Justia Missouri Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant worked part-time for Design Design from July 2008 until she obtained full-time employment in March 2010. Claimant received $320 in unemployment benefits and $25 in federal stimulus benefits for each of forty-eight weeks from May 2009 to March 2010. After the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission discovered Claimant’s employment with Design Design, the Commission found that Claimant willfully failed to disclose that she was working during the period she was receiving benefits. Therefore, the Commission determined that Claimant must return part of her benefits and pay certain penalties. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, the Commission’s decisions, holding that sufficient competent evidence in the record supported all of the Commission’s actions, except for the amount of one of the penalties. Remanded with instructions to reassess that penalty. View "Coday v. Div. of Employment Sec’y" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against his employer, BNSF Railway Company, for damages related to an injury he sustained while in the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff asserted claims for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). The trial court granted judgment in favor of BNSF. Defendant appealed, asserting three claims of error relating to the trial court’s exclusion of certain evidence at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings challenged by Plaintiff. View "Lozano v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned four separate decisions of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission that determined the Second Injury Fund was liable for compensation to injured claimants. On appeal, the Fund claimed that the Commission misapplied Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.220.1 by combining or "stacking" injuries to meet the statutory thresholds that trigger the Fund's liability and by considering injuries that did not meet the thresholds to calculate the extent of the Fund's liability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission misapplied section 287.220.1 in combining preexisting permanent partial disabilities to meet the thresholds for triggering the Fund's liability; (2) however, three Claimants in these appeals each had an individual preexisting permanent partial disability that met the statutory thresholds to trigger the Fund's liability, and therefore the Commission did not err when it found they were entitled to compensation and awarded an amount based on the combined disability of their preexisting injuries and the last injury; and (3) because the fourth Claimant did not have a preexisting permanent partial disability that met the statutory thresholds, the Commission erred in awarding compensation from the Fund to him. View "State Treasurer as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Witte" on Justia Law

The survivors of Barbara Smith appealed a punitive damage award of $1.5 million against the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. The Smiths contended that certain evidence admitted by the trial court was outside the court of appeals' prior mandate, and erred in overruling their motion for a new trial on the grounds of juror nondisclosure. The company cross-appealed, contending that the Smiths failed to make a submissible case for punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's mandate did not address any issues concerning what evidence could be presented at the retrial of punitive damages, and that the trial court did not err in overruling the Smiths' motion for a new trial or the Company's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Smith vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation" on Justia Law

Veteran filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits alleging that he sustained an injury during the course of his employment with Employer. Veteran received care and treatment for that injury at a United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facility, which Employer did not authorize. The VA petitioned for a writ to compel the chief ALJ to allow the VA's intervention in the proceeding, claiming entitlement to intervene as a matter of right under 38 U.S.C. 1729 and the U.S. Constitution's supremacy clause. The circuit court denied the VA's petition. The Supreme Court reversed and issued a permanent writ of mandamus, holding that section 1729 and the supremacy clause gave the VA the right to intervene in Veteran's workers' compensation claim to assert its claim for recovery of health care provided to him. View "U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs v. Boresi" on Justia Law

Appellants Reva Billings and William Morrison worked at a Western Union Financial Services (Western Union) call center in Bridgeton. On July 3, 2008, Western Union advised Billings that she would be laid off on July 20 and Morrison that he would be laid off on August 7. The U.S. Department of Labor determined the employees were eligible for Trade Act benefits and set the impact date as July 15, 2008. Appellants subsequently applied for their benefits. The Missouri Division of Employment Security denied benefits to both on the grounds that they were separated from employment prior to the impact date, finding the date of separation for Appellants to be July 3, 2008. The Industrial Relations Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission erred in considering Appellants to have ceased work on the date they received their contractually required advance notice of the future dates on which they would be furloughed, as the correct dates were the dates Appellants' furloughs became effective, notwithstanding that Western Union chose not to be physically present at the workplace during the notice period. View "Billings v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law

Employee was terminated from her employment after her driver's license was suspended due to her epilepsy. Employee filed this action against Employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Employee in the amount of $11,250 for compensatory damages. Employee filed a motion for additur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The circuit court sustained Employee's motion and gave the parties thirty days to accept a higher amount of compensatory damages or elect a new trial on these damages only. Employer would not agree to an enhanced compensatory damage award, and the circuit court ordered a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Employee's motion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. View "Badahman v. Catering St. Louis" on Justia Law

Two cities separately appealed judgments entered against each city and in favor of the Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 ordering the public employer to adopt collective bargaining procedures. In a consolidated opinion in the two cases, the Supreme Court held (1) the right to organize and bargain collectively recognized in the Missouri Constitution inherently imposes a duty on each city to bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative elected by its police officers and sergeants with a goal of reaching an agreement; (2) the cities here were not excused from carrying out this duty because the public employees represented by the union were not covered by the procedures codified in the public sector labor law; but (3) nevertheless, because the cities may not be able to meet their duty without establishing a framework, the trial courts erred in ordering them to do so. Furthermore, the Court entered judgment ordering the cities to recognize the union as the collective bargaining unit for the cities' police officers and sergeants and to begin to meet and confer with the union for collective bargaining. View "E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield" on Justia Law

The American Federation of Teachers, its St. Louis affiliate, and individual representatives appealed the trial court's summary judgment declaring that the board of education of the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the individual members of the board had no duty to "meet and confer" or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Mo. Const. art. I, 29 provides that all employees, public and private, have a right to organize and to bargain collectively, it necessarily requires the board to meet and confer with the union, in good faith, with the present intention to reach an agreement. Remanded. View "Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

As a state employee, Laurel Beard was a member of the Missouri State Employees' Retirement System (MOSERS). Beard filed for retirement but died before her annuity start date. Following Beard's death, Plaintiffs, Beard's assigned heirs, requested MOSERS to distribute Beard's retirement benefits to them as Beard's designated beneficiaries. MOSERS' board of trustees determined Plaintiffs were not entitled to retirement or survivor benefits because Beard died prior to her annuity starting date and did not have a surviving spouse or dependent children. Plaintiffs filed suit, seeking review of the MOSERS decision denying benefits. The trial court entered judgment in favor of MOSERS. Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the trial court wrongly interpreted Mo. Rev. Stat. 104.1030 in denying them retirement benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly applied the plain language of section 104.1030; and (2) section 104.1030 is constitutional for vested members of MOSERS who have filed for retirement but die before their annuity start date. View "Beard v. Mo. State Employees' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law