sentences to run consecutively. View "State v. Teter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) finding that Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC (CCE I) was entitled to manufacturing exemptions with respect to its 2011 and 2012 purchases of replacement equipment used to provide telecommunications service, holding that the AHC's decision was authorized by law.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the AHC did not err in (1) finding CCE I's provision of telecommunications service qualified as "manufacturing" for purposes of the sales and use tax exemptions in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(4) and 144.054.2; and (2) finding that CCE I was not required to establish that its replacement equipment was "substantially used" in manufacturing in addition to proving that the equipment satisfied the integrated plant doctrine and was "used directly" in manufacturing. View "Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 1995, MacColl, charged with having “deviate sexual intercourse with an unnamed juvenile female,” pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct, a class A misdemeanor. The circuit court sentenced MacColl to one year in jail, suspended the execution of her sentence, and placed her on two years’ probation. MacColl completed required sexual offender treatment programs; the circuit court discharged MacColl from probation in 1997.In 2000, Boone County sheriff’s office personnel advised MacColl to register as a sexual offender under the Missouri Sex Offender Registration Act (MO-SORA) MacColl registered as a sex offender and has maintained her registration. In 2020, MacColl sought removal from the registry, arguing that she does not have a prior or current independent obligation to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. 20901 (SORNA) The circuit court found MacColl was required to register in 1995 because the offense to which she pleaded guilty was a sex offense against a minor as defined by the federal Jacob Wetterling Act (SORNA's predecessor); MacColl was required to register under MO-SORA beginning in 2000 because she was someone who has been required to register under federal law.The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the sex offender treatment programs MacColl completed during her probation qualified as a program certified by a jurisdiction or the attorney general to entitle her to a reduction in her registration period, which would resolve whether MacColl ever was required to register. View "MacColl v. Missouri State Highway Patrol" on Justia Law