Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Daniel Primm was convicted of four counts of second-degree statutory rape, three counts of second-degree statutory sodomy, and three counts of misdemeanor second-degree child molestation. Each count related to the acts appellant committed against his grandniece, T.B.. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting, over objection, evidence that appellant had committed uncharged sex crimes against T.B. and another grandniece, R.C., and had given R.C. marijuana; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant's conviction for one count of second-degree statutory rape. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, and (2) there was sufficient evidence of penetration, taken together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, to support each count of statutory rape. View "State v. Primm" on Justia Law

Appellants, St. Louis County and St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC), filed suit against Prestige Travel and numerous other online travel companies that facilitate the booking of hotel and motel rooms via the internet. The appellants argued that Prestige and the other companies were required to pay hotel and tourism taxes imposed by the revised ordinances of St. Louis County and state law. Prestige moved to dismiss the petition, and the circuit court overruled the motion. Shortly thereafter, H.B. 1442, which specifically exempted online travel companies such as Prestige from the tax, was passed. Prestige filed a motion to reconsider its motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed the case. Appellants appealed, arguing the law violated the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) appellants waived their constitutional challenge to the law by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity; (2) the law does not violate the original purpose requirement of the state constitution; and (3) the argument that the title of the law is so general that the bill should be invalidated in its entirety is not supported by the current state of law. View "St. Louis County v. Prestige Travel, Inc." on Justia Law

The State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts is an agency with the authority to register and supervise all state physicians, surgeons, and midwives. After receiving a series of letters regarding the propriety of instances in which a physician delegates certain pain management procedures to advance practice nurses (APNs), the Board published a letter stating that APNs did not have the appropriate training or experience to perform those procedures. Appellants, medical professionals, filed a petition in the circuit court seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from enforcing its "letter rule" and claiming that (1) the Board's letter failed to adhere to statutory public rulemaking requirements, and (2) the Board's letter exceeded the authority of the Board insomuch as it defined the scope of practice for nurses. The trial court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Board failed to comply with rulemaking procedures and therefore the letter had no legal effect; and (2) it was unclear whether the Board was attempting to regulate the practice of physicians or the practice of nursing. Therefore, the record did not support summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Mo. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sohrab Devitre was previously involved in a separate lawsuit in which he agreed to have an independent medical examination by Dr. Mitchell Rotman. After the conclusion of that case, Devitre sued Dr. Rotman and the medical center at which Dr. Rotman practiced for personal injuries caused during the examination. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit for Devitre's failure to file the health care affidavit as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225, and the trial court dismissed Devitre's action. On appeal, Devitre argued that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the lawsuit because he was not a patient of the defendants, and (2) the medical examination conducted by the doctor did not create a physician-patient relationship that would trigger the requirement in Section 538.225 to file a health care affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that recipients of an independent medical examination are patients of the physician for the limited purpose of conducting the examination, and therefore, a physician-patient relationship existed and triggered the requirement in the statute for the filing of a health care affidavit. View "Devitre v. The Orthopedic Ctr. of Saint Louis, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant Maura Celis-Garcia was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy. The defendant appealed, asserting that (1) the trial court violated her constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict because, although the state presented evidence of multiple, separate acts of hand-to-genital contact committed against her two minor daughters, the verdict directors failed to require the jury to agree to the specific acts she committed to find her guilty of a single count of statutory sodomy against each daughter; and (2) the trial court erred by overruling her objections to certain testimony by two expert witnesses because the testimony improperly vouched for the credibility of the victims, thereby invading the province of the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the trial court failed to instruct the jury it had to agree on the same act or acts of hand-to-genital contact the defendant committed in finding her guilty of statutory sodomy, her right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated. Because the defendant's conviction was reversed on the basis of her first point, the Court did not address her second point. Remanded. View "State v. Celis-Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michelle Schaefer, Cindy Brandt, and Dale Price were charged with intoxication-related driving offenses, and each plaintiff had prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses. The plaintiffs filed a consolidated petition for a declaratory judgment, asserting that the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. 577.023 that pertain to enhanced penalties for individuals with multiple prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses violate the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, each plaintiff had an adequate remedy of law. The Court concluded that an alternative remedy to a declaratory judgment action for each plaintiff would be litigating the constitutional issues in each separate criminal case. View "Schaefer, et al. v. Koster" on Justia Law

Tonya Lindhorst and Eric Lindhorst divorced in 1998. The dissolution decree ordered Eric to pay $1,100 monthly in child support and $1,000 monthly in maintenance. In 2003, Tonya began receiving Social Security disability benefits. In 2008, both parties filed motions to modify the decree. The trial court reduced Eric's maintenance obligation but increased his child support obligation and did not make the modified child support award retroactive to the date that Tonya served her motion to modify. Tonya appealed. At issue was whether the trial court erred in imputing income to Tonya from part-time employment while assuming the continued receipt of Social Security disability benefits. The Supreme Court held (1) the level of work and income imputed to Tonya would disqualify her from Social Security benefits and therefore the trial court erred in considering both the imputed income and Tanya's Social Security disability benefit as a basis for reducing Eric's maintenance obligation; and (2) because Tonya demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in its modification of the child support award, that part of the judgment declining to make the increased child support obligation retroactive is reversed. Remanded. View "Lindhorst v. Lindhorst" on Justia Law

Pamela Carothers was found in contempt of court for failing to satisfy a support judgment against her. She was not represented by counsel, and no waiver of her right to counsel appeared in the record. Although she timely filed her notice of appeal, her appeal was dismissed. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs decision, and the case was then transferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the judgment of contempt was in error because Mrs. Carothers did not waiver her right to counsel. The Court reversed the lower courtâs judgment and set aside Mrs. Carothersâ warrant of commitment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Anthony Brown appealed his convictions for firearms charges and second-degree murder. At trial, Appellant claimed self-defense. During closing arguments, the trial court permitted the State to use a âpropâ gun to rebut Appellantâs self-defense argument. The State used the gun to show that the victim could not have carried and drawn the gun as Appellant had asserted. There was no evidence that the gun that was used as an exhibit in the Stateâs closing argument was similar in size or shape to the victimâs gun. During deliberations, the jury asked to see the âprop.â The trial court denied the request because the prop was not evidence. Upon review of the trial records, the Supreme Court found that the State âshould not have been able to bypass normal evidentiary limitationsâ by showing the gun to the jury: âthe Stateâs closing argument demonstration was necessarily speculative and carried with it the distinct possibility of misleading the jury . . . Under these circumstances, there is a substantial likelihood that the juryâs decision was influenced by the improper demonstration.â Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury found Appellant Donald Nash guilty of capital murder for the 1982 killing of Judy Spencer. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole or probation for 50 years. Appellant argued on appeal that he was wrongly convicted under a section of state law that had been repealed in 1983, and that no other statute replaced it that criminalized the murder for which he was charged. Furthermore, Appellant argued that he was convicted on insufficient evidence at trial, because the trial court excluded his evidence that someone else committed the murder. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellantâs interpretation of the statute in question, finding that âthe apparent purpose of the 1983 enactment of the new section . . . was to make clear that an offense committed in 1982 should be charged and prosecuted according to the laws existing in 1982â and not after the changes were enacted. The Court also found that the evidence presented at Appellantâs trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict against him. The Court affirmed Appellantâs conviction and sentence.